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Abstract 
This dissertation challenges the prevailing periodization of Quebec and Ontario’s 
economic development in Canadian historiography by contrasting the specificity of 
capitalist social relations with the non-capitalist forms of social reproduction belonging 
to French Canadian peasants and Upper Canadian farmers in the colonial period. With a 
few notable exceptions, existing historical interpretations assume that capitalism was 
there, at least in embryo, from the colony’s very beginning in the guise of the fur trade, 
manufacturing, or a local bourgeoisie. By contrast, this thesis brings together, through a 
comparative perspective, different pieces of the interconnected histories of France, 
Britain, the United States, Ontario, and Quebec in order to show that capitalism did not 
arrive on the shores of the St. Lawrence River with the first settlers. The dissertation also 
brings together pieces of the uneven intra-regional histories of these regions, and 
provides a general reflection on how to systematically integrate the geopolitical 
dimension of social change into historical sociology, political economy, and 
comparative politics. As such, the question with which the thesis is concerned is not 
exclusively that of the transition to capitalism in Quebec or in Ontario, but more broadly 
the interrelated questions of state-formation and ‘late development’ in north-eastern 
North America. 
One of the main findings of the dissertation is that only with the development of 
industrial capitalism in the north-eastern United States were the conditions for the 
emergence of capital-intensive types of agriculture in rural areas of Quebec and Ontario 
put in place. American breakthroughs toward industrial capitalism irrevocably 
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transformed the system-wide conditions under which subsequent agricultural evolution 
took place in neighbouring regions, generating a new geopolitical configuration in which 
customary peasant production continued to persist in Quebec alongside petty-commodity 
farmers in Upper Canada and the development of industrial capitalism in urban areas 
such as Montreal. These findings bring to the fore the need to directly address the 
‘peasant question’ in order to understand the impact of the continued existence of a large 
peasantry on state-formation and the long-term economic development of Quebec during 
the period when industrial capitalism was emerging as a dominant feature of the North 
American economy. 
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   À la mémoire d’Eva, décédée alors que la 
rédaction touchait à sa fin. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation takes as its starting point the observation that no macrohistorical 
process has had more consequences for early modern social development than the 
epochal transition from feudalism to capitalism. Uniquely located at the confluence of 
colonial ventures led by the French and British metropolises on territories occupied by 
native communities, the European population that settled on the shores of the St. 
Lawrence River was not spared the disruptive effects of this protracted changeover. The 
specificity of the Canadian experience, however, is still in want of a geopolitically 
sensitive and theoretically-informed historical synthesis that goes beyond the ways in 
which Canadian historiography has traditionally attempted to make sense of capitalist 
geopolitical expansion in North America. 
 
Represented by historians like Fernand Ouellet and Jean Hamelin, the ‘Quebec 
School’ of Canadian historiography attempted to explain the slow development of 
French Canadian society by arguing that the domination of traditional values among the 
peasantry long proved a powerful obstacle to modernization. Revolving around the 
historical research of Guy Frégault, Maurice Séguin and Marcel Brunet, the ‘Montreal 
School’, for its part, tried to explain the slow pace of early modern Canadian 
development by pointing to the catastrophic effects of the British Conquest on French 
Canadian society. In the last few decades, a revisionist account led by Jean-Pierre Wallot 
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and Gilles Paquet has gained popularity. This account denies the existence of ‘delays’ in 
the socioeconomic development of Quebec in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. It 
tries to portray the province during this period as modern and dynamic—allegedly 
similar to any other western society. Meanwhile, debates in political economy have long 
been dominated by Harold A. Innis’s staple theory and its emphasis on Canada’s 
economic dependence upon the trade of natural resources, such as fur, fish, wheat, and 
timber, with the French and British metropolises. This framework continues to have a 
decisive influence on the way that historians, sociologists, and economists consider the 
nature of capitalist development in Canada.  
In contrast to these approaches, this dissertation builds on the thesis of the 
economic historian Robert Brenner regarding the agrarian origin of capitalism to 
examine how capitalism ‘spread’ to the St. Lawrence Valley after it first emerged in the 
English countryside. The development of agrarian capitalism in Quebec and Ontario, the 
dissertation contends, must be analyzed as part of what could be referred to as the 
‘puzzle of capitalist geopolitical expansion’; in other words, it poses the question of how 
to theorize the spatio-temporally differentiated historical origins and expansion of 
capitalism to Canada? Given that no ‘national’ trajectory of development can be 
understood as separate from the interactions and pressures emerging from broader 
intersocietal relations, the failure to directly address the puzzle of capitalist geopolitical 
expansion proves to be a fatal weakness for existing approaches to Canadian economic 
development. For this reason, the argument of the dissertation will interest not only 
historians, sociologists, and political economists, but also scholars of the discipline of 
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International Relations (IR) and comparative politics. 
It must be noted at the outset that the particular focus of the dissertation is on the 
St. Lawrence Valley, where the most fertile land was chosen by the first Europeans to 
establish themselves in villages that have now became major urban centres—Montreal, 
Quebec City, Trois-Rivières. Initiated in the St. Lawrence Valley was a political process 
of European colonization that led to the creation of a Laurentian society whose territory 
today constitutes the largest Canadian province with the second biggest population of 
the country—modern-day Quebec. Colonization gradually expanded westward as 
military considerations and the imperatives of the fur trade brought Europeans deeper 
into the interior of the continent. Following the American War of Independence in the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, a great number of settlers immigrated to the north 
shores of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie to the southwest of the Valley. This territory 
became the province of Ontario with the advent of the Confederation in 1867. Today, it 
is Canada’s most populated province. Together, the St. Lawrence Valley and the north 
shores of Lakes Ontario and Erie long constituted the ecumene of central Canada. They 
still encompass the most inhabited area of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario.  
The choice of the St. Lawrence Valley and the north shores of Lake Ontario and 
Lake Erie as communities to study is not without some methodological difficulties. As 
pointed out by the historian Gérard Bouchard, the French ‘fact’ along the shores of the 
Valley has been closely linked with the Canadian destiny since the nineteenth century 
and its history can consequently hardly be separated from the broader Canadian context. 
This is why the dissertation also ventures into the history of the colonization of modern-
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day Ontario. I have attempted to do so by going beyond a comparative perspective that 
would treat Quebec and Ontario as two separate entities and tried to uncover the 
interactive dimension of their respective development. This does not mean, however, 
that French-Canadian history is to be conceived as merely a segment of a single 
Canadian narrative; rather it is considered in its specificities, as an entity in itself. As 
historian Gérard Bouchard has aptly pointed out, ‘[t]he history of the French-speaking 
community in Quebec and Canada clearly identifies empirically as an object of 
analysis’.1 Bouchard claims that ‘[t]he French/English duality has always been deeply 
anchored, first in its ethnographic dimension (language, religious traditions, customs, 
etc.), then in its behaviour and collective representations (ideologies, national identity, 
memory, political action)’.2 The population living in present-day Quebec still 
perpetuates, among other things, ‘an ideological discourse of emancipation […], a long 
tradition of constitutional and political struggles, a rooting in the Laurentian territory 
[…] and a strong sense of belonging’.3	  
Absent from Bouchard’s inventory are fundamental specificities in the historical 
development of social-property relations in the province. While these relations cannot 
entirely explain the contours of colonial state-formation or economic development in 
Quebec, they are crucial to understand the generative grammar of much that is done in 
terms of forms of appropriation of surplus labour and organization of production in class 
societies. Social-property relations are at the heart of a theoretical framework first put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau Monde (Montreal: Boréal, 2001), 78. (my translation) 
2 Ibid. (my translation) 
3 Ibid., 79. (my translation) 
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forward by Robert Brenner in the 1970s as an alternative to Althusserian Marxist 
orthodoxies. Brenner’s theory aimed to draw our attention to one of the fundamental 
dimensions of the ways by which social classes reproduce themselves, namely the 
relationship of exploitation between direct producers and those that appropriate their 
surplus. At the centre of this relationship is class struggle, through which human beings 
‘make their own history’. But as Marx once famously said, ‘they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the past’.4 With this dissertation, I seek to 
contribute to our collective understanding of this past by focusing on the differentiated 
strategies of reproduction of agricultural producers in early modern Quebec and Ontario. 
In Quebec, agricultural producers were embedded in the complex set of rights 
and obligations associated with the seigneurial regime. By contrast, in Ontario, farmers 
were not politically subjected to another class. Quebec’s peasants were consequently 
non-capitalist in very different ways than Ontario’s farmers. The central argument of my 
thesis is that this difference played an important role in the way agricultural 
communities in both provinces dealt with the emergence of industrial capitalism, first in 
the north-eastern United States, and then in Montreal, given its commercial position. I 
show why, in both provinces, but for different reasons, the widespread creation of a 
capitalist/wage labour relationship in agriculture was impossible. In Ontario, it is the 
scarcity of labour that prevented the generalization of this form of appropriation in 
agriculture. In Quebec, by contrast, it is the seigneurial regime that constituted an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Wildside Press LLC, 2008). 
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obstacle to the creation of a labour-force composed of people who are juridically free, 
but devoid of land. Even as the seigneurial regime was abolished, and as land started to 
become scarce, the abundance of free familial labour acted against the need to hire 
agricultural wage labourers. And yet, agricultural producers in both provinces were 
increasingly, but unevenly, forced to conform to the logic of capitalist production even 
in the absence of wage labour.  
An insightful way to understand the uneven development of capitalism in 
agriculture is to take as starting point the transformation of England’s agrarian class 
structure, which set in motion a historically specific dynamic of social reproduction in 
which the role of the market in society was profoundly transformed. And I mean so not 
just in a definitional sense, but in a very concrete sense, as it implied very real changes 
in the way surplus appropriation was operated when compared to pre-capitalist societies, 
where there existed extra-economic limits to how production could be transformed. In 
England, as production was taken out of the hands of custom, the law, and personal 
domination based on political status, production was ‘freed’, but only to be subjected to 
an impersonal economic drive to produce competitively. The commodification of the 
labour of formally ‘free’ producers by means of wages became a key means of 
revolutionizing production to an extent never before seen in history. But wage labour 
was not the only way by which productivity was improved to serve the ends of constant 
accumulation and profit-maximization. This was also achieved by the introduction of 
new tools, machinery, and technologies, what I refer to as more ‘capital-intensive’ types 
of production. Given the obstacles to the introduction of the capitalist/wage labour 
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relationship in agriculture, it was through such ‘capital-intensive’ investment that 
Quebec’s peasants and Ontario’s farmers faced the challenges presented to them by 
industrialization, although with different timing and different outcomes.  
In the case of Quebec, I insist on the creative role of the Church in shaping these 
different outcomes, for instance, by participating in the emergence of the cooperative 
model that facilitated the modernization of the dairy industry. By comparison, 
neighbouring Upper Canadian farmers, when presented with the fruits of industrial 
capitalism, could much more easily take advantage of the tremendous possibility for 
improving productivity then opened up, since they were not politically subjected to 
another class, nor was production embedded in the complex set of rights and obligations 
that characterized Quebec’s peasant society. In a context of labour scarcity, Upper 
Canadian farmers were quick to seize upon the new possibilities offered by new 
machinery, as testified the rapid adoption of the most up-to-date farm implements 
developed in the United States. Through this process, Ontario’s farmers ended up 
market-dependent much earlier than Quebec’s peasants. They ended up ‘capitalist’, one 
could say, but not in the sense of agrarian capitalism the way it existed in England, nor 
in the sense of industrial capitalism with its distinctive capitalist/wage labourer class 
structure. It is why I prefer to speak of ‘petty-commodity producers’ and ‘capital-
intensive agriculture’ to grasp the specificities of Ontario’s market-dependent 
agricultural production. 
To shed light on this transformation, it is necessary to bring together, through a 
comparative perspective, different pieces of the interconnected histories of France, 
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Britain, the United States, Ontario, and Quebec. It is also necessary to bring together 
pieces of their uneven intra-regional histories, with different developmental trajectories, 
for instance, within the United States itself, between the mid-West and the North-east, 
and also within Quebec, between the countryside and major urban centres, especially 
Montreal. Here Brenner’s theory of social-property relations stands to gain by a general 
reflection on how to systematically integrate the international dimension of social 
change into historical sociology and comparative politics. As such, the question that this 
dissertation is really asking is not exclusively that of the transition to capitalism in 
Quebec, but more broadly the question of ‘late development’ in north-eastern North 
America. 
On this matter, one of the main contributions of the dissertation concerns the 
political economy literature. Looking at how various Western states in the nineteenth 
century attempted to fill technological and economic gaps separating them from earlier 
developers, political economists usually insist on the role of private entrepreneurs, 
banks, and the state. By contrast, my dissertation points to ways in which other 
sociopolitical forces, like the Church, also play an active role in shaping processes of 
late development. While many historical accounts, such as Canadian historian Fernand 
Ouellet’s, see in the Church and the peasantry conservative forces of reaction, my focus 
on open-ended strategies of reproduction, in a context where rural property relations 
were being radically challenged, allowed me to grasp fundamental elements of the 
creative process through which both the Church and the peasantry tried to cope with 
agricultural problems. This dissertation also offers an interesting contribution to 
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comparative politics, as comparativists rarely pay attention to Quebec in their attempts 
to understand the persistance or disapearance of the peasantry during the nineteenth 
century. Yet, a comparative analysis often attracts more attention if it explores a case 
that seems to escape the general rule. Such is the case of Quebec, as the existence of a 
non-capitalist peasantry in the province is unique in contrast with other communities of 
non-capitalist, yet non-peasant, agricultural producers elsewhere in North America.  
It is important to note that the dissertation is not an historical work. While I had 
to constantly take a position on various historical debates at a descriptive level of 
abstraction, I have not sought to contribute to the microsociological knowledge of 
historical events themselves. Rather, through my insistence on distinguishing the 
specific dynamics of capitalism from other kinds of social formations, my contribution 
aims at a macrosociological level which examines the place of Canada within large 
inter-regional processes in the Atlantic world. 
There are, of course, many limitations to any attempt at providing a macro-
sociological synthesis of the scope of my dissertation, with three centuries of history 
covering the territories of two Canadian provinces, and integrating the interconnected 
histories of France, Britain, and the United States. One of these limitations lays in the 
many choices I had to make in order to keep this ambitious project doable. Among the 
objects that I could not discuss in detail was the process of industrialization in Montreal. 
From the beginning, I selected agriculture as my field of research, and I tried to remain 
faithful to this choice for reasons of space and time. This implied, for instance, not 
engaging directly with the literatures of labour studies and industrial relations. I 
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overlooked too, also for considerations of time and space, important moments of 
Canadian political history, such as the birth of the Canadian Confederation. Another 
limitation of my thesis concerns the limited breadth of the literature on which I relied to 
discuss France, Britain, and the United States, all regions of the Atlantic world that were 
not the primary focus of my dissertation.  
The history of Native peoples also deserves much more attention than I was able 
to give it in the dissertation. As one reads this dissertation it should be kept in mind that 
both the displacement of large numbers of people as a result of European colonialism in 
North America and the insistent reality of Native peoples’ local agency are at the heart 
of the geopolitical processes of state-formation and economic development I sought to 
describe, even though the primary focus of my research is the population of white 
settlers that established themselves on the shores of the St. Lawrence River and the 
Great Lakes. French Canadians were ‘colonizers’, and I mean it in the full sense of the 
term—not only a group of settlers in a place, but a group that established political 
control over it. This is a sharp truth often obscured by a nationalist historiography that 
tends to forget that if New France was conquered by the British, French Canadians were 
themselves the agent of a colonial project that paved the way for the displacement, 
dislocation, and devastation of Native peoples. Recovering the imperial occupation and 
domination of Quebec’s and Ontario’s indigenous space remains an urgent task for 
Canadian historians. 
The basis for the first relations between Native peoples and the French—the fur 
trade—is discussed in Chapter 1 as part of a broader discussion of merchant capital and 
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capitalism. This chapter provides a discussion of the general theoretical outlook of 
Canadian historiography and political economy with regard to pre-Confederate Canadian 
economic development. It does not aim to be comprehensive in breadth, nor exhaustive 
in depth; the historical reinterpretation of the transition to capitalism in Canada 
undertaken in subsequent chapters will provide the opportunity to discuss in greater 
detail many of the theoretical arguments then introduced. Chapter 1 simply attempts to 
direct our attention to a pitfall shared by the majority of historiographical and economic 
interpretations of capitalism in Canada: the reproduction of the premises of Adam 
Smith’s model of economic advance—the ‘commercialization model’—and its 
commodity fetishism. The teleological and unilinear view of development underpinning 
this model posits as the main mover of history the quantitative expansion of international 
trade and exchange relations. Accordingly, the existing research on Canadian economic 
development has tended to associate capitalism with the pan-European rise of the 
bourgeoisie and the development of urban areas, rather than theorizing it as a 
historically-specific set of social relations that first developed in the English countryside 
before transforming the international environment constituted of multiple and interactive 
developmental paths.   
Chapter 1 concludes by devoting special attention to Gérald Bernier and Daniel 
Salée’s study of the pre-capitalist structure of early modern Quebec. Bernier and Salée 
have brought forward an impressive array of evidence supporting the claim that pre-
capitalist social relations dominated the life in the St. Lawrence Valley up until at least 
the mid-nineteenth century. However, despite its important merits and rich contribrution, 
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Bernier and Salée’s work is limited by the explicit adoption of an internalist mode of 
explanation that focuses on domestic class struggles and social relations, but brushes 
aside the international dimension of early modern Canadian development. Indeed, 
Bernier and Salée have argued that, in Quebec, capitalism slowly emerged out of the 
breaking up of the feudal mode of production through the action of feudal society itself, 
as was the case in England. In doing so, they downplay the international socioeconomic 
and geopolitical pressures created by early modern English capitalism and the crucial 
agency of British colonial rulers and settlers in introducing capitalist social relations in 
North America. This appears to be the result of a fetishization of Brenner’s explanation 
of the origin of capitalism in England, as if it provided a model for explaining the 
subsequent development of capitalism elsewhere in the world.  
In order to begin uncovering the geopolitical and intersocietal processes 
dismissed by Bernier and Salée as punctual ‘exogenous influences’ and conjunctures, 
Chapter 2 turns its attention to the historiographical debate concerning the nature of the 
seigneurial regime in New France. It examines the question of whether the society of 
New France was ‘feudal’ and reviews Roberta Hamilton’s insights about the impact of 
the differentiated character of the agrarian developmental trajectories of France and 
England on the process of the colonization of North America. Like Salée and Bernier, 
Hamilton is one of the rare Canadian historians to have explicitly attempted to overcome 
the weaknesses of what Brenner has called the ‘commercialization model’. Arguing 
against historical interpretations that see capitalism ‘budding’ everywhere traces of trade 
and commerce are to be found, Hamilton has rightly insisted on the absence of capitalist 
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social relations in the colony under the French regime.  
However, while comparing France and New France in order to assess the feudal 
character of the latter, Hamilton fails to take into account the fact that the French state 
had long undergone a radical transformation away from feudalism toward absolutism. 
Building on the contributions of George Comninel and Benno Teschke, Chapter 2 offers 
a new understanding of the pre-capitalist forms of exploitation that characterized social-
property relations in New France. Through the intricacy of the politics and economics of 
the mercantilist policies that had brought France to the New World, a unique social-
property regime, no more akin to French feudalism than to early modern French 
absolutism, and yet decisively in the orbit of the latter, developed on the shores of the St. 
Lawrence. After two centuries of existence, this colonial regime experienced a profound 
upheaval as the British Conquest in 1760 separated it from the European metropolis that 
had provided it with an absolutist colonial administration and imprinted a particular 
dynamic upon its social reproduction.  
Pursuing my inquiry into the geopolitical and intersocietal processes through 
which the Laurentian colonial society was constituted, Chapter 3 deals with one of the 
most dramatic events in the history of the colony: the British Conquest. In order to do 
so, it recasts the event itself within the broader framework of geopolitical rivalries and 
mercantilist trade wars that characterized early modern international relations between 
capitalist Britain and continental absolutist states. I contend that this broader framework 
allows us to shed a new light on one of the most central issues ever debated by Canadian 
political scientists and historians, that is, what were the socioeconomic consequences of 
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the British Conquest? On this matter, Chapter 3 argues that if the Conquest did not 
decapitate a grande bourgeoisie capitaliste—such a bourgeoisie did not exist—it did 
close the doors of the most lucrative offices within the state to French Canadians. This is 
an important fact given the primary importance of the state as a means of private 
appropriation for the colonial ruling class. Meanwhile, military concerns and the need to 
control the French Canadian population in a geopolitical context characterized by 
growing dissent in the Thirteen American colonies led the British authorities to preserve 
the seigneurial regime and reassert the local privileges of the seigneurs and the clergy. 
Excluded from the state but still enjoying local powers, the seigneurs and clergy 
redoubled their efforts in exploiting the French Canadian peasantry. The chapter then 
highlights the obstacles to agricultural innovation placed in way of the French Canadian 
rural population by the incentives and restrictions that the seigneurial regime imposed on 
strategic decisions made by economic actors, and how this led to an agricultural crisis 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Chapter 4 deepens our understanding of the consequences of the decision of the 
British authorities to preserve the seigneurial regime in the St. Lawrence Valley by 
exploring the implications of Lower Canada’s agricultural crisis for the development of 
the neighbouring province of Upper Canada (modern-day Ontario). Attention is paid to 
the structure of class relations that developed with Upper Canada’s formation following 
the Constitutional Act of 1791, which introduced the freehold tenure in the new province 
of Upper Canada, as well as in areas outside of the seigneurial regime within Lower 
Canada. Examining the strategies of reproduction of the ruling class and the formation 
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of the colonial ‘land/office state’, the chapter concludes that while the introduction of 
the freehold tenure in Upper Canada meant that there would be no socio-legal obstacles 
to the eventual development of capitalism, in itself the freehold tenure did not 
automatically generate capitalism. A broader transformation of system-wide conditions 
and structural opportunities was required before the majority of Upper Canadian farmers 
would undertake a shift toward a more capital-intensive form of agriculture.  
The examination of the conditions under which the emergence of essentially 
capitalist farming in Upper Canada became possible is the object of Chapter 5. The 
chapter begins with an exploration of the work of Charles Post on the origins of 
capitalism in the United States and a conceptual clarification of the differences between 
independent household producers and petty-commodity producers. It then describes the 
working of the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes commercial system and how the strategies of 
the merchant communities contributed to integrate Upper Canada into a broader 
economic regional reality increasingly transformed by the development of industrial 
capitalism in the northeastern United States. It is argued that while the development of 
capitalism there resulted from the threat of dispossession that loomed over farmers in the 
aftermath of the American Revolution, no such threat was required for Upper Canadian 
farmers to engage in capital-intensive types of farming.  
Finally, Chapter 6 identifies the social conditions under which the development 
of capital-intensive types of agriculture was initiated in the French Canadian 
countryside. It shows the persistence of pre-capitalist social relations well into the 
second half of the nineteenth century and emphasizes the class conflicts that shaped, and 
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were shaped, by these social relations. Changes in the province’s balance of class forces 
intersected with the development of industrial capitalism in urban centres of the 
province and of New England in ways that spawned unique problems to be dealt with by 
the state, the Catholic clergy, and the peasantry. A creative process of adaptation and 
resistance to market imperatives ensued. It resulted in a unique combination of the ‘old’ 
and the ‘new’, the drawing together of pre-capitalist and capitalist social relations, in the 
form of the cooperative movement in the dairy industry. 
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1. 
Capitalism beyond the European Heartland 
 
 
A crucial feature of the contemporary era is that the geopolitical expansion of capitalism 
across the whole planet is almost complete. Political scientist Ellen Wood has argued 
that this change is best characterized as the process of the universalization of capitalist 
social relations within the multi-state system. Indeed, the twentieth century has seen the 
totalizing process of capitalism make colossal advances in geographical areas where 
other forms of social and economic organization prevailed. As capitalism has expanded 
geographically, it has also extended into areas of social life, from health care and water 
to intellectual property, that were previously unaffected (or only partially affected) by its 
imperatives of competition, profit maximization, commodification, and accumulation.   
This process emerged in early modern Europe, with the commodification of land, 
money and labour-power, and deepened in the following centuries, as the control of 
capital over both the workplace and daily life intensified. The creation of the Bretton 
Woods institutions in the aftermath of the Second World War went a long way toward 
claiming new areas for capitalist imperatives and lowering barriers to international trade 
between North America, Western Europe and Japan (the so-called ‘triad’). The 
reorganization of the global financial system according to the dictates of neo-classical 
economics has, since the 1970s, further deepened the international liberalization of trade 
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and opened new spheres of social life to commodification. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union, little more than two decades ago, has also been a key factor in the transformation 
of the bulk of social relations beyond the confines of the economic triad.  
Capitalism has certainly travelled a long way since its inception in the early 
modern epoch. It is little wonder that scholarly debates on the epochal transition from 
feudalism to capitalism have spilled so much ink over the issue: no macrohistorical 
process has had a more profound impact on both the social and international structures 
of modernity. Unfortunately, most attempts at theorizing this transition have relied on 
Adam Smith’s model of economic advance—the ‘commercialization model’—to explain 
how capitalism emerged in early modern Europe and went on to spread worldwide. 
Within this framework, capitalism’s initial ‘take-off’ of self-sustained growth is 
theorized as the outcome of a pan-European phenomenon associated with the 
quantitative expansion of markets and urban areas. Similarly, the social diffusion of 
capitalism, once it had developed in Europe, is seen as a market-driven phenomenon that 
takes ‘the form of a lava flow evaporating and liquefying the sediments of tradition 
standing in its path’. This chapter presents Robert Brenner and Ellen Wood’s critique of 
the commercialization model before turning to their alternative account of the 
emergence of agrarian capitalism in the English countryside. It then asks important 
questions about how to understand the diffusion of capitalism beyond Europe and 
explores some of the methodological challenges associated with attempts at grappling 
with the international dimension of social change. 	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The Commercialization Model 
Brenner and Wood have criticized this model for its individualistic and 
mechanistic presuppositions, which claim that economic development goes hand-in-
hand with the opportunities engendered by the growth of the world market. In the 
commercialization model, what is considered normal development is assessed against 
ethnocentric criteria deduced from a reductionist historical narrative of the rise of 
modern Europe. This model is based on a unilinear concept of social progress that sees 
the development of productive forces—along with greater specialization and division of 
labour—as the outcome of naturally expanding markets. In return, the development of 
productive forces more or less mechanically determines the social relations of class and 
property, as well as the form of the state. According to Wood, this theory of history 
implies one generic model of development that associates capitalism with cities, and 
capitalists with bourgeoisie; it assumes ‘that cities are from the beginning capitalism in 
embryo’.5 As an account of how and in what circumstances capitalism developed, the 
commercialization model leaves unexplained the very thing that requires elucidation: its 
origin. In fact, the commercialization model presumes capitalism ‘always to be there, 
somewhere’.6 The model takes for granted the existence of a natural drive toward the 
expansion of commercial activities and urban economies, yet one that is delayed until it 
is released from its feudal, and typically political, fetters.  
 Because the commercialization model leaves unexplained the origin of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London; New York: Verso, 2002), 13. 
6 Ibid., 4. 
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capitalism, any elaboration of its geographical diffusion rests on shaky historical and 
theoretical foundations. Historically, the way in which the specific origin of capitalism 
in the English countryside generated economic and geopolitical pressures on the 
European continent and the rest of the world is lost in the description of the worldwide 
growth of commercial exchanges. Yet, the historical diversity of relations and 
permutations that have characterized the contested construction of distinct ‘geo-
economic’ regimes fundamentally contradicts the single and linear narrative of the pan-
European rise of the bourgeoisie and the quantitative extension of trade networks. In the 
case of the New World, for instance, ‘different outcomes in the struggle over peasant 
land tenure’ in the metropolises had important implications ‘for the history of French 
and English colonization in America’.7 
The commercialization model’s theorization of the geopolitical spread of 
capitalism remains locked within a binary opposition of trade and feudalism that 
assumes feudal property to have been the fetter on capitalist tendencies that existed prior 
to the transformation of social relations. Capitalism, in this view, is simply conceived as 
a set of commercial practices, rather than ‘a regional sociopolitical transformation and 
the concomitant construction of new forms of economic and political subjectivity that 
would create consequences of world-historical relevance’.8 As such, the 
commercialization model ignores one of Marx’s main contributions to understanding a 
qualitative distinction of the modern world: ‘[i]n themselves, money and commodities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Roberta Hamilton, Feudal Society and Colonization: The Historiography of New France (Gananoque: 
Langdale Press, 1988), 58. 
8 Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher, “The Changing ‘Logics’ of Capitalist Competition,” Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 20 (2007): 569. 
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are no more capital than the means of production and subsistence are. They need to be 
transformed into capital’.9 It is the general contention of this dissertation that the 
reaffirmation and destruction of old social-property relations outside Europe, once 
capitalism had first developed in England, were complex processes that went far beyond 
mere changes in commodity exchanges or trade relations. 
This is no denial that Marx’s early writings were significantly influenced by 
Adam Smith’s teleological and stagist theory of history: Marx perceived as ineluctable 
the universal transformation of old social relations of production into capitalist ones 
under the aegis of the bourgeoisie—a transformation that he thought would everywhere 
pass through the same ‘stages’ as those experienced in Western Europe. As George 
Comninel has pointed out, however, what most observers fail to note is that Marx 
eventually broke away from Smith’s assumptions about the technically-determined 
evolution of the labour process, in order to theorize modes of production as sets of 
social-property relations.10  
For the mature Marx, the effect of trade on non-capitalist societies was an open-
ended affair, which varies according to the nature of pre-existing social relations: ‘what 
comes out of this process of dissolution, i.e. what new mode of production arises in 
place of the old, does not depend on trade, but rather on the character of the old mode of 
production itself’.11 Capitalism’s development in the modern world, in fact, was ‘itself 
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10 Rethinking the French Revolution: Marxism and the Revisionist Challenge (London; New York: Verso, 
1987). 
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conditioned by quite other circumstances than the development of commercial capital’.12 
The same applies to urban development, which had little to do with the growth of trade 
in history.13 To understand these processes, I argue, one must look to the shape and 
content of social-property relations, which unquestionably develop along with the non-
determined, yet non-contingent, conflictual reproduction of class, gender and race. In the 
early modern world, this is an open-ended and highly politicized process occurring 
within a world divided into multiple and interacting polities. 
 
The Agrarian Origin of Capitalism 
According to Brenner, Marx aimed at explaining so-called primitive 
accumulation—the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith—as ‘the series of social 
processes by which the fundamental social-property relations that constituted the feudal 
mode of production were broken up and transformed through the action of feudal society 
itself’, as lords ‘lost their capacity to take a rent by extra-economic compulsion and the 
peasants were separated from their possession of the means of subsistence’.14 This 
process, Wood emphasizes, had little to do with the breaking-up of obstacles to 
development by the growth of commerce in cities and urban areas, for ‘even communal 
constraints, with or without the material limits of peasant property, are not enough to 
account for the absence of systematic development of productive forces of the kind we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 450. 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Bourgeois Revolution and Transition to Capitalism,” in The First Modern Society: Essays in English 
History in Honour of Lawrence Stone, ed. A. L. Beier, David Cannadine, and James Rosenheim 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 273. 
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associate with capitalism. In fact, it is, on the whole, a mistake to think in terms of 
blockages’.15  
It is, instead, the creation of ‘a positive compulsion’ to alter productive processes 
that must be accounted for, as changes in social-property relations generated competitive 
conditions for peasants and tenant farmers who found themselves ‘both free to move in 
response to those conditions and obliged to do so’.16 While markets have almost always 
provided opportunities for trade exchanges, only in capitalism do they become 
obligations. Such a change in social-property relations first historically occurred in 
England through the expropriation of the peasantry from the land and the concomitant 
obligation for tenant farmers to make ever-growing profits in order to maintain access to 
the land through the commercial lease market, at the same time as English lords were 
losing their capacity to extract rent by extra-economic compulsion.17 The result of this 
epoch-making process was a generalized tendency toward the improvement of 
agricultural labour productivity associated with ‘the presence throughout the economy of 
a systematic, continuous and quasi-universal drive on the part of the individual direct 
producers to cut costs in aid of maximizing profitability via increasing efficiency and the 
movement of means of production from line to line in response to price signals’.18  
Such a systemic tendency toward improvement is made possible ‘only when the 
individual direct producers are not only free and have the opportunity, but also are 	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18 Robert Brenner, “The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism,” Journal of Agrarian Change 1, 
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compelled in their own interest, to maximize the gains from trade through specialization, 
accumulation and innovation, as well as the reallocation of the means of production 
among industries in response to changing demand’.19 Capitalism, therefore, cannot be 
reduced to production for the market, which throughout history has always been entirely 
compatible with pre-capitalist systems, even if, in these systems, ‘it is either unnecessary 
or impossible, or both, to reinvest in expanded improved production in order to profit’.20 
Nascent capitalism did not only imply the market-dependence of wage labourers, but 
also of landlords and capitalist tenant farmers, forced to improve the means of 
production to face competition. Without historical precedent, capitalist social 
domination subjects all classes to an abstract and impersonal, yet ‘objective’, 
dependency, which consists of ‘social relations which have become independent and 
now enter into opposition to the seemingly independent individuals; i.e., the reciprocal 
relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals’.21  
The emergence of this historically specific form of social domination was an 
unintended result of struggles between feudal lords and peasants over rents. Neither of 
these classes were fully aware of the consequences of their actions as they struggled to 
reproduce themselves on the basis of strategies that might appear ‘irrational’ to us but 
were actually quite rational in the feudal context. Within feudal society, specialization 
was considered a sub-optimal and highly risky venture from the viewpoint of the 	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Left Review 104, no. 1 (1977): 32. 
21 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Harmondsworth: Vintage 
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peasantry. Specialization meant subjecting oneself to market-dependency and 
jeopardizing the very conditions of one’s subsistence, the price to pay in the case of 
‘business failure’ being nothing short of starvation. This makes what Brenner calls 
‘safety-first’ diversified subsistence agriculture the best strategy in a context in which 
subsistence crises were both common and unpredictable, often lasting several years.22	  
Furthermore, specialization would have undermined the very cultural basis of 
both peasant communities and landlords’ social reproduction. The need to ensure a 
measure of security in infirmity and old age tended to generate a desire to have many 
children, resulting in the subdivision of holdings and early marriages, practices that all 
directly go against the requirements for profit maximization that went with 
specialization.23 Inversely, the absence of a market of free tenants or wage labourers that 
could be subjected to economic exploitation rendered politico-military strategies of 
accumulation the most favourable to landlords. Direct force was needed, not only to 
overcome potential resistance from the peasantry when its surpluses were appropriated 
through coercion, but also to defend one’s demesne in the face of other lords’ appetite 
for conquest and plunder. 	  
As a consequence, it was more logical for lords to systematically invest in the 
acquisition of luxury goods (to keep up their noble standing) and military equipment (to 
cope with intra-lord and lord-peasant rivalries) than to invest in the means of production. 
Meanwhile, lords were not able to force peasants to improve the productivity of their 
lands, for the latter were in general able to remain in possession of their means of 	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subsistence. Increased production did not, consequently, directly benefit the lord. Under 
feudalism, the ‘open-field systems’ of production benefitted from intensive labour. As 
Comninel has argued, this, concomitantly, resulted in a structural pressure towards 
higher population which, in turn, profited to the lords because many fines and dues were 
paid by individuals, not families.24 This demographic bias is evident in the rapid, and 
unprecedented, growth of population during the feudal era, amounting to something like 
a three- to four-fold increase in just two centuries.25 Because the open-field systems did 
not allow for innovation in production, there was no basis for lords to engage in 
investment in means of production and, with the exception of England, the end result 
was that ‘definite society-wide (non-capitalist) development patterns’ led to ‘economic 
(non-) development in medieval and (most of) early modern Europe’.26 	  
It must be stated here that the merchant class not only faced the same difficulties 
as the lords in improving the means of production on the land, but also faced barriers 
imposed by guilds in towns. Therefore, they could best make their profits through 
pursuing trade activities revolving around the age-old principle of ‘buying cheap and 
selling dear’, rather than through the investment in and reorganization of production. To 
prevent overtrading and the reduction in profits this would bring, merchants had to 
secure the control of entry to markets, something that could be done only via political 
assistance, i.e. via alliances with the monarchy and/or the lordly class.27 This reflects the 
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fact that, in pre-capitalist societies, the appropriation of labour surplus was overtly 
performed on the basis of ‘extra-economic’ powers, that is, powers drawn from inter 
alia, customs, cultural traditions, legal and political privileges, or the use of violence. 
 
The Transition Debate in the Canadian Historiography 
The research program put forward by Brenner, Wood, and Comninel during the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s focused on elucidating the transition to capitalism in France 
and England—the European heartland.28 One of its main outcomes was the 
identification of fundamental differences in the respective development of the two 
countries, with non-capitalist social relations long continuing to condition the strategies 
of social reproduction of social classes in France, at the same time as capitalism was 
consolidated in England. With the work of Hannes Lacher, Benno Teschke, and 
Frédérick-Guillaume Dufour, a subsequent generation of researchers sought to draw 
conclusions from Brenner, Wood, and Comninel’s theses for understanding international 
relations. While the initial focus of this second wave still remained largely on France 
and England during the medieval and early modern epoch, more recent research has 
shown a growing interest in processes of agrarian change and industrialization during 
the nineteenth century. 
 Regarding Canadian and Québécois historiography, the research of Gérald 	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Bernier and Daniel Salée in the early 1990s has gone a long way to opening new 
avenues to understand the transition to capitalism in nineteenth century’s Quebec. 
Indeed, they have provided a remarkable collection of facts which point resolutely 
toward the pre-capitalist character of Quebec up until at least the mid-nineteenth 
century, and argued that pre-capitalist social practices left their impression on Canadian 
society long after the abolition of the seigneuries. With their focus on social-property 
relations and the adoption of a periodization of capitalism informed by Brenner’s thesis, 
Bernier and Salée have avoided several pitfalls of traditional historiography.  
 More specifically, they have broken away from the presupposition that Canada 
has been a ‘capitalist’ society since the early settlements of New France, a claim that 
rests on the theoretical premises of the commercialization model. As it has tended to 
take for granted the idea that capitalism emerged almost simultaneously across the 
whole of Europe and its colonies over the course of five centuries of market expansion 
and the rise of the mercantile bourgeoisie, Canadian historiography has assumed that 
European colonies in North America were themselves capitalist from their foundation. 
The work of three historians of the University of Montreal stands as a case in point. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, Guy Frégault, Marcel Brunet, and Maurice Séguin, known as the 
‘Montreal School’, sought to explain Lower Canada’s long-standing ‘backwardness’ by 
reference to the British Conquest. In order to do so, they depicted New France as a 
dynamic commercial and industrial society. According to these historians, New France 
was a burgeoning capitalist society, which had developed, until the British Conquest in 
1760, as ‘any normal society of the period in North America […]. [It] was dynamic and 
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progressive. It was a society of the New World that enjoyed fully its collective liberty’.29 	  
French Canadian historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
portrayed New France as a society of peasants. In sharp contrast, the Montreal School 
put forward the thesis that the commitment of French Canadians to agriculture arose 
only under British rule, as a direct result of the Conquest. Seen as a catastrophic 
watershed in Quebec’s history, the Conquest ‘decapitated’ the French Canadian 
bourgeoisie, as French cadres and wealthy merchants were forced to, or chose to, go 
back to France. Those who remained were compelled to abandon trading and 
manufacturing activities, monopolized by English merchants. With the exception of a 
minority of men eager to serve the new rulers, French Canadians were largely excluded 
from councils and other positions of authority, as well as networks of favouritism. As a 
result, Quebec’s development was diverted from a ‘normal’ path of commercial 
expansion, urbanization, and industrialization and forced back upon agriculture.	  
An illustrative example of this position is Frégault’s attempt at depicting the 
economy of New France in the two decades preceding the Seven Years’ War as a 
booming case of capitalist development. His work is replete with attempts to prove that 
during this period ‘industry expanded more than agriculture’.30 Pointing out the 
importance of the fur trade for the economy, the presence of naval construction in the 
shipyards of Quebec, and the ironwork made at the St. Maurice Forge in Trois-Rivières, 
Frégault concluded—in a statement that few historians today would endorse—that ‘in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Michel Brunet, La présence anglaise et les Canadiens: études sur l’histoire et la pensée des deux 
Canadas (Montréal: Beauchemin, 1964), 114. (my translation) 
30 Canadian Society in the French Regime (Montréal: The Canadian Historical Association, 1954), 11. 
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times of peace as in times of war, in prosperity as in depression, one factor dominated 
the economic life as well as political, namely, big business’.31 Frégault has overstated 
the importance of manufacturing activities while overlooking the importance of 
agriculture. The fact is that manufacturing activities in New France were greatly 
underdeveloped in comparison with those of New England. Even the St. Maurice Forge, 
the only establishment of its kind in New France, was not profitable—riddled with debts, 
it was taken over in 1741 by the government. As for the fur trade, French traders had an 
increasingly hard time competing with the fur trade of their English neighbours in the 
few decades preceding the British Conquest.32  
The slow pace of socioeconomic development in New France as compared to its 
American neighbour is made even more evident when demographics are taken into 
account. The French state had only the most limited capacities to provide the colony 
with immigrants. Both France and England began their colonial ventures in North 
America at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Both waited until the first decade of 
the seventeenth century to found sustainable settlements—the French at Saint-Croix 
Island, in 1604, and the British in Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607. The respective 
populations of the French and English colonies in North America, however, soon 
showed tremendous disparities. At the time of the Conquest, a century and a half later, 
the population of New France was barely 70,000 inhabitants, compared to a million and 
a half in the British American colonies, where industries were also developing at a much 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 12. 
32 Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered (Montréal; Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985); Louise Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-
Century Montreal (Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1993). 
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more rapid pace.33 	  	  
Fur Trade, Merchant Capital and Capitalist Production 
Faced with this evidence, a number of historians have abandoned the idea of 
depicting New France as a booming capitalist society. Yet, even as the ‘backwardness’ 
of New France’s development when compared with its American neighbour is taken 
seriously into account, the tendency is still to depict New France as a colony in which 
capitalism did exist, albeit in a fettered form. This is the case, for instance, of Fernand 
Ouellet’s ‘culturalist’ approach. A problematic association between the fur trade and 
capitalism is found in Ouellet’s work, even if the historian insists more than many others 
on the delay of Quebec’s development and the economic inferiority of French 
Canadians. Ouellet has maintained that the fur trade was ‘of a capitalist type’ and 
chastised the French traders for their lack of a capitalistic outlook in managing the 
business. Such a proposition is problematic, for the fur trade, as Hamilton has pointed 
out, 
 
dealt only with the circulation of commodities. It did not influence or penetrate 
the process of production itself. Indeed, that kind of activity, which took 
advantage of national and regional price differences to secure a profit, had been 
an aspect of feudal societies for centuries. Ouellet’s apparent equation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1967, vol. 1 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), 20; Kenneth 
McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Développement et modernisation du Québec (Montréal: Boréal, 1983), 38. 
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capitalism and profit-making led to a failure to distinguish between the economic 
systems of France and England as they were unfolding in the seventeenth 
century.34 
 
An important distinction to be aware of in dealing with the bourgeoisie has been 
highlighted by Marx, who demonstrated that merchant wealth, whether in the form of 
commercial capital or of money-dealing capital, differs fundamentally from capital as 
we find it within the specific capitalist mode of production. The challenge taken up by 
Marx was precisely to identify the historical specificities of the latter against economists 
who interpreted every commercial activity, in any society since the beginning of time, as 
a form of capitalist activity. As such, the special form of capitalist production was, in 
Marx’s words, ‘poles apart’ from merchant capital.35 According to him, the difficulty 
that economists have in grasping the distinction between the two is largely due to their 
‘inability to explain commercial profit and its characteristic features’.36 
In the movement of commercial capital, ‘the merchant’s profit is firstly made [...] 
simply within the process of circulation, i.e. the two acts of purchase and sale. […] “Buy 
cheap and sell dear” is the law of commerce, not the exchange of equivalents. […] 
Commercial capital, in the first instance, is simply the mediating movement between 
extremes it does not dominate and preconditions it does not create’.37 It is otherwise in 
the capitalist mode of production, which implies a ‘reversal’ in the way trade and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Feudal Society and Colonization, 24. 
35 Marx, Capital: Volume 3: A Critique of Political Economy, 440. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 447. 
	   33	  	  	  	  
industry interact together: capitalism appropriates unpaid labour ‘in the course of the 
actual process of production’.38 Because capitalism appropriates surplus-value in the 
actual process of production, its tendency is to take over the production process, 
subordinating it to its imperatives and revolutionizing its technological components. 
This is the process of the real subsumption of production under capital, by which ‘capital 
takes command of production itself and gives it a completely altered and specific 
form’.39  
As Michael Zmolek has explained, the real subsumption of production under 
capital ‘entails specialized production for exchange on a competitive basis, which 
presupposes market dependence and a system of consistently seeking ways of reducing 
the price/cost ratio of output, which in turn requires further specialization, accumulation 
of surpluses, and innovation, or the adoption of the best available production 
techniques’.40 On this matter, an important distinction has been sketched out by Ellen 
Wood between price-sensitive producers and cost-sensitive ones. Only the latter are 
forced to improve ‘labour productivity at lower cost, especially by transforming the 
methods of production, in a competitive market with many producers’.41 The case of the 
Low Countries is particularly telling in this regard. Examining the conditions in which 
the Low Countries’ direct producers engaged with the market in order to obtain basic 
necessities in a way that did not subject them to the relentless and systematic 
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41 Wood, “The Question of Market Dependence,” 57. 
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development of the productive forces, Wood concluded on the need to establish the 
differentia specifica of capitalism beyond the producers’ dependence upon the market 
for the basic components of their survival and the commercial production of 
commodities. Briefly summed up, her argument is that as long as access to the factors of 
production is not dependent upon the market, the need to engage in commercial 
agriculture to obtain food supplies through the market is not sufficient to set in motion a 
capitalist logic of development with its characteristic ethos of ‘improvement’.42 This 
argument follows closely the logic behind Marx’s observation about the forces 
underlying the need of the producer to increase labour productivity and lower costs.  
As political economist Moishe Postone has pointed out in his reinterpretation of 
Marx’s analytical categories, the capitalist drive toward the relentless and systematic 
development of the productive forces is due to an abstract logic of social domination 
which imposes the real constraint of unbridled productivity on producers.43 It is possible 
to sort out the nature of this directional dynamic by insisting on the historical meaning of 
the analytical categories of ‘value’ and ‘labour’ as they are used in the Grundrisse and 
Capital: as Postone has explained, ‘value’ does not refer to any form of material wealth, 
and ‘labour’ does not refer to any productive activity mediating between humans and 
nature. They are historically specific categories that acquire a unique ‘double dimension’ 
in capitalism, which includes both a use value and an exchange value, to which 
correspond concrete labour and abstract labour. On the one hand, the use value produced 
by concrete labour consists in this property that objects have to satisfy human needs. On 	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43 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 312. 
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the other hand, the exchange value is constituted by abstract human labour by virtue of 
the fact that objects produced from the labour of one producer are ‘the means by which 
goods produced by others are acquired’;44 ‘regardless of its specific content, the labour 
therefore serves the producer’ as a means to acquire the property of others.45 Labour is 
thus the only element common to all goods, which causes it to play the role of ‘general 
social mediation’ in capitalist societies.46  
By ‘general social mediation’, Postone seeks to account for the fact that, in the 
process of capitalist production, the law of value ensures that each particular job must 
meet the requirements of productivity of all the other particular jobs. In other words, the 
socially necessary labour time for the production of a good, that is to say, abstract labour 
(and not, for example, the direct rule of the seigneur in New France), conditions the 
labour of each producer according to the labour of others. In turn, these other labours are 
themselves simultaneously conditioned by the labour of the first, and from this 
relationship between the labours of each producer unfolds the dynamic that give to 
capitalist production its specificity. This dynamic is unique in that the increase in the 
number of goods produced is usually accompanied by a decrease of the value contained 
in each product. This occurs as soon as the improvement of productivity, which in the 
first place resulted in a greater production of goods in a particular unit of production, is 
generalized to the entire sector. The increase in productivity therefore generates greater 
value creation per time unit only during the short period when a producer retains a 
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competitive advantage over the others.47 When other producers adopt the same 
technologies or develop methods that generate a similar increase in productivity, the 
socially necessary labour time to produce a good falls. To maintain the same level of 
value creation per time unit, producers must therefore constantly boost the means of 
production and increase productivity at a breakneck pace. Value, therefore, is ‘a form of 
wealth whose specificity is linked to its temporal determination’.48 
Prior to the historical subsumption of production under capital, accumulation of 
wealth was accomplished directly through merchant wealth without control of 
productive processes, which largely remained, as Marx explained, ‘the production of the 
producer’s means of subsistence’.49 Only when direct producers were dispossessed of 
their means of subsistence did capital acquire its ‘modern meaning’50, becoming ‘capital 
as capital’51, ‘capital proper’52, ‘capital as such’53, the ‘genuine’ capitalist mode of 
production54, a ‘specific’ and ‘particular’ mode of production. Economists have always 
confused the two, failing to note that money and commodities ‘become translated into 
capital only in certain specific circumstances and their owners likewise become 
capitalists only when these circumstances obtain’.55 The elementary forms of capital, or 
capital in general, should not be confused with ‘capital as such’.56 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Moishe Postone, “Critique and Historical Transformation,” Historical Materialism 12, no. 3 (2004): 59. 
48 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 123. 
49 Marx, Capital: Volume 3: A Critique of Political Economy, 444. 
50 Ibid., fn444. 
51 Ibid., 445. 
52 Marx, Capital, 1030. 
53 Ibid., 975. 
54 Marx, Capital: Volume 3: A Critique of Political Economy, 452. 
55 Marx, Capital, 975. 
56 It is in an attempt to make this distinction clear, while breaking away from teleological interpretations of 
	   37	  	  	  	  
The dynamics of investment and re-investment of the Canadian fur trade 
correspond in all aspects to the dynamics of merchant wealth, rather than to the 
dynamics of the capitalist mode of production. Military officers, French Canadian 
habitants and metropolitan merchants engaged in the trade directly relied on the 
construction of military forts to access the resource and make an income from it. 
Settlements in the region to the west of Montreal were for long restricted, not only 
because of their vulnerability to attacks by Iroquois, but also because the location would 
have allowed the settlers to illegally compete in the fur trade.57 There, as in the greater 
part of New France outside the St. Lawrence Valley, only forts and trading posts were to 
be found.58 The making of alliances with Native peoples was also a necessary condition 
to access the resource. These alliances were not purely economic, but also political, 
military and cultural. Great efforts were put by Frenchmen to maintain Native peoples in 
good dispositions within a relation that, while unequal, was not just of coercion and 
domination.59 Pointing out that ‘[t]he value accorded to the furs over a large area had 
little to do with supply and demand’, Dechêne has described the working of the trade in 
these terms:	  	  
[t]raders attracted and retained their clientele through treaties involving a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Marx, that in the dissertation I speak of ‘capitalist’ versus ‘pre-capitalist’ societies, the former applying to 
societies in which the specifically capitalist mode of production dominates, while the latter applies to 
societies in which capital exists only in its more usual and general meaning, that is, as any form of wealth. 
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complex interplay of alliances, tributes, and lavish distributions of powder, 
necklaces, tobacco, and liquor, as well as by manifesting their trustworthiness, 
personal valour, and dexterity, and, of course, by providing quality goods. With a 
rifle worth five beavers, anyone hoping for better terms had to search further 
afield, beyond the purview of the middlemen, but this automatically raised travel 
costs.60	  
 
The extra-economic dynamic of the fur trade was further strengthened by the terms of 
exchange imposed on Europeans by Indians on the basis of political factors and 
intertribal alliances.61 As anthropologist Bruce Trigger has argued, these alliances were 
so embedded in social and political institutions ‘that trade and peace were virtually 
synonymous and Indian traders scorned to haggle over the price of individual goods. 
The personal motive for trade was not […] to possess an inordinate amount of exotic 
goods but to be able to acquire prestige by giving them away. These features of native 
economies accord with a nonmarket model of economic activity’.62 
To be sure, this does not mean that native traders were indifferent to the 
possibilities of making substantial profit from their exchanges. ‘The real question’, in 
fact, ‘is not whether individual traders sought such profits but why they did so and what 
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they did with their gains’.63 On this matter, evidence abounds in the historical literature 
that Native traders were not reinvesting their profits to improve the means of production. 
Quite the contrary, they followed non-capitalist strategies of appropriation, usually 
trying ‘to obtain higher values for their goods not to obtain more of the Europeans’ 
wares but to minimize the effort that had to be expended to satisfy their wants. It is also 
obvious that the goods obtained were not hoarded by individuals but were redistributed 
in a traditional fashion as a source of prestige’.64 
For the most part of the seventeenth century, among European settlers and 
merchants the fur trade was hold in monopoly and surrounded by tight regulating 
practices.65 Regulation were reaffirmed by the proclamation of the Royal government in 
1663 as it ordained the Superior Council of Quebec to ‘regulate the dispersal of all 
public moneys, the fur trade with the Indians and any commerce involving the 
inhabitants of the country and the merchants of our Kingdom […].’66 By the mid-
eighteenth century, twenty-five permits, or congés, were issued annually giving the legal 
right to depart with goods to trade with the Indians in the west. As had been the case 
with chartered companies before, these permits were granted on a political basis in 
return for past or present services to ‘the impoverished nobility, deserving officers, and 	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religious communities’.67 Most of the recipients would hand over their permits to 
merchants in exchange for a return on profits. These merchants—all essentially 
outfitters—would equip the coureurs des bois (then called voyageurs) with a cargo of 
goods to be exchanged in the western woods.68 The outfitters provided voyageurs with 
the goods they needed to perform trade with the Indians. Here, the task of voyageurs was 
separated from the spheres of production between which it mediated, taking a staple—
animal fur—from a region where it was worth close to nothing and bringing it to a far 
distant and much more developed market where its price was high. 
In a study of three parishes of the Richelieu Valley, historian Allan Greer has 
shown that in pursuing commercial activities ‘[t]he fur barons, the grain traders, and the 
local shopkeepers drew a profit from the feudal society they found [...] and in certain 
respects they reinforced the existing exploitation and economic backwardness rather 
than challenging the dominion of the aristocrats’.69 As such, commercial activities in 
Canada were analogous to other forms of carrying trade that are found in history, as 
conducted, for instance, by the Venetians, Genoans, Dutch, etc. In these cases, as Marx 
has explained, ‘the major profit was made not by supplying a specific national product, 
but rather by mediating the exchange of products between commercially—and generally 
economically—undeveloped communities […]. Here we have commercial capital in its 
pure form, quite separate from the extremes, the spheres of production, between which it 	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mediates’.70 
 
The Geopolitical Diffusion of Capitalist Social Relations 	  
The problematic association of the fur trade with capitalism is far from exclusive 
to Ouellet. It is found in much of Canadian historiography and political economy. A case 
in point is Harold Innis’s celebrated staple theory, which decades of prolific authorship 
have drawn upon to produce a framework that focuses on the centrality of the trade of 
primary goods. Following this framework, a large array of economic historians and 
political economists have explained Canada’s slow development by its dependence upon 
more developed states and the circuits of international trade. These scholars argue that, 
within a hierarchical chain established by colonization, European metropolises 
appropriated the most lucrative natural resources of the colony and hence hindered its 
development. In addition to this transfer of wealth, periodical shifts from one staple to 
another created cyclical disturbances that interrupted and slowed down colonial 
economic activities.71  
A similar argument was put forward by dependency theorists in the 1950s and 
1960s. They recognized that, in many instances, the ‘capitalist’ penetration of less 	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developed societies outside Europe failed to produce self-sustained growth. More often 
than not, in fact, the expansion of capitalism reinforced the limited basis for economic 
growth and created new barriers to development.72 This insight, it must be noted, was 
present in Innis’s major study of Canadian development, The Fur Trade in Canada. 
Innis conceived of the whole economic and political structure of the colony as geared 
toward the needs of the imperial metropolis and the transfer of wealth from the former to 
the latter. In a nutshell, he argued that ‘[t]he economic history of Canada has been 
dominated by the discrepancy between the centre and the margin of western civilization 
[…]. [A]griculture, industry, transportation, trade, finance and governmental activities 
tend to become subordinate to the production of the staple for a more highly specialized 
manufacturing community’.73 
This view has the merit of systematically taking into account the international 
dimension of social change beyond the analysis of domestic cultural mentalities and 
political institutions. It points to the need to look at the relation between developed and 
underdeveloped societies, for the secret to development—or non-development—does 
not lay exclusively in domestic political cultures and institutions, but also in the history 
of colonial relationships. A problem, however, emerges with Innis’s theory as 
individualistic-mechanist presuppositions pervade its focus on the role of staples trade in 
Canadian economic development. As David McNally has argued, while Innis’s view 
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may well depart from Smith’s ‘optimistic-liberal’ outlook in dismissing the notion that 
any country integrated into the international division of labour unfailingly experiences 
economic growth, it nevertheless remains completely compatible with Smith’s 
commodity fetishism.74 Innis considered the movement of primary goods—itself rooted 
in geographical factors (such as vastness of land and abundance of natural resources) 
and technological innovations (especially in transportation and communication)—as the 
prime factor determining development. The resulting neglect of the role of social 
relations of production in economic life is difficult to surmount within the parameters of 
the staple theory, for it conceals ‘the human, social and historical character of the 
“things” which seem to govern social life’.75 	  
Innis has theorized capitalism as the natural expansion of exchange, rather than 
considering the origins of capitalist class relations in what Marx termed ‘primitive 
accumulation’. The result is a reification of the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ which 
obscures the internal diversity of sociopolitical dynamics that drove the development of 
different European state/society complexes. On one hand, Innis depicts European 
metropolises as more or less all the same: economically developed, able to engage in 
technological innovation, and predatory. On the other hand, he depicts colonies as 
doomed to underdevelopment, stagnation, and poverty. Even if colonies are deemed as 
much ‘capitalist’ as the metropolises because they are part of the international division 
of labour, they are said to occupy a different ‘position’ within the capitalist world system 
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and, as such, are expected to follow a different path of development. Their ‘function’ is 
to provide natural resources and surplus capital to the core. In that sense, instead of 
positing one generic model of Smithian development for the whole world—as did, each 
in their own way, the Montreal and Quebec schools—Innis assumed two generic 
models: one for core developers and one for dependent developers. 	  
There is a valuable insight in pointing out that peripheral countries in the 
nineteenth century, developing in a world economy where metropolitan powers had 
already undergone or were undergoing industrialization, could not possibly replicate the 
pattern of economic advancement followed by these first developers. Yet, the fact is that 
there never has been one model of economic advancement, even among European 
countries, whose diversity of developmental paths was much more pronounced than 
Innis assumed. In the eighteenth century, for instance, England was the only country 
where capitalism had developed.76 Capitalism was, at that time, well on the way to 
thoroughly transforming the life of the urban masses with the first Industrial Revolution 
and the making of the English working-class. Determined to keep its head start, Britain 
put into place many measures to prevent the industrialization of both its continental 
rivals and its overseas colonies, passing laws, for instance, that forbade the export of 
machinery, skilled workers, and manufacturing techniques.  
In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, large segments of the 
continental agrarian elite could content themselves with providing Britain with the grain 
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and agricultural products it needed for its rapid development, as this role reinforced their 
traditional forms of rule and authority. This ‘passing complementarity of differently 
developing economies’ lasted for a time.77 Marx could still, as late as 1870, consider 
England as the only country that had undergone a full capitalist transformation. It is, he 
says,  
 
the only country where there are no more peasants and where landed property is 
concentrated in a few hands. It is the only country where the capitalist form, that 
is to say, combined labour on a large scale under the authority of capitalists, has 
seized hold of almost the whole of production. It is the only country where the 
vast majority of the population consists of wage labourers. […] England is the 
bulwark of landlordism and European capitalism.78  
 
By then, however, England’s domination of the world economy was seriously 
challenged by rival states taking advantage of their backwardness to adopt right away 
the most up-to-date technologies available without paying the full cost in time, money, 
and human resources for research and development that the developer did. Among the 
late developers, Germany provides a remarkable example, as capitalism developed there 
with such suddenness that ‘the economy was transformed from a largely agrarian, feudal 
basis in the first half of the nineteenth century to the most modern industrial economy in 	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the world as the same century drew to a close’.79 Clearly, once we start dissociating 
capitalism from the expansion of trade, the geopolitical expansion of capitalist social 
relations appears as a much more protracted and diverse process than what has been 
suggested by either the single narrative of the pan-European rise of the bourgeoisie, or 
by the binary opposition between core and periphery at the centre of the staple theory.	  
 
Pre-Capitalist Social Relations in Early Modern Quebec 
 Even if one was able to identify the presence of large-scale and standardized 
manufacturing activities in early modern Quebec, this would not automatically imply the 
existence of capitalist social relations. As George Comninel has pointed out, 
manufacture of this kind is found as far back in history as ancient Greece and Rome.80 
Even huge factories, a concentrated proletariat, and advanced industrial technologies do 
not in themselves necessarily indicate the presence of capitalist social relations, for they 
can very well exist in the absence of the specific capitalist discipline of time and labour 
(in workplaces and beyond) that expresses the generalized subjection of social 
reproduction to market imperatives. Of course, no date or event allows us to precisely 
pinpoint the moment in which a society becomes ‘capitalist’. It is, nevertheless, 
important to recognize that the reproduction of modern societies has been gradually, 
albeit unequally, subjected to market imperatives in a way unprecedented in history.  
 When one stops assuming that the presence of the fur trade or manufacturing 	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activities meant that capitalist social relations existed in the colony, the fundamental 
question becomes whether, when, and how direct producers became market dependent 
and subjected to a capitalist discipline. On this matter, Bernier and Salée have noted that 
as late as the 1840s, Lower Canada’s manufacturing activities were far from market 
dependent: for the most part, they took place in artisan-owned workshops, where ‘the 
social relations of production rested mostly on a master-servant relationship, a guild-like 
conception of work and the paternalism so characteristic of the pre-capitalist labour 
process’.81 Merchants, moreover, were not progressive agents of change and bearers of 
capitalist development. As Bernier and Salée have pointed out, merchants played a 
reactionary role in defending the old order. Many merchants, in fact, were owners of 
seigneurial titles and seigneurial land.82 As such, they had vested interests in the old 
system and repeatedly demonstrated their support for preserving the agricultural outlook 
of Lower Canada’s economy. They adopted a reserved attitude to the gradual 
introduction of the free land tenure in the province. The lack of merchants’ enthusiasm 
when the conversion of seigneuries into free and common socage was made possible by 
constitutional reforms is a case in point: 
 
In 1825, the Canada Tenure Act authorized everyone who so desired to commute 
their seigneurial property into freehold. Between 1826 and 1836, only twenty-	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one requests in commutation were presented to the Executive Council, less than 
10 percent of the total number of seigneuries. None of these requests aimed at 
converting a whole seigneury into free and common socage […]. Some 
individuals, such as John Munro and Thomas Bell in Trois-Rivières, even applied 
for seigneurial land whence they could have just as easily obtained free and 
common socage land. […] Clearly, although free land tenure was a possible 
alternative after 1791 for anyone wishing to own land, the seigneurial system 
continued to dominate landownership and land management in Quebec until its 
abolition on 1854.83  
 
A closer examination of the system of freehold tenure also indicates that the strict 
regulations which were supposed to guarantee a relatively equal access to the land in 
order to favour the settlement of uninhabited areas were not as rigorously applied as 
supposed: ‘administrative abuses, monopolization, and speculation by well-to-do 
merchants and their political associates’ were common practices. These practices had for 
consequence to limit access to small landed property.84 The aftermath of the Conquest 
was significant in that regard, for the British Crown rewarded many military officers and 
loyal individuals with large grants of land, establishing networks of patronage and 
favouritism that facilitated the concentration of land in few hands—especially in the 
Eastern Townships.  
 Many of the new owners did not stay in Canada to live on their land but rather 	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went back to their motherland, England, hence becoming de facto absentee landlords. 
‘These acquisitions’, Bernier and Salée have explained, ‘resulted in the formation of 
large private domains where immediate exploitation was not a priority. Rather, these 
lands were to be held for speculative purposes as well as for the social prestige they 
conferred on their owners because, at that time, landownership still remained the 
cornerstone of political power’.85 On the whole, when acquiring free land tenures in the 
townships, merchants displayed little enthusiasm in transforming them into productive 
farming units or manufactures: speculation in land, not improvement, was the motto. It 
constituted a convenient means of investment in ‘a commodity likely to return a profit. 
Original grantees of lands who had never entertained the idea of exploiting them were 
only too happy to sell them to merchants buying them with speculative intentions or to 
commercialize their natural resources, especially lumber’.86  
Many regulative systems were implemented in order to curtail the extent of 
abuses, frauds, and speculation. Among these systems were the ‘Leaders and Associates’ 
system of land distribution between 1791 and 1826, the location ticket system in 1818, 
and the New South Wales system in 1825. Merchants and local officials, however, found 
various (and often ingenious) ways to deprive these systems of their ability to guarantee 
a fair access to land. Regulations were often actually instrumental in the appropriation of 
massive amounts of land for speculative purposes. By the 1830s, with demographic 
pressures and thousands of new British immigrants, the price of land had reached 
excessive summits, making it impossible for Lower Canadian peasants to buy a plot for 	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themselves. Consequently, many landless peasants and immigrants moved to urban 
centres, to the United States, or to remote areas recently opened to colonization. 
Meanwhile, pre-capitalist practices of exploitation did not cease to be exerted on free 
holding tenures, as dues, charges, and constraints continued to be integrated in deeds of 
sale, giving the owner the legal power to extract unpaid labour and other means of 
extortion over surplus labour.87  
Given the pre-capitalist attributes of Lower Canada, it should not come as a 
surprise that the debate about Quebec’s ‘backwardness’ has taken on so much 
importance among Canadian historians and political scientists. Lower Canada’s 
economic development was limited when compared with New England, which had 
already developed, early in the nineteenth century, capitalist industries along with the 
expansion of transportation and protective tariffs. While neighbouring Upper Canada 
was soon to follow the American example as to the pace of development of 
manufacturing and industrial activities, the case of Lower Canada remains a striking 
example of arrested development that historians and social scientists have, as of yet, 
failed to convincingly explain. 
 
Geopolitically Uneven and Socially Combined Development 	  
Building on Salée and Bernier’s impressive account of the pre-capitalist 
character of Quebec up until at least the mid-nineteenth century, my dissertation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ibid., 53–56. 
	   51	  	  	  	  
endeavours to expand their understanding of how capitalism emerged in Quebec by 
examining the influence of geopolitical and inter-societal processes on the 
developmental trajectory of the colonial society. As Bernier and Salée have pointed out, 
‘[t]he transition to capitalism in colonies may not be as self-propelled a mechanism as it 
is in the metropolis’; it proceeds ‘in part from external factors and can thus be 
precipitated or delayed as a result of metropolitan policies’.88 Nevertheless, concerned as 
they were with responding to the obsession with the metropolis/colony relationship that 
characterizes Innis’s staple theory, Bernier and Salée did not focus on elaborating on the 
role played by external factors in the transition. While recognizing the role of colonial 
economic and administrative policies in the transition to capitalism in Quebec,89 they 
favoured the internal contradictions of the ancien régime social framework as the 
driving force behind the transition.90  
In this dissertation, I share Bernier and Salée’s conviction that domestic social 
structures did matter a great deal in shaping the colony’s developmental trajectory. But I 
also examine how international forces interacted with these structures to influence the 
transition to capitalism in the province. Here I conceive of the ‘international’ dimension 
of the transition as including processes that went well beyond the mere relationship with 
the imperial metropolis to encompass the fact that, once capitalism had given its first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ibid., 151. 
89 “Our boundaries [...] extend into the 1840s, when the precapitalist socioeconomic order is being 
strongly challenged, and the obstacles that retarded the emergence of the capitalist mode of production in 
Québec are lifted through changes in colonial economic and administrative policies”. Ibid., x. 
90 “Between 1760 and 1840, Québec was essentially an ancien régime colonial society whose bases of 
legitimacy were slowly but gradually eroding, not so much because of the influence of ‘international 
capitalism’ but because the internal contradictions of the socioeconomic order were overwhelming”. Ibid., 
10. 
	   52	  	  	  	  
revolutionary impulse to production in England, later transitions would inevitably take 
place in an interstate system radically transformed by geopolitical and economic 
pressures emanating from Britain and its imperialism. In this sense, Britain can be said 
to constitute ‘the first and only case of “early” (and thus relatively un-influenced by 
global factors) industrialization’ and ‘all subsequent cases therefore’ can be considered 
“late”.91   
Pre-capitalist sets of attitudes and expectations held by lords and peasants under 
the conditions of coercive ‘extra-economic’ modes of surplus extraction were unable to 
generate dynamics of self-sustained growth: these sets made it ‘either unnecessary or 
impossible, or both, to reinvest in expanded improved production in order to profit’.92 In 
this circumstance, it took highly specific and stringent conditions for the first capitalist 
transformation to emerge out of feudal class struggles in the English countryside. 
Consequently, it is highly inconceivable that the rare and contradictory form of 
appropriation that developed in Britain could endogenously develop elsewhere without 
external influence.	  
If it had not been for the existence of British capitalism and the changing 
international environment that it created for other states and societies, one cannot 
assume that capitalism would have developed at a later point elsewhere in the world. 
This does not mean that we must conceive of external factors as entirely conducting the 
development of capitalism in the colonies, for primordial in shaping the process and 
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outcomes of late development ‘is how contending social classes shape and respond to 
development processes through struggles (in order to maximize advantages and displace 
disadvantages)’.93 Indeed, even when capitalism was introduced to other societies 
through more or less conscious attempts at emulating features of Britain’s social and 
economic institutions, these attempts engendered struggles, the outcome of which could 
not be predicted in advance.94 	  
It may thus be more adequate to conceive of late development, not so much in 
terms of emulation, but in terms of ‘substitute mechanisms’ with which rulers of pre-
capitalist societies sought ‘to achieve rapid development without some of the 
“undesirable” consequences it might yield’.95 In this regard, Brenner’s study of the 
agrarian origins of capitalism is a necessary starting point for understanding processes of 
late capitalist development. Pointing out the diversity of early modern, regional 
sociopolitical paths of development and the historical specificity of their spatio-temporal 
origins, it allows us to break away from teleological and evolutionist readings of history. 
In itself, however, Brenner’s study reveals little about the historical processes by which 
capitalism was diffused and the novel nature of agrarian and urban transformations that 
these helped trigger outside Britain. 
One way to look at the puzzle of the geopolitical diffusion of capitalism is 	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through the notion of uneven and combined development (UCD), originally put forward 
by Trotsky to ground historical materialism in an understanding of the world economy 
as an integrated and interactive whole. Trotsky sought to break away from the ‘stagist’ 
version of Marxism present in most of early twentieth century European Social-
Democratic thought and explain why, by the early twentieth century, the international 
context had evolved in such a way that the possibility of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ in late 
developing societies had been ruled out. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
stagism was so rampant that most social theories ‘tended to believe that societies and 
history moved through progressive stages until they reached some kind of emancipatory 
ideal (which they defined very differently), a sort of utopian stasis’.96 Against this view, 
Trotsky argued that historical materialism is a method of social investigation that cannot 
determine the actual content of what is to be analyzed or provide, in Baruch Knei-Paz’s 
words, ‘in advance all the possible particular political forms which social relations may 
give rise to’.97 In Trotsky’s perspective, the analysis needs to reflect upon both the 
universality and the peculiarity of specific paths of development, rather than ‘postulate 
in advance, or arrive at, an inevitable internal structure for this framework’.98 
Despite some scattered references to UCD as a universal law—speaking of 
unevenness, for instance, as ‘the most general law of the historic process’99—Trotsky’s 
critique of stagism must be seen as an early critique of positivism, for it conceives of 
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world history as an open, dialectical, and contradictory process, the outcome of which is 
impossible to predict in advance. As IR theorist Justin Rosenberg has explained, the 
‘key’ for Trotsky ‘was quite simply that the development of backward societies took 
place under the pressure of an already existing world market, dominated by more 
advanced capitalist powers’.100 ‘[M]ost of the examples he studied lay within the 
modern period, leaving undeveloped any claim we might want to make about the 
transhistorical generality of the phenomenon’.101 Indeed, Trotsky never theoretically 
considered the universal and transhistorical character of UCD in a systematic fashion; 
rather, he took as his starting point ‘the straightforward empirical observation that the 
historical world of capitalism did not appear simultaneously everywhere out of the same 
social and cultural conditions’.102 
However, in his efforts to introduce the notion of UCD into debates about 
International Relations, Rosenberg has himself ‘relaxed the caution’ first shown with 
regard to the idea of a law of UCD, ‘for while the concrete pattern of socio-cultural 
diversity at any given time is contingent, the fact of this diversity itself is not’.103 His 
has subsequently attempted to make of Trotsky’s metaphors of the ‘whip of external 
necessity’ and of the ‘advantage of backwardness’ universal (rather than historically 
specific) mechanisms within a grand theory of UCD understood, at the most general 
level of abstraction, to specify how the conceptual attributes of ‘unevenness’ and 
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‘combination’ provide an explanation of all types of inter-societal relations from the 
dawn of humanity to the contemporary era. This, of course, could quite hardly be closer 
to the traditional objective of positivist thought in IR, namely to formulate a true 
‘science' of international relations based on a methodological preference for general 
theories. Ultimately, Rosenberg postulates that the social world has regularities that can 
be discovered through the theory of UCD, seen as the basic regularity of human 
development as a whole.  
While positivistic tendencies in Rosenberg’s theory of UCD are highly 
problematic, the observation that late developers could benefit from the ‘privilege’ of 
backwardness by subsequently making ‘leaps’ in the compass of social evolution 
nevertheless raises interesting issues about the international dimension of social change 
in the modern era. The crux of Trotsky’s notion of UCD was that advanced societies 
exert decisive influence and pressure on the transformation of less advanced states and 
societies, for, as Trotsky pointed out, the organization of backward societies ‘under the 
whip of external necessity […] is compelled to make leaps’.104 The whip of external 
understood by Trotsky as the relentless military pressure of the most powerful societies 
on other countries, for this ‘is the continued condition under which the backward polity 
strives to maintain its existence through assimilating the perceived means and sources of 
the power of its adversaries, turning “the foe into a tutor”’.105 In that sense, once 
capitalism had developed in England, revolutionizing the means and conditions of 	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production, continental early modern states subject to geopolitical and economic 
pressures emanating from England acquired a new and specific historical character in 
responding to this external influence, without themselves immediately becoming 
capitalist. ‘Combination’ thus refers to this drawing together of pre-capitalist and 
capitalist social relations. 
One reason why the establishment of capitalist social relations of production 
followed a wide variety of paths is that capitalism’s expansion beyond England took 
place within an already-existing interstate system characterized by a much greater 
heterogeneity than simplistic notions of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, or for that matter 
‘Europe’, account for. As Teschke has pointed out, while France, Austria, Spain, 
Sweden, Russia, Denmark-Norway, Brandeburg-Prussia, and the Papal States 
constituted a diverse collection of absolutist regimes, the Holy Roman Empire ‘remained 
a confederal elective monarchy until 1806. The Dutch General Estates established an 
independent oligarchic merchant republic. Poland was a “crowned aristocratic republic” 
and Switzerland a free confederation of cantons. […] Italian merchant republics 
struggled against being transformed into monarchies’. By contrast, in Britain, the feudal 
regime was transformed through an ‘enclosure’ movement in the countryside and the 
establishment of the first constitutional parliamentary monarchy into the first capitalist 
economy.  
The diverse forms taken by European state/civil society complexes were 
themselves the long-term result, as Teschke and Lacher have argued, ‘of centuries of 
social conflicts over rights of domination and appropriation over land and people 
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amongst pre-capitalist classes. These conflicts stretch right back to the dissolution of the 
Carolingian Empire and finally crystallized in a primarily dynastic multi-state 
system’.106 In this regard, it is far from certain that the highly diverse nature of these 
conflicts and their outcomes can be grasped by UCD formulated as a ‘macro-
structuralis[t] conceptions of world history, which press[es] the rich variety of 
historically diverse political geographies into a single covering law’.107 Specific 
historical mechanisms such as the ‘advantage of backwardness’, for instance, may well 
have operated in the case of some late developers, but for many others, they did not. 
Similarly, the ‘whip of external necessity’ understood as military pressures may well 
have been felt by some states in certain times and certain places (such as the late 
nineteenth century in Europe), but the same certainly cannot be said of all polities at all 
times and in all places in history. Ultimately, as Teschke has explained,  
 
UCD contains no theoretical categories to account for change. For the notions of 
‘advance’ and ‘backwardness’, coupled to the notions of the ‘whip of external 
necessity’ and ‘the privilege of backwardness’, are temporal metaphors for 
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unevenness, which stand themselves in need of explanation. Likewise, the 
category of development is only a result of social change (a manifestation of 
social change) and never the cause of change in itself. This suggests that the 
subject of change has to be re-anchored in a category outside UCD: ‘human 
practice’.108 
 
The focus on human practice points out the need to place social conflicts at the centre of 
our analysis without presupposing the forms they take or the nature of the political 
spaces in which they take place. After all, it is social agency that always determines the 
complex ways in which structural conditions are confronted, adapted to, or 
transformed—for instance, ‘whether or not the “whip of external necessity” holds 
causally and whether its effects turn into the disadvantages rather than advantages of 
backwardness’.109	  
 
Concluding Remarks: Bringing in the ‘Peasant Question’  
To understand the economic evolution of North America in the colonial period, 
as well as the eventual development of capitalism on the continent, the social conflicts 
shaped by and shaping this transformation must to be brought to light. In this regard, one 
of the central issues that needs to be addressed is the ‘peasant question’, also often 
referred to as the ‘agrarian question’ in political economy. For the purposes of this 	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research, the peasant question queries the consequences of the continued existence of 
large peasantries for social and economic development during the period when industrial 
capitalism was emerging as a dominant feature of the northeastern United States; it 
demands how peasants in Quebec and commercial farmers in Ontario responded to or 
resisted the new conditions and imperatives imposed therein. The peasant question is not 
merely ‘historical’, a question of the past, but one with continuing relevance, dealing as 
it does with one of the most significant socio-economic transformations still unfolding 
across the world to this day, that is, the dramatic change in the structure of traditional 
societies away from agriculture as the primary economic activity to the conditions 
typical of Global North countries, where only a tiny fraction of the whole labour force is 
employed in agriculture. As such, the peasant question continues to attract attention in 
its many variants, taking the form today of an inquiry into the question of ‘whether, and 
if so, how, the location of small-scale petty commodity food and farm production within 
contemporary capitalism has been reconfigured during the era of neoliberal 
globalisation’.110  
Among those that debated the question at the turn of the twentieth century was 
Karl Kautsky, whose concern was with ‘whether, and how, capital is seizing hold of 
agriculture, revolutionizing it, making old forms of production and property untenable 
and creating the necessity for new ones’.111 Kautsky’s question, I argue, cannot be 
answered in the abstract, since, in any given historical scenario, different socio-
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economic processes operating through different mechanisms and resulting in diverging 
outcomes can be observed. Understanding the peasant question in England, and the 
sociohistorical processes by which capitalism revolutionized agriculture there, means 
understanding the specificities of ‘agrarian capitalism’, a unique, transitionary mode of 
agriculture that was found only in England. It consisted of a three class system—the 
‘triad’ of landlords, tenant farmers, and wage labourers—never to be reproduced outside 
England. While English tenant farmers were required to have sufficient capital to engage 
in the normal forms of up and down husbandry, the landlords were generally willing to 
work with such tenants in further improving the land. The tenants were not exploited—
they were capitalists.112 
In aiming to theorize the ‘peasant question’ in the colonial context of early 
modern Canada, this dissertation proposes that it cannot be understood according to the 
English ‘model’. The conditions under which capitalist tenant farmers were able to take 
leases in England were very different than the conditions under which tenant farmers in 
other societies had access to tenancy. Given the predominant agrarian social relations of 
North American colonies, ‘the explanation of state-variations’ in this context 
nevertheless requires, like in those of Europe up to the late nineteenth century, ‘an 
extension of the field of social forces to include, at a minimum, the constitutive role of 
the peasantry in the differential resolution of class conflicts over the sources and 
modalities of extraction, property-relations and the power-configurations (state-forms) 
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that institutionalised these conflicts’.113 The peasantry was not a passive and neutral 
agent simply responding to structural imperatives imposed from above, but a decisive 
actor in changing the destiny of North America. There, social conflicts that gave shape 
to colonial societies had their origins in the multilinear and interactive process of the 
colonization of the New World. It is in the outcome of these ‘conflicts—the 
reaffirmation of the old property relations or their destruction and the consequent 
establishment of a new structure—that is to be found perhaps the key to the problem of 
long-term economic development’.114 
From the outset of colonization, European imperial powers faced challenges of a 
different genre than those faced in Europe, as they had to construct and manage new 
societies in distant lands. Interpretations that overlook this fact cannot but provide an 
incomplete account of the contradictions that drove the multiple transitions to capitalism 
in North America. We must have an appreciation of the nature of colonial-state 
formation which took place prior to the development of capitalism to be able to properly 
grasp the sociopolitical twists and turns that the colonial society experienced as it was 
confronted with British imperialism and integrated within its empire. In Ontario, for 
instance, as in the northeastern United States, no three class system of agrarian 
capitalism ever developed. Instead, household-producers who were initially relatively 
impervious to ‘market discipline’ became petty-commodity producers as their 
dependence on the market progressively increased under specific historical conditions. 
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Petty-commodity producing farms continued to rely on family labour with no, or only 
few, and usually occasional, wage workers.  
By contrast, in Quebec some aspects of the ancien régime were reinforced in the 
encounter, at the same time as new institutions, identities, and political subjectivities left 
their imprint on the colony. In other words, we need to understand colonial Canada as 
part of capitalism’s progressive historical development and incorporation of pre-
capitalist regions through the geo-territorial configuration of the states-system that 
existed in Europe, but which needed to be re-created in the North American colonial 
context. Class struggles therefore should be theorized as something located within the 
wider structures of the international rather than separated from it. As such, an historical 
analysis of the socially uneven and geopolitically combined sets of social-property 
relations of the early modern Atlantic world may well provide the surest starting point to 
understand some the differences that characterized the colonial development of North 
America, and particularly the fact that, for centuries, the St. Lawrence Valley was 
marked by a distinct, society-wide, pre-capitalist developmental dynamic that resulted in 
a slow pace of agricultural technological progress, whose roots are to be found in the 
seigneurial regime, understood as a socio-political legacy of French absolutist 
imperialism.  
As I will discuss in what follows, the preservation of the seigneurial regime by 
British authorities willing to ensure the continuation of many social and political 
institutions inherited from French absolutism to cope with the difficulties of ruling such 
a distant colony, in the context of growing unrest in the Thirteen British American 
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colonies, had fundamental consequences, not only for the development of the province 
of Quebec itself, but also for the neighbouring province of Ontario. Given the 
particularity of each province, how capital seized hold of agriculture and revolutionized 
it in each case can only be understood through a radical historicization that sheds light 
on the complexity of social, political, and economic forces. 
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2.  
Colonial State-Formation in New France  
 
 
Building on the composite image of the historiography provided by Yves 
Zoltvany, forty years ago, Marie-Ève Ouellet has recently noted that the historical 
studies of the state in New-France still tend to follow one of two tendencies: the first 
focuses on government structures and institutions; the other on the socio-economic 
context of government’s interactions with the colonial society, in other words, on 
governance practices.115 The institutional tendency is characterized by its attention to 
the effectiveness of the system and its different institutional components, especially the 
governor, the intendant, the Sovereign Council and the system of justice. According to 
Ouellet, because the links between these components are rarely made clear, the result of 
the institutional approach is ‘a fragmented picture of the state’—a picture further 
fragmented by a reluctance to study the colonial state in relation to the metropolis: 
‘[o]ne searches in vain studies dealing simultaneously with the central government and 
the colonial administration. This results in two historiographies that are fairly 
compartmentalized, artificially perpetuating the division between administrative 
realities’.116  	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 What is more, ‘the question of the existence of a colonial state, and hence the use 
of the concept, has not been clearly resolved’.117 If this is the case with studies that have 
focused on institutions, it is perhaps even more so with studies that focus on governance 
practices. These studies tend to look at the state through a biographical approach of 
officers in charge without really ‘considering the existence of the state beyond its 
practitioners’.118 This approach has the merit of bringing attention to the interdependence 
between the administrators and the population, including issues that remained invisible 
until recently with regards to ‘policy-making processes, communication imperatives and 
the political culture’.119 The approach remains limited, however, by a historical 
periodization that follows the succession of colonial administrators and their policies 
without an attempt to identify more general tendencies and evolutions in the workings of 
the state. With the exception of Marxists historians and sociologists whose main 
contributions date back to the 1970s and the 1980s,120 both the institutionalist and the 
biographical approaches to the study of the state in New France have adopted an 
empiricist approach that devotes little attention to theorizing the state. 
 This contrasts sharply with the consideration given to theorization of the state in 
the British historiography, for instance in the work of Philip Corrigan and Derek 	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Sayer,121 or in the work of historians immersed in the business of studying ‘history from 
below’, such as Christopher Hill.122 Among the latter, E. P. Thompson studied everyday 
struggles and political agitation while paying due consideration to the state, which he 
theorized as a locus of appropriation and exploitation.123 Building on Thompson’s works 
as well as on Morton Fried’s anthropological definition of the state—as ‘the complex of 
institutions by means of which the power of the society is organized on a basis superior 
to kinship’,124 a set of ‘formal, specialized instruments of coercion’ that achieves 
‘paramountcy in the application of naked force to social problems’125—Wood has 
argued that in performing certain common social functions, the state implies ‘a social 
division of labour and the appropriation by some social groups of surplus produced by 
others’.126 This definition is broad enough as to be able to encompass the very different 
forms of politically organized subjection in history without presupposing their nature 
and their meaning.  
Whether or not state institutions were intended from the outset as a means of 
appropriation and exploitation, they historically developed ‘as a means of appropriating 
surplus product—perhaps even as a means of intensifying production in order to 	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increase surplus—and as a mode of distributing that surplus in one way or another’.127 
The division between producers and appropriators entailed by the evolution of a 
specialized, coercive public authority implies the existence of classes, which should be 
defined broadly enough to include 
 
all divisions between direct producers and the appropriators of their surplus 
labour, even cases in which economic power is scarcely distinguishable from 
political power, where private property remains undeveloped, and where class 
and state are in effect one. The essential point is the recognition that some of the 
major divergences among various historical patterns have to do with the nature 
and sequence of relations between public power and private appropriation.128 
 
This constitutes the central premise of my dissertation, one that has been also shared, 
and expanded in insightful ways, by Benno Teschke in his analysis of The Myth of 1648. 
In a passage worth quoting at length, Teschke has argued that ‘historically and 
regionally specific property regimes and their associated conflicts over the terms and 
chances of reproduction between and among classes’ provide a solid foundation on 
which to lay out the  
 
wider analysis of the constitution, operation and transformation of different 
forms of rule, different spatial orders and different geopolitical dynamics. The 	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historical construction of different polities in their multilinearity and differential 
temporalities and the nature of their interactions are grounded in conflicting 
domestic strategies of reproduction over property and power. Correlatively, the 
focus on domestic sources of power has to be complemented by the incorporation 
of the domestic consequences of the international co-existence and mutual co-
determination of diverse polities for their respective ‘national’ trajectories—as 
they are bound together in a wider geopolitical order. In other words, processes 
of differential class- and state formation have to be interrogated simultaneously 
in their internal and external dimensions.129 
 
In this chapter, I argue that there is a lot to gain from theorizing the state and classes of 
New France in the light of these definitions, for they provide general starting points to 
identify the driving forces behind the development of any social formation, that is, the 
imperatives and constraints associated with specific forms of organization of power. 
There was no modern notion of strong territoriality or geographically unified sovereign 
statehood in New France. Nor were there elaborated governmental agencies with 
personnels of considerable size or efficient means to surveil and rule the population. 
There nevertheless existed a set of property relations that organized and supported a 
basic apparatus of administration as well as a complex of political rights and obligations 
among various classes attempting to reproduce themselves through producing a surplus 
product or appropriating the surplus product of others. Even in the absence of a highly 	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centralized, uniformly administered, and clearly delimitated state apparatus with 
sovereign powers, it is thus possible to speak of a process of ‘state-formation’ in the 
colony. 
 Before turning to the process of colonial state-formation, I first examine the 
process of absolutist state-formation that has occurred in the French metropolis during 
the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, for the French absolutist state provides a 
comparative starting point to identify the similarities and differences of the socio-
political institutions that were introduced in New France. Central among these 
institutions was the seigneurial regime—the mode of land tenure privileged by the 
French Crown for colonizing New France—which we gain to locate within the broader 
dynamic of reproduction of the colony taken as a totality. I conclude that if the 
geographical distance overseas conferred upon state-formation in New France a degree 
of autonomy that had no equivalent in continental French provinces, the logic of 
reproduction of the colonial ruling class remained resolutely ‘absolutist’ as it had more 
to do with access to the state than to the parcellized sovereignty of the seigneurial 
regime. The fact that only a small surplus could be appropriated from the peasantry in 
the colonial context softened the competition between the seigneurs and the absolutist 
state, whose main interests did not lay in the direct political appropriation of the 
peasant’s surplus as in France, but in commercial activities embedded in the geopolitics 
of mercantilist rivalries. 
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From Feudal Rent-Taking Lords to the Absolutist Tax/Office State 
Recent contributions of historical sociology to the discipline of International 
Relations have shown that if territorial statehood consolidated itself in the early modern 
period, it was not however as a result of the rise of capitalism. Instead, the centralization 
of state authority and the concomitant differentiation between domestic and international 
realms was the result of the consolidation of absolutist social relations of sovereignty, 
which were themselves a product of the logic of political accumulation at the origin of 
feudal state-building in the late Middle Ages.130 When capitalism emerged it had an 
impact on the territorially defined states-system, but it did not create it. The inter-state 
system already existed. In this sense, only once the social dynamics that led to the 
differentiation of diverging and plural paths of state-formation and economic 
development in the early modern states-system have been identified does it become 
possible to proceed with the historical reconstruction of the diffusion of capitalism and 
its logic of political organization within the pluriverse created by absolutist state 
formation beyond England. 
One of the paths of state-formation taken by European states is that of 
absolutism, exemplified by seventeenth-century France. The society of ancien régime 
was complex and historians have never ceased to argue about whether its form of 
government was truly absolutist or how far its authority was absolute. French historian 
Pierre Goubert, for instance, described the society of the ancien régime as an intricate 	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society, ‘a conglomeration of mostly centuries-old, sometimes thousand-year-old 
elements […] an immense, turbid river carrying dead hulks of trees, rank weeds torn 
from its banks, and living organisms of all ages and sizes’.131 The seigneurial system 
was one component among others within this complicated conglomeration, and its 
significance for the whole society had long been transformed by the rise of a new 
nobility. ‘The business affairs of the Grands, the clergy and the king’, Goubert 
explained, had ‘brought new blood to the French nobility, so that while the ancient 
feudal nobility tended for the most part to derive their income from landed sources, the 
total number of the nobility was increased and replenished by altogether different types 
of revenue’.132  
The most outstanding members of the new nobility had backgrounds in 
commerce and finance, as well as tax-gathering, army provisioning and ‘a whole system 
of collections, loans, advances and deductions from the revenues of others’.133 Under 
these conditions at the eve of the French Revolution, seigneurial dues and tithes were 
part and parcel of a broader critique within which figured prominently the ‘marketing of 
offices, and the inequality in its taxation, law and concept of man’.134 Far from 
dominating the countryside in the same manner as they had done during the Middle-
Ages, the seigneurs were increasingly out-competed by the state. As another historian 
puts it, the poor continued to produce ‘his main crop for the subsistence of his own 
family and remained the typical occupier of the soil’, yet he grew ‘overburdened by a 	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collection of charges among which national taxation’, not seigneurial dues, ‘might be the 
heaviest’.135  
The historical significance of this transformation is such that recent studies have 
called for theorizing the absolutist state as ‘a new structure of class society’ rather than a 
mere reassertion of feudalism.136 To better appreciate this theoretical innovation, one 
gains by first going back to the considerable differences that existed between 
manorialism, which succeeded the fall of the Roman Empire, and the diversity of feudal 
regimes that replaced manorialism around the turn of the millennium. As George 
Comninel pointed out, what had emerged in France following the post-Carolingian 
collapse of the Frankish kingdom of Gaul and the transformation of manorial lordship, 
was the parcellized sovereignty of the seigneurie.137 
The seigneurie increased the authority of the landlords who appropriated the 
power of the ban, which under Frankish political and territorial institutions represented 
the power to command men. With their new powers seigneurs were able to impose new 
‘duties, levies, and obligations’ as well as a new ‘structure of dependency and surplus 
appropriation’ upon a collection of estates held as fiefs.138 The foundation of the French 
lordship thus rested more in their jurisdiction over territories than in the personal status 
of servitude of those inhabiting the seigneuries.139 While increasingly associated with 
territory rather than with personal status, the burden of exactions that had previously 
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characterized manorialism continued to exist and ‘[i]ts full range of primarily 
jurisdictional levies—cens, dîmes, lods et ventes, champarts, banalités, and the like—
remained an important part of the extraction of surplus from the French peasantry right 
down to the Revolution, though increasingly in conjunction with burdens imposed by the 
central jurisdiction of the absolutist state’.140 
Like Comninel, Benno Teschke has theorized the French state as a complex 
structure of exploitation that rested ‘primarily on the French peasantry, whose pre-
capitalist and non-market dependent forms of reproduction had to carry the burden of 
excessive and punitive rates of taxation […] levied primarily through a more centralized, 
although still personalized, form of rule’.141 In the process of absolutist state-formation, 
the means of accumulation of the ruling class had become less and less dependent ‘on 
autonomous and independent feudal rights’ and more and more ‘on state-sanctioned 
privileges,’ as the Crown energetically supported the formation of the new noblesse de 
robe endowed with administrative public powers in matters of taxation, justice and 
war.142 The creation of this noblesse de robe and the centralizing powers of the 
monarchy appropriating a ‘centralized rent’ that competed with local noble powers of 
appropriation went directly against the interests of the old feudal class.143 
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In the process of being integrated within the state, the aristocracy was 
reorganized and transformed into a patrimonial group comprising office owners and 
beneficiaries of royal favours. This apparatus had been created by the king in direct 
competition with the powers, property and privileges of the local seigneurs, who often 
resisted and rose in rebellion against the court, for instance during the Fronde, a series of 
civil wars that shook France between 1648 and 1653. Despite the opposition of certain 
groups of nobles, the monarch expanded a unified government by building ‘its own 
dependent following of politico-military servants through granting them various forms 
of politically constituted private property—initially, fiefs with seigneurial dues, but, 
more characteristically, income-yielding offices, dependent on the monarchy’s power to 
tax land’.144  
 
France and England: Two Different Patterns of Historical 
Development 
 
The long-term of pattern of economic evolution of England radically differed 
from the pattern of economic evolution of France. In England, indeed, the adoption of 
capitalist strategies of reproduction by the aristocracy set the development of the state on 
a completely different trajectory, away from the construction of an absolutist tax/office 	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state. Not only did the main source of income laid in capitalist agriculture rather than in 
offices, but the fact that landlords dominated land ownership in England, and also 
constituted the ‘Parliamentary class’ that determined the tax rates, in the context of there 
being no permanent land tax, made the idea of heavy taxation much less attractive to the 
rulers.145 None of this, of course, was accidental; it all conformed to two different 
patterns of historical development. In such different social-property regimes, peasant 
struggles themselves took on distinct forms, as in England peasant revolts continued to 
directly target the landlords in a desperate attempt to safeguard what was left of their 
rights to property in the face of capitalist pressures, while ‘[i]n France the target of 
peasant revolt was, typically, the crushing taxation of the absolutist state’.146  
The ancien régime ended up weakened, especially during and after the Seven 
Years’ War, by ‘a permanent state of fiscal crisis and, finally, to state collapse under the 
geopolitical pressure exerted by a qualitatively distinct and comparatively superior 
capitalist state/society complex: post-1688 England’.147 Here Teschke’s analysis probes 
the question of the international ‘as a constitutive moment, and not merely as a 
contingent or residual quantity, into the social dynamics of early-modern revolutions and 
the developmental trajectories of state formation’.148 ‘The de-feudalization and de-
militarization of the French nobility’, he pointed out, ‘imparted a form of sovereignty 	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that gave territory a much sharper definition compared to the “parcellized sovereignty” 
of medieval times’ even if the absolutist sovereignty associated with the tax/office state 
had nothing to do with capitalist sovereignty because social-property relations continued 
to be personalized and politically constituted.149 As he explains, 
 
absolutist-dynastic territoriality was no longer internally fragmented and 
challenged since the feudal nobility had lost […] their independent and 
autonomous territorial bases of power. […] This internal pacification of royal-
aristocratic relations […] was, however, not matched externally in form of a 
static geographical scale of territory due to the Crown’s involvement in 
interdynastic struggles over territory.150 
 
The result of Teschke’s historical reconstruction is a research agenda insisting on how 
geopolitical and fiscal pressures emanating from Britain generated a need for 
‘modernizing’ projects among continental polities in the context of regionally pre-
existing class constellations. The kind of geopolitical and fiscal pressures exerted on 
distinct polities and the way these various pressures were experienced by different social 
classes in regionally differentiated sets of social-property regimes resulted in a wide-
ranging set of outcomes. In some cases, these outcomes took the form of violent or 
sudden change disrupting existing class structures and displacing centres of power. The 
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political tensions and social conflicts that emerged in the process had consequences not 
only for domestic fault lines but also for interaction at the broader level of international 
relations: ‘class relations, territorial scales and state forms’ were renegotiated and 
transformed by power struggles and social conflicts, ultimately resulting in cumulatively 
connected and internationally mediated combination of the old and the new.151  
France, for instance, was caught in a ‘downward spiral of warfare, royal debt-
accumulation, office creation, over-taxation and inability to repay loans to an 
increasingly dissatisfied class of private financiers, both noble and bourgeois, that finally 
led to intense intra-ruling-class conflict over the form of the French state and the French 
Revolution’.152 By contrast, English feudalism underwent a different trajectory as 
peasant producers ended up ‘neither bound to the soil nor subject to arbitrary will’; they 
‘enjoyed rights equal to those of the lords before the judiciary of the king’.153 Comninel 
has stressed the unique character of this development and located its origins ‘directly 
from the absence of the seigneurie banale in the social relations of English manorial 
lordship, together with the strength of the monarchy’.154 It is within this peculiar 
structure of class relationships that an agricultural revolution took place, one that has 
been flagrantly absent from agricultural development in France and its colonies. 
 
Slowly, beginning with freehold leases of arable land converted to pasture, with 
little thought at first of long-term implications, the English landlords—and the 	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prosperous tenants increasingly driven by market competition in respect of both 
production and the terms of leases—created an unprecedented social space where 
all production was virtually completely ‘freed’ from consideration of the 
immediate community’s needs. In some cases, especially in certain regions, this 
primarily took the form of a permanent shift from grain crops to pasture. Yet 
arable farming too was transformed, by combining greatly increased flocks of 
sheep (producing manure as well as meat, wool and hide) with more intensive 
corn production (made possible by the sheep)—‘improved agriculture’. Fallow 
was eliminated entirely, while, over time, new fodder crops made possible still 
more intensive sheep-corn farming. Other specialisation emerged as well.155 
 
The English agricultural revolution allowed for the tremendous development of the 
entire British economy, including ‘higher productivity rates, sustained, if non-linear, 
aggregate economic growth, higher rates of urbanization and population growth and a 
discourse of improvement’.156 No similar agrarian revolution occurred in early modern 
France, which nevertheless underwent a significant transformation in the course of the 
early modern period with the development of absolutism. As a result of its struggle with 	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landlords for the appropriation of peasants’ surpluses, the French state had succeeded to 
increase its own power by offering protection to the peasantry and guaranteeing the 
hereditability and fixity of the rents. In this process, a form of non-parliamentary 
taxation without ties with seigneurial exactions was created to provide the Crown with 
an autonomous and direct source of revenue.157  
Looking at the typical depiction of the French revolution as a ‘bourgeois 
revolution’ in light of historical evidences provided by revisionist historians, Comninel 
concluded against the Marxist orthodoxy that the revolution did not oppose a backward 
(feudal) aristocracy to a progressive (capitalist) bourgeoisie in an attempt by the latter to 
create a capitalist society. Rather, the French revolution embodied a political struggle 
over access to and possession of the state, which through the development of absolutism 
had displaced the seigneurie banale as the primary means of surplus appropriation.158 In 
this view, the absolutist state had nothing to do with capitalism without, however, being 
still ‘feudal’: seigneurial relations did persist, but ‘they were no longer the central 
relations of class exploitation, being instead subsidiary to the centralised collection of 
taxes by the state and the exaction of rents through share-cropping and leases’.159  
As the most important means of appropriation of the nobility and the quickest 
road to social mobility for both the bourgeoisie and the lower noblesse became 
dependent upon the purchase of state offices—which were systematically used for 
private enrichment—class distinctions between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy faded 	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away. For those who aspired to join higher ranks among the ruling class, it is through the 
collection of taxes and fees, financial returns on state loans, and money or gifts 
bestowed by the King that one’s social status could be best reproduced and wealth 
accumulated. Consequently, it is ‘the state itself, and particularly its career 
opportunities’—not, as it has been often assumed, the establishment of capitalism by a 
bourgeoisie triomphante—that turned out to be main object of the intra-ruling class 
struggles in the lead to the French revolution.160 The French bourgeoisie was not a 
capitalist class and no systematic class difference can be drawn ‘between the forms of 
wealth and income enjoyed by the bourgeoisie and the supposedly feudal nobility’.161 
Pressures of geopolitical competition are not foreign to the conditions that led to 
the French revolution. The French defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the financially 
ruinous campaigns in the Americas left behind ‘a militarily weakened and financially 
bankrupt France [that] was eventually forced, in a period of dramatic class conflicts, to 
violently alter its internal social property relations’.162 Beyond Britain, capitalism 
imposed itself by politically working itself through pre-existing social property regimes 
and dynastic politics in geopolitically mediated and chronological uneven processes of 
late development—sometimes protracted, as in France, or shockingly rapidly, as in 
Germany. ‘More often than not’, Teschke concluded, ‘it was heavy artillery that battered 
down pre-capitalist walls’.163 How these walls were reconstructed through new state 
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strategies cannot be derived theoretically but requires a radical historicization of the 
ways ‘states responses […] were refracted through respective class relations in national 
contexts, including class resistance’.164 
 
The Seigneurial Regime in New France 
Many studies of social property regimes have contributed to provide a still 
tentative, yet much clearer picture of the geographically combined and socially uneven 
development of capitalism in continental Europe.165 As shown by Charlie Post’s study 
of the social roots of capitalism in the United States and the impact of its development 
on the Civil War, the combination of a comparative perspective with developmental 
explanations in the analysis of social property regime is also ideally placed to study 
colonial state-formation processes and the diffusion of capitalism beyond the European 
heartland. One lesson of Post’s study is that, contrary to what has often been assumed, 
capitalism certainly did not come with the first ships to the North-American colonies.166 
More than one specialist on Africa, India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the 
Americas have drawn similar lessons from their studies of forms of political rule, land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Ibid., 265–266. 
165 Xavier Lafrance, “Citizens and Wage-Labourers: Capitalism and the Formation of a Working Class in 
France” (Doctoral Thesis, York University, 2013); Green, “Uneven and Combined Development and the 
Anglo-German Prelude to World War I”; Lacher and Germann, “Before Hegemony”; Eren Duzgun, 
“Class, State and Property: Modernity and Capitalism in Turkey,” European Journal of Sociology 53, no. 
02 (2012): 119–48; Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, “Social-Property Regimes and the Uneven and 
Combined Development of Nationalist Practices,” European Journal of International Relations 13 (2007): 
583–604; Clemens Hoffmann, “The Eastern Question and the Fallacy of Modernity. On the Premodern 
Origins of the Modern Inter-State Order in Southeastern Europe” (Doctoral Thesis, University of Sussex, 
2010); From a theoretical perspective that shares many insights of the theory of social property relations, 
see also Shilliam, German Thought and International Relations. 
166 Charles Post, The American Road to Capitalism (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011), 39. 
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policies and labour issues in colonial contexts.167  
One has to be careful not to take for granted the desire of the European agents 
who carried colonization out to introduce capitalism in the colonies. Not only were 
European metropolises embarking upon colonial ventures in the New World not all 
capitalist—only Britain, as discussed previously, was capitalist—but even capitalist 
Britain did not necessarily succeed, or even attempt, to introduce capitalist social 
relations in its colonies. To understand how colonizers administered their rule one has to 
take seriously the fact that strategies for maintaining control were potentially powerfully 
influenced by open-ended political conflicts between colonizers and between them and 
the colonized in complex settings involving both colonial and metropolitan cultures.168 
Much is to be gained from probing the mode of existence of native communities that 
came in interaction with European settlers and the manner in which they shaped and 
influenced colonization.169 A lot can also be learnt by studying the interaction between 
European metropolises and the population of white settlers that crossed the Atlantic to 
establish themselves permanently on the new continent. In the process, these settlers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Anne Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa (London: James Currey, 
1989); Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994); Eric 
Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
168 Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, “Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule,” 
American Ethnologist 16, no. 4 (1989): 609; Lauren Benton, “Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: 
Jurisdictional Politics and the Formation of the Colonial State,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 41, no. 03 (July 1999): 543; Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and 
Postcolonial Histories, vol. 11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Nicholas Thomas, 
Colonialism’s Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
169 On these interactions within the fur trade, see Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, 158–194; 
Trigger, Natives and Newcomers Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered; For broader explorations of the 
relation between indigenous social formations and European imperialism in North America, see Michael 
Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Allan Greer, “Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of 
North America,” The American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (2012): 365–86. 
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individually and collectively, developed new repertoires of experiences and identities 
resulting in complex relationships with the metropolises, which rule and authority they 
sometimes welcomed, sometimes contested, within processes of colonial state-
formation. Central to the distinctive character of the process of colonial state-formation 
in New France was that the land appropriated from Native peoples by the colonizers was 
held under the terms of the ‘seigneurial’ tenure, to which I now turn. 
The process of state-formation in New France was directly ‘colonial’ in that it 
consisted in the implantation of settlements on a distant territory. This implantation 
resulted in specific forms of cultural, political, and economic exploitation of the Native 
peoples that inhabited the lands with sets of social, political, and economic relations, as 
well as cultural and spiritual worldviews, radically different than those of the European 
settlers.170 For reasons of time and space, when discussing colonial state-formation in 
this chapter it is the process of settlement itself on which I focus—‘colonialism’—rather 
than on ‘imperialism’, its flip-side according to Edward Said who conceives of the latter 
as ‘the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a 
distant territory’.171 To understand the specificities of French colonial settlements in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Barbara Alice Mann, Iroquoian Women: The Gantowisas (Peter Lang International Academic P, 2006); 
Bruce Johansen and Barbara Alice Mann, Encyclopedia of the Haudenosaunee (Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood, 2000); Trigger, Natives and Newcomers Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered. 
171 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 8. Said’s dichotomy has 
important limitations. As George Steinmetz has shown from a perspective of comparative sociology, 
imperial ideologies and practices of settlement are co-constitutive of each others in complex historical 
settings that give way to significant differences across major instances of colonialism. More specifically, 
he identifies four determining structures in the definition of colonial native policy: ‘(1) precolonial 
ethnographic discourses or representations, (2) symbolic competition among colonial officials for 
recognition of their superior ethnographic acuity, (3) colonizers’ cross-identification with imagos of the 
colonized, and (4) responses by the colonized, including resistance, collaboration, and everything in 
between’.George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in 
Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 2.  
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New France, it is necessary to look at the seigneurial regime in which crucial dimensions 
of French settlers’ political subjectivities and understanding of property were embedded. 
The seigneurial regime was first introduced in 1624 with a baronie granted to 
Guillaume de Caën. Two other seigneuries were granted in 1626 to Louis Hébert and the 
Jesuits, respectively.172 More significant for the introduction of the seigneurial system in 
New France was the creation of the Company of One Hundred Associates in 1627, for it 
received the whole territory of New France—from Florida to the Arctic—under 
seigneurial terms, including the powers to 
 
improve and arrange the said lands as they will deem it to be necessary, and 
distribute them to those who will live in the said land […]; give and attribute to 
them such titles and honours, rights, powers, and options that they will judge to 
be good.173 	  	  
1.1. Maps of the organization of seigneuries in New France before 1663 and in 1745 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Benoît Grenier, Brève histoire du régime seigneurial (Montréal: Boréal, 2012), 55. 
173 “Acte pour l’établissement de la Compagnie des Cent Associés pour le commerce du Canada, April 29, 
1627”, quoted in Harris, Seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study, 22. As Grenier 
points out, the first mention of the power to distribute fiefs and seigneuries is dated of 1541, ‘when the 
sieur La Rocque de Roberval receives from François Ier a commission to establish a colony of settlement 
in New France’. Brève histoire du régime seigneurial, 54. (my translation) No duchies or marquisates 
were ever created in New France, but a few baronies and counties were (e.g. the baronies of Longueuil 
and Portneuf, the county of Saint-Laurent). 
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Note: Before 1663, the seigneurie granted by the King of France in New France are very large but 
the boundaries are not clearly delineated. 
 
Source: Service national du RÉCIT de l’univers social, maps adapted from Serge Courville. Le 
Québec. Genèse et mutation du territoire, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2000, p.115. 
License: Creative Commons (by-nc-sa) 	  	  
From then on, all those who owned a company’s concession that could be further 
subgranted were ‘seigneurs’.174 Seigneurs could grant arrière-fief, a sort of 
‘subseigneurie’ within their concession, and those who owned these arrière-fief were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Following Harris’ usage of the term, in this study ‘“seigneur” usually refers to one of the group who 
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“seigneurie” refers to the land so held. Unless otherwise indicated “seigneur” and “seigneurie” are not 
intended to include the king, the companies, the holders of small arrière-fiefs, or their concessions’. 
Seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study, viii. 
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also considered seigneurs.175 Soon, several hundred seigneuries and arrière-fiefs were 
granted in New France.176 The acquisition of a seigneurie, however, did not give the 
owner a noble rank or title, even if the land itself was considered ‘noble’. This was no 
different than in France, where, as Goubert has noted, ‘[a]nybody can buy a seigneury, 
as long as he is rich: in addition to its revenues it will confer upon him a measure of 
dignity which will help him gradually to project the illusion of nobility in the eyes of the 
naive, the apathetic and the forgetful’.177 The fact remains that in the colony like in the 
metropolis, nobles and ecclesiastic seigneurs held most seigneurial lands. Few in number 
(a little less than 2% of the population)178, the nobility of New France was well endowed 
in fiefs: in the first half of the eighteenth century, nobles owned nearly half of the 
seigneuries and a third of the seigneurial superficies.179 Two third of these seigneuries 
are owned by military officers.180 The clergy also possessed a considerable portion of 
the seigneurial land: a third of the seigneurial land and one sixth of the number of fiefs 
in the first half of the eighteenth century.181	  
Seigneuries were settled by peasants, who, by paying the cens—a nominal but 
highly symbolic annual levy—were acknowledging that the land could not be further 
subgranted. By paying the cens, the peasantry was also acknowledging the legitimacy of 
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a complex set of feudal responsibilities and obligations, among them the obligation of 
tenir feu et lieu, that is, the requirement of clearing and ‘developing’ their plot of land. If 
New France’s peasants—or censitaires, as they were called—neglected to respect this 
requirement, the seigneur had the right to join their plots to the seigneurial domain.182  
The peasant therefore imperfectly owned his land, which was part of a large and 
complex network of formal and informal rights and obligations including, in some cases, 
an access to communal grazing grounds under seigneurial control for which an annual 
fee had to be paid on an individual basis183, as well as ‘vaine pasture, or the right of 
pasturing animals on the fallow’.184 The creation of commons by the seigneur was not 
an obligation, however, and by 1700, only a third to a half of all settled seigneuries had 
commons.185 Frequently made out of wetlands on the shores of the St. Lawrence, these 
communal lands were smaller in size than in France or England during the same 
epoch.186 This is perhaps attributable to the fact that in New France most seigneuries 
came off the St Lawrence, giving a strikingly consistent pattern to land use that was not 
the case in France. The close proximity of the river and of forests also meant that many 
of the needs that commons were intended to meet in France did not require such land in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 To appreciate the scope of the phenomenon, it is useful to recall with Grenier that “[t]he historian 
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seigneuries”. Ibid., 94. My translation; See also Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-
Century Montreal, 161–162. 
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New France.187 
 Where there were no commons, fields were never enclosed, like in France.188 As 
Dechêne has noted, this allowed the children to lead animals ‘on to the wasteland at the 
edge of the woods, on to the fallow, or along the roads. […] There were no hedges along 
the ditches’.189 If the soil was rocky enough, censitaires would sometimes try to use 
rocks to bank their plots as they cleared them. But ‘[o]nly the gardens, meadows, and the 
front of concessions that abutted on the commons were fenced in with cedar stakes. The 
properties themselves were almost never separated by fences’.190 	  
An obligation associated with the seigneurial regime of New France was the 
payment of the yearly rente, introduced in concession contracts and eventually joined 
with the cens in confuso. Like the cens, the rente was fixed: it could not be changed, was 
forever associated with the land, was transferred with it, and could not be redeemed once 
and for all by the censitaires with a lump sum. The average value of the rente is difficult 
to establish, for it varied with each seigneurie and each region. The estimate is also 
complicated by the fact that it often included payments in both kind and money.191 
Censitaires were also responsible for giving the priest a dîme, a yearly tithe. In 1663 a 
royal edict fixed it at one/thirteenth of the grain harvested, but it was clear to the 
governor and the intendant that this was too high: the rate they established for the colony 
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was of one/twenty-sixth, plus an exemption for the first five years.192 	  
The seigneurs had personal rights such as the banalités, among the most 
important was the seigneur’s monopolistic rights to oblige its censitaires to use its mill 
and pay a fee on ground wheat. This fee was fixed at one/fourteenth of the bushel, 
significantly more than in France, where it varied typically between one/sixteenth and 
one/twenty-fourth of the bushel. Other monopolies abounded, including, for some 
seigneurs, the exclusive right to trade fur on their fiefs. As a result of these monopolies, 
seigneurs could impose levies for a wide array of activities ranging from fishing and 
gathering wood to the use of the commons. In the eighteenth century, the increasing 
number of seigneurs reserving for themselves the right to take rock and sand from the 
censives led Dechêne to conclude that the seigneurie had become ‘rigid and invasive’.193 
There were also many restrictions on land transfers. The retrait lignager allowed 
the wife and children of a seigneur who was deciding to sell his land to reimburse the 
purchaser and have the seigneurie for themselves. The children’s légitime was ‘an 
individual’s right to half his original inheritance’, which gave to any son and heir the 
right to interfere and invalidate any transaction.194 Finally, the retrait seigneurial 
allowed the seigneur ‘to expropriate lands which changed hands […] on indemnifying 
the buyer for his purchase price plus expenses’.195 Mutation fines were also collected on 
estate transactions: the lods and ventes, which were requested by the seigneur during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Louise Dechêne, “L’évolution du régime seigneurial au Canada. Le cas de Montréal aux XVIIe et 
XVIIIe siècles,” Recherches sociographiques 12, no. 2 (1971): 160. 
193 Quoted in Grenier, Brève histoire du régime seigneurial, 94. (my translation) 
194 Harris, Seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study, 46. 
195 Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant, 95. 
	   91	  	  	  	  
sale of a peasant’s plot (called a censive)—a twelfth of its value as in France—and the 
quint, which was collected by royal agents during the sale of a seigneurial domain—a 
fifth of its value. These mutation fines constrained the movement of estate, limited its 
concentration, and contributed to prevent the commodification of land.	  
 
The ‘Rates’ of Exploitation 
Most of the elements that had prevented sustained economic growth in pre-
capitalist France had thus been imported in New France: ‘the feudal rent’, which ‘itself 
limited the funds available for accumulation’; ‘restrictions on peasant mobility’, which 
‘tended to limit the development of a free market in labour’; and ‘feudal restrictions on 
the mobility of land’, which ‘tended to prevent its concentration’.196 Yet it is difficult to 
assess whether these constraints were more important in the metropolis than in the 
colony. As Roberta Hamilton has pointed out, to start with, the context of the 
metropolitan background is ‘complex, highly variable, and often quite unknown (at least 
in any precise sense)’.197 Regional differences in particular make the amount of 
seigneurial dues, taxes and tithes levied in France extremely difficult to estimate. ‘It is 
little wonder that comparisons with New France vary so greatly’, Hamilton proclaims, 
for ‘one can simply choose the numbers that accord with one’s argument!’198 
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Around 1730 in Basse-Provence alone tithes ranged from 1/8 (in one community) 
through 1/16 (in thirty-six) to 1/24-1/50 (in eight). […] State taxation also varied 
throughout the country. While the ‘pays d’État’—provinces still possessing their 
own estates—were taxed at a lower rate, the average rate was perhaps “1/8 or 
12,5% of the gross yield of the first course”. Again, however, there is 
“bewildering variety”. The direct tax—the taille—functioned very differently in 
different parts of the country. In some places it was a tax on individuals, in other 
places, on land’.199 
 
French historian Pierre Goubert offered, in Hamilton’s words, ‘a most educated guess’ 
about the proportion of peasant production ‘garnered in one way or another by 
others’:200 ‘The inroads made into gross peasant production by this spate of rents, very 
unevenly distributed, can never be assessed at less than one fifth and must often have 
reached twice that amount (some historians have suggested even higher rates […]).201 
As for New France, Hamilton’s own estimation of the rate of exploitation of the 
peasantry is inspired by Denis Monière’s calculation: ‘The tithe represented 4 per cent of 
production, and the seigneurial rent—when it was collected—11%’.202 This estimation 
is close to the one provided by Dechêne, who estimated that ‘in the form of cens and 
rentes, tithes and milling rights, it is about 10% to 14% of the gross revenue of the 
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   93	  	  	  	  
habitant that is given to the seigneur’.203  
 Part of what accounts for this considerable difference (20% to 40% in France vs 
10% to 15% in New France) are the initial conditions of settlement, which made it 
difficult for seigneurs to make high demands on a peasantry that could hardly pay dues 
and tithes given the time needed to clear the land, build basic shelters, and establish 
productive crops.204 As agriculture developed and made possible the appropriation of a 
larger surplus by the seigneurs, counter-powers emerged out of the bonds of solidarity 
that developed over time among peasants despite the distance that, in this vast land, 
often physically separated each habitant from the other.205 To be sure, communal life in 
New France was not regulated by official local assemblies of peasants as it was the case 
in many regions of France, but ‘key people’—typically militia officers, churchwardens 
and the ‘anciens’—nevertheless often stood up for the whole group of habitants and 
contested the authority of the seigneur when his behaviour was deemed inappropriate.206 
Even if the ability of seigneurs to impose financial obligations and other duties on rural 
inhabitants was often strengthened by their role as primary notables of local 
communities, before clergymen and militia captains,207 seigneurs could not ‘without 
worrying stop offering these services for which the censitaires pay a portion of their 
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income or their harvest’.208 Coalitions among peasants were often created ‘to ensure that 
the mills are maintained, that the flour is of good quality, that chores associated with 
road maintenance are not abusive, etc. […] Clearly, just about everywhere in the 
seigneuries that have been studied, there was a series of conflicts in which the upper 
stratum of the local peasantry was particularly active’.209 
Struggles between censitaires and seigneurs also had a juridical dimension, the 
censitaires being, according to Richard Harris, ‘at their creative best’ in the use of 
courts.210 By the 1680s peasants could make use of the royal courts established in 
Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal, as well as the Sovereign Council. The intendant 
was also solicited for appeals of seigneurial judgment. Of course, the cost of recourse to 
royal or seigneurial justice was considerable.211 Administrative decisions and edicts 
from the king and colonial administrators did not always favour seigneurial powers, as 
illustrated by the fact that the religious seigneurs of Montreal—the Sulpicians—lost their 
rights to haute and moyenne justice in 1693, when the state used the Sovereign Council 
to undermine their court and replaced their baillage by a royal court.212 The loss of high 
and middle justice from one of the most important seigneuries of the colony strengthed 
the absolutist regime. 
Historians have long debated the role of the state in regulating the seigneurial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Grenier, “Pouvoir et contre-pouvoir dans le monde rural laurentien aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles” (my 
translation) 
209 Ibid. (my translation) 
210 Harris, Seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study, 66; See also Jean-Claude Dubé, 
Claude-Thomas Dupuy: Intendant de la Nouvelle-France, 1678-1738 (Montréal: Fides, 1969), 221. 
211 Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal, 207. 
212 Ibid., 206. 
	   95	  	  	  	  
system of justice since its establishment in New France.213 However, less attention has 
been paid to the role of the state within the broader dynamic of reproduction of the 
colony taken as a whole. In order to get to the roots of the difference between the rate of 
exploitation of the peasantry of New France and its counter-part in France, one has to 
look beyond the seigneurial regime and pay due consideration to the absence of a 
centralized taxation system by the French absolutist state, for in ancien régime France, 
the centralized taxation was such that the taille (a tax levied on the French peasantry and 
non-nobles) was in fact the ‘greatest single source of revenue for the Crown’.214 There 
was no equivalent in New France, where the administrative costs of the colony were 
paid by a 10% duty on wines, spirits, and tobacco entering the colony and a deduction of 
25% of the value of the beaver pelts sold (known as the quart). These constituted ‘the 
only taxes the people in Canada paid and, compared to their counterparts in France who 
were taxed almost out of existence, they had little to complain about’.215 The collection 
of this revenue was facilitated by the fact that there was only a single port through which 
the colony was received exports and imports by sea.216	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Why the absolutist state did not import centralized taxation in New France can be 
exaplined by the slow pace of settlement in the seigneuries, which made them rarely 
profitable for their owners. If few settlers meant few seigneurial dues to collect, it also 
meant that the taxation basis for the state would long remain weak. The crude reality of 
the overwhelming and hard work needed for bare subsistence in the first years of the 
settlement made taxation by the French state almost impossible, especially since the 
Crown wanted to attract settlers despite the hostility of the climate and the land.217 No 
wonder that the French state did not decide to pursue colonial ventures in New France to 
conquer large populations that could provide it with new revenues to extract from 
taxation. The first exploratory voyages of Jacques Cartier to the Kingdoms of Stadacona 
and Hochelaga in 1534 and 1535 had revealed a land of harsh climate populated by 
native people described with contempt as ‘savages’ by Europeans rather than the 
fabulous wealth of the kind found by the Spanish in South America. The idea that a 
passage to Asia could be found quickly vanished and originally the only attractive 
commodity discovered was the fish of Newfoundland’s Grand Banks. Hence the little 
interest initially showed by Europeans in northern America. Efforts at colonizing the 
region in the early seventeenth century occurred only after New France started to 
generate interest as a source of beaver pelts.218 Fur remained the major Canadian export 	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for the whole seventeenth century, with the cargoes going back to France being filled 
about four-fifths of beaver.219 
With the English and the Dutch establishing themselves not so far down the 
Atlantic coast, pressures increased on France to establish a fort at a narrows of the St. 
Lawrence in an attempt to control fisheries and fur trading networks. Quebec was 
founded. Like Jamestown and Plymouth, the new settlement suffered from the harshness 
of the cold winter and from scurvy. Of its initial 25 inhabitants, only nine survived the 
first year.220 From then on, in good and bad times the colony developed basic governing 
institutions as its population slowly grew. For half a century beginning with the creation 
of the Compagnie de Rouen under the auspices of Samuel de Champlain in 1614 and up 
to the establishment of the Royal Government in 1663, the task of organizing the 
distribution of land and facilitating settlement was entrusted to chartered merchant 
companies. The first half of the seventeenth century was thus characterized as a 
proprietary period in which monopolistic chartered companies succeeded each other in 
the colonization process. As Dechêne has asserted, New France was initially a trading 
colony, one in which ‘[t]he network between native producers and merchants had been 
operating for well over a century when the first wheat-field ripened on the Island of 
Montreal’.221 Fur remained the major Canadian export for the whole seventeenth 
century, with the cargo ships going back to France filled about four-fifths with beaver 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Press, 2011), 86. 
219 Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal, 72. 
220 Bérenger, Durand, and Meyer, Pionniers et colons en Amérique du Nord, 161. 
221 Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal, 63. 
	   98	  	  	  	  
pelts.222 
If the fur trade was of primary importance for merchant companies, one needs to 
be careful not to exaggerate its importance for the general population. As Dechêne has 
pointed out, earlier historians have depicted the habitants as invariably lured by the 
profits of the trade and ready, at the first occasion, to abandon their land and leave their 
family behind in order to roam the forest as coureurs des bois. The fact is that the vast 
majority of the habitants took up land on seigneuries and tilled it for their primary 
subsistence; only a tiny minority left for the woods to engage in the fur trade.223 This 
agriculture was only minimally commercialized, since towns were too small to represent 
a significant domestic agricultural market and surpluses could often not be sold, a 
situation that discouraged attempts at improving the techniques of production. Even if 
some peasants were going to Montreal in order to sell their produce, its market never 
developed into a regional centre of distribution of grain.224 
 Foreign outlets for grain were also not very significant. In the seventeenth 
century, ‘[o]ne could hardly find two ships a year to convey a bit of the surplus to the 
West Indies, where Canadian flour was not appreciated and could not compete with 
equally cheap metropolitan flour, which cost less to transport’.225 Twice as distant from 
the West Indies than Boston, and with a port closed a third of the year because of the 
winter, the population of New France was at a disadvantage to export anything other 	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than fur to the metropolis. France itself, with its peasant economy, was in little need of 
foreign grain and its mercantilist policies even denied New France the right to feed the 
military troops stationed in the colony.226 
The self-sufficient character of agriculture was strengthened in the second half of 
the seventeenth century as most habitants retreated away from the fur trade, which 
became increasingly concentrated into the hands of a few merchants and professionals. 
‘Voyageurs had to be experienced and good credit risks, so that country boys who chose 
such occupations tended to make them lifelong’.227 This phenomenon was further 
intensified between 1690 and 1719, as the colony underwent a credit crisis that saw a 
significant inflation in prices, accentuating the gap between domestic production and 
essential imports so that after this crisis, ‘despite faster and more regular land clearance, 
crop production sags and aligns itself to that of the population, as if the settlers had 
given up producing beyond their needs and those of the town’.228 The same applies to 
animal husbandry, for which ‘there is little indication of any specialized production for 
the market […]. Some families had more animals than others because some families 
were larger or more comfortable than others, but all had essentially the same 
complement of livestock […] conditioned primarily by domestic consumption needs’.229 
Peasant families ‘normally run their own affairs, supporting, maintaining, and 
reproducing themselves mainly with the fruits of their own collective labour with land 
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and equipment under their own immediate control’.230 
If there was little ‘connection’ between commerce and agriculture, as Dechêne 
has stated it, there was, however, a close connection between merchants, seigneurs and 
individual officers who all benefited from interrelated military and commercial activities 
associated with mercantilist dynamics. These activities provided the principal means of 
accumulation to New France’s ruling classes in a context where seigneurial dues did not 
typically amount to more than a secondary income.231 Seigneuries indeed constituted 
only one  form of investment among many others: ‘One who makes no investment, who 
leaves to chance the collection of fees and farm rents, derives almost nothing from it’.232 
This is true not only of the pioneer period of settlement, when ‘a seigneurie can not even 
guarantee the subsistence of a seigneurial family’, but also of the later period of the 
French regime, when ‘as a general rule […] the seigneurs are not rentiers on the land. 
[…] During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the “seigneurial” part of the income 
of the seigneurs constitutes more or less an extra revenue’.233 Consequently, seigneuries 
were caught up in what Grenier describes as a ‘vicious circle’: since the ‘seigneurial’ 
portion of the revenues of seigneurs constitutes a type of secondary income, most of the 
seigneur’s energies and resources were put in other, more lucrative activities outside the 
seigneuries.234 It would not be exact however to say that little investment were made to 
improve seigneuries, even if, as revenue drawn from demesne farms declined in 	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importance over time.235 As Alain Laberge has demonstrated with his detailed analysis 
of the aveux et dénombrements of 177 seigneuries in 1725: ‘investment of various nature 
were made to develop seigneuries. However, the seigneurial objectives are woven in a 
framework that is not exclusively rural: investment on most seigneuries are not an end in 
themselves, they participate in a larger process of socio-economic positioning’.236 
 
Inheritance Rights 
The clergy—who possessed a considerable portion of the seigneurial land (a third 
of the seigneurial land and one sixth of the number of fiefs in the first half of the 
eighteenth century)237—typically fared better than lay seigneurs. The grant of 
seigneuries was used by the King to support certain religious groups and their missions 
in New France in a time when the Counter-Reformation pervaded the politics of the 
French Crown.238 Historians of New France who have studied ecclesiastic seigneuries 
have shown that religious seigneurs often asserted assiduously both their spiritual and 
temporal powers to collect tithes and seigneurial dues from censitaires.239 In this pursuit 
ecclesiastic seigneuries had some advantages over lay seigneuries beyond their moral 
appeal: they displayed much more rigour in collecting information on their 
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seigneuries—generally in the form of censiers and papier-terriers240—and they did not 
suffer from the fragmentation that threatens lay seigneurial estates at the death of the 
seigneur.241 To be sure, the transmission of lay seigneuries to the heirs rarely implied 
their actual divisions, as the beneficiaries would usually sell their ‘inheritance rights’ to 
one of the heir so that the ‘cession of the shares restored the original holding’.242 This 
did not prevent, however, the multiplication of ‘co-seigneurs’ on many seigneuries: as 
Grenier has explained, ‘[t]oward 1725, almost half lay seigneuries have only one 
seigneur, but in the other half we witness a multiplication of co-seigneurs whose number 
varies depending on the size of the family: from one to thirty’.243  
Under the Custom of Paris prevailing in New France, both seigneurial and 
commoners’ land risked division (‘always theoretical’, Dechêne has argued244)  at the 
death of the heads of household. In the case of the seigneurie, inheritance was governed 
by the feudal hereditary right of primogeniture. This right allowed the elder son to 
receive, at the seigneur’s death, half the land of the estate, while other brothers and 
sisters would receive equal portions of the remainder estate. If the seigneur’s death 
preceded the wife’s, she would receive half of the estate in usufruct, the eldest son 
receiving half of the second half, while the rest would be divided equally among other 
brothers and sisters.245 Grenier has recently highlighted one of the consequences of these 
inheritance patterns for gender relations, documenting the fact that it is not rare, in New 	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France, to see women, mainly widows, managing and being responsible for seigneuries. 
A seigneurie could thus end up in the hands of a ‘seigneuresse’, at least for a time: 
‘[t]his feminine seigneurial power occurs generally during periods of transition, but 
these periods of transition can be very long’.246   
The ownership of a seigneurie could also be end up in the hands of a dozen co-
seigneurs, and even more, in the space of only two generations. These fragmented rights 
on seigneurie could themselves potentially be further divided among wives, sons and 
daughters at the death of each of the new co-seigneurs.247 As Harris has noted, 
‘[o]ccasionally the ownership of a seigneurie became so complicated that a special 
investigation was required to unravel the tangle’.248 The case is well illustrated by 
property disputes on Île Bizard, where a mémoire instructif had to be prepared to help 
the arbiters sorting out who were ‘the seigneurs of the island after three eldest sons had 
died in quick succession leaving so many inheritors that, even with this mémoire, it is 
clear neither who the several dozen seigneurs were, nor what fraction of the seigneurie 
each of them controlled’.249  
The embeddedness of seigneurial property rights in a complex system of 
hereditary rights and familial ties had consequences for the particular patterns of 
seigneurial investments, the greater part of seigneurial revenues being shielded from 	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market imperatives. Since seigneurs did not need to compete in markets to maintain their 
ownership of land, few incentives existed to encourage seigneurs to put back in the land 
the dues they appropriated from the censitaires. The division of the ownership of  
seigneuries between co-seigneurs made investment in estates extremely difficult to 
orchestrate, and very rarely profitable for any of them. The main seigneur of a 
seigneurie,  
 
unless he was willing to pay the bills, could not make general improvements to 
the seigneurie without consulting his coseigneurs. Should he build and pay for a 
mill without an agreement, each of the coseigneur could claim a share of its 
revenue; and to persuade half a dozen widely scattered coseigneurs to renounce 
their shares in a projected mill or to contribute to its construction was a 
troublesome, time-consuming business. Usually the principal seigneur did not 
bother, and the necessary new mill or repairs to the old one were neglected until 
a clamour from the censitaires led to an intendant’s ordinance.250 
 
To be sure, seigneurs could buy co-seigneurs’ parcels of land or whole seigneuries 
owned by other seigneurs, but these purchases were highly complicated matters that 
could easily take decades to be achieved.251 Overall, ‘[s]eigneurs had trouble enough to 
acquire the exclusive control of one, much less of two or three seigneuries, and these 
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few blocks of seigneuries controlled by single seigneurs were always broken up when 
they died’.252  
The fragmentation of seigneuries’ ownership had important consequences for the 
way seigneurs handled their responsibility to build a mill, often the only significant 
improvement that a seigneur would make on land during his lifetime: ‘With 
depreciation, repairs, and a miller’s salary, the yearly expenses for the simplest mill 
must have been in the order of 500 livres a year. Assuming an average price for wheat of 
approximately two and one-half livres a minot, the seigneur had to take in two hundred 
minots in some combination of his own and his censitaires’ grain […] to break even on 
his mill’.253 In general, as Harris has explained, ‘the gristmill was a liability to a 
seigneur until there were at least twenty-five families in his seigneurie, or more than 
twice that many during the first years of settlement. Settlers in Canada were seldom 
easily come by, and only a few seigneuries ever attracted even twenty-five families 
within fifteen years’.254 As a result, ‘[t]hroughout the seventeenth century there were 
complaints that seigneurs were not building or maintaining mills. A surprising number 
of mills were built years before they could be profitable, but most seigneurs 
procrastinated because of the debts they knew a mill in a sparsely settled seigneurie 
would incur’.255 Everything considered, Harris concluded that the seigneurial regime 
constituted at best a secondary income for seigneurs, profitable only when they 
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numbered at least forty or fifty families.256  
In order to attract and keep families in their seigneuries, seigneurs had to offer 
relatively advantageous tenurial terms. Lots were conceded by seigneurs to censitaires 
‘under terms which, in principle, made them the perpetual property of the recipient […]. 
[The censitaires] could not in theory be evicted and their tenure was therefore much 
more permanent and secure than, for example, that of an English copyholder’.257 
Together with the need for seigneurs to have a maximum of households settled on 
censives to make the seigneurie profitable, the tenurial terms of the seigneurial regime 
made peasants of New France able to retain the possession of their parcels without 
having to compete on the market. The situation of the peasant of New France therefore 
presents similarities with that of the French peasant, who, unlike the English tenant, ‘did 
not have to provide a level of rent equal to what the landlord might get from any other 
tenant—or else be evicted at the expiration of his lease’.258 
 
Colonial State-Formation, Geopolitics and Mercantilist Rivalries 
The responsibility to protect censitaires from seigneurial abuses and assure the 
hereditary character of peasant tenure was largely assumed by the intendant, who was 
asked in French provinces to protect rural communities ‘from intemperate exploitation 
by their landlords’.259 The zeal with which the indentant Raudot tried to curb the power 	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of seigneurial interests in New France is illustrative of a similar role in the colony; his 
recommendation to reform the seigneurial system to tip the scales in favour of the 
colonial peasantry was not entirely followed, but the promulgation of the Edicts of 
Marly in 1711 addressed some of his concerns.260  
The French state could also count to a certain extent on militia captains to 
counter-balance seigneurial power. Introduced shortly after the Royal government, 
‘[m]ilitia captains, as officers of the government obeying orders from the governor and 
intendant and answerable to them, exercised an authority that was entirely delegated and 
of a completely different order from that of a seigneur’.261 According to Eccles, militia 
captains ‘did much to integrate the administration with the general mass of society. This 
also ensured that the seigneurs as a group or class could not become too powerful and 
oppress the habitants or pose a threat in any way to the royal authority […].’262 While 
the authority of the King’s officials in colonial affairs should not be overstated, the 
existence of counter-powers such as militia captains and state officials combined with 
the fact that peasants of New France could, in principle, have recourse to the King’s 
courts offer a major contrast with forms of French feudal lordships during the Middle 
Ages, when lords had immunities on matters regarding their estates and their 
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dependants.263 Even if there are some evidence that the royal justice tended to favour 
seigneurs in their decisions, the fact that seigneurs needed to have recourse to them 
shows some of the limits of the authority of the demilitarized seigneurial class that was 
established in the colony.264  
But the role of the state in shaping the ruling class’ strategy of reproduction goes 
well beyond seigneurial justice to encompass most of the colony’s commercial activities. 
To secure the command of trade routes, merchants, seigneurs and officers indeed had to 
access the state and engage in various diplomatic activities related to dynastic alliances, 
constitutional struggles and even warfare. This made investments in manufacturing and 
industry particularly difficult to secure since political authority over territories was never 
guaranteed in time. The political terms on which private property, ruling status, 
commercial privileges and the definition of territories rested could change overnight 
entirely following dynastic intrigues, patronages or outright conquest from competitors 
or foreign powers. In fact, three times within less than a century and a half did Quebec 
city switch hands between France and Britain, an exemplification of the volatile nature 
of territories in the early modern international context. Without a significant population 
the territory was highly vulnerable to foreign conquest.  
In the conflicts that drew early modern European polities into constant clashes 
with each other and eventually led them to compete outside Europe for colonies in the 
New World, militarized individual feudal lords had long lost their role as the main 	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protagonists. Centralized states now occupied the front scene at the same time as new 
compromises had to be devised with trading companies and military officers which in 
the case of New France constituted the main agents on the ground. The French Crown 
indeed used its rights to dispense trading monopolies charters to towns and merchant 
companies as a way to encourage the latter to become its partnering agents in colonial 
ventures. Royal military protection at sea was also offered in what developed as a class 
alliance which resulted in what Teschke as described as 
 
gigantic military-commercial machines whose vessels, though sailing under the 
royal flag and on a royal commission, were owned and commanded by private 
entrepreneurs who shared costs and profits with the Crown. As joint-stock 
companies, trading companies were private enterprises; as chartered companies, 
depending upon royal trading concessions and privileges, they were public 
agencies, carrying rights of sovereignty.265 
 
As merchant companies would try to gain access to trade routes and to monopolize 
access to commodities, territorial expansion and the conquest of vast territorial lands 
could not be avoided. The exploitation of natural resources and market monopolies, the 
establishment of colonies and the access of circuits of exchange by joint-stock 
companies unavoidably generated politico-military competition backed by rival polities 
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in efforts to exploit extra-economic advantages of various kinds.266 Absolutist imperial 
expansions thus implied ‘the dispersal of political and economic power bound up with 
private property, governed by an imperial state from a very great distance’.267 When 
European colonial ventures led to settlement, ‘it tended to be for the purpose of 
enhancing trade, whether by establishing trading posts or by means of more wide-
ranging territorial occupation. This kind of settlement might have little to do with 
production, or production might be for the purpose of provisioning the imperial power’s 
merchant ships.268 Competition was ‘primarily “extra-economic”, involving piracy and 
retaliation, diplomacy and alliances, trade embargoes, and outright armed struggle 
against rival merchants and towns’.269 This directly resulted, Teschke has noted, ‘into 
almost permanent maritime trade wars between political rivals—the dominant logic of 
interaction between seafaring international actors in period’.270  
Teschke has argued that mercantilism was not an early form of capitalism, but 
rather a ‘politically constituted unequal exchange prolonging medieval practices into the 
early modern world’.271 The result was the pursuit of ‘militarily protected maritime geo-
commerce’ that fostered aggressive and competitive yet counterproductive long-term 
development tendencies.272 The search for power and wealth were intimately linked, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 202. 
267 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (London; New York: Verso, 2005), 38. 
268 Wood, The Origin of Capitalism, 150–151. 
269 Quoted in Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 202. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid., 197–198; See also Maurice Dobb, “Capital Accumulation and Mercantilism,” in Studies in the 
Development of Capitalism (London: Routledge, 1946), 177–220; Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis 
XIV’s France. 
272 Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 197–198. 
	  111	  	  	  	  
‘[s]ecurity and reproduction were inseparable’.273 It is in this broader geopolitical 
framework that commercial competition systematically fuelled politico-military hostility 
pushing ‘nations into one war after another’ and imprinting upon ‘all wars a turn in the 
direction of trade, industry, and colonial gain, such as they never had before or after’.274 
North American colonies were no exceptions. Since their inception they were indeed 
associated with the dynamics of mercantilist trade wars between European powers vying 
for the political control of long-distance commercial roads and vast territories bursting 
with natural resources. 
In this geocommercial setting, the aims of chartered companies were far from 
being exclusively commercial. In addition to the tasks of building and settling colonies, 
chartered companies had to work at the conversion of Native peoples and ensure the 
defence of the territory. It is, for instance, the Company of Adventurers to Canada 
founded by the Kirke family and several London merchants that financed and led the 
military expedition which, during the Thirty-Years War, succeeded in capturing Quebec 
in 1629—the biggest French settlement in New France at the time. In exchange, the 
Company was expecting to receive from the English Crown the letters patent that would 
give it a monopoly of right to trade and settle in Canada along the St. Lawrence. The 
Company’s hopes were frustrated three years later when the colony was restored to the 
French authority with the Treaty of Germain-en-Laye. While merchant companies were 
public-private ventures, the interests of the king were clearly not always compatible with 
those of the individuals engaging in these ventures for the sake of private enrichment. 	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The opposite is also true, especially since the fur trade was not even profitable for the 
French monarchy.  
As Catherine Desbarats has shown in her analysis of New France’s finances and 
what it represented in terms of burden for the French empire, together with the Canadian 
portion of the Domaine d'Occident, the fur trade ‘proved a fiscal disappointment. In 
contrast with the taxes collected in the West Indies and in France, rights to the Canadian 
beaver monopoly and to the trade duties falling on selected fur exports and on incoming 
spirits and tobacco barely covered the modest ordinary expenditures assigned to them 
even in peacetime’.275 Actually, they ‘did not even cover the costs of cultivating the 
native alliances on which not just the trade, but New France’s military capacity 
depended’.276  
That said, for individual members of the colonial administration and the 
merchants and seigneurs who associated with them, the fur trade could be remarkably 
profitable. Nobles and office-holders—not only merchants—were taking part in 
chartered companies, as illustrated by the Company of One Hundred Associates, 
chartered in 1627 with the participation of Cardinal Richelieu, principal minister of the 
king and one of the masterminds behind absolutist state-making.277 The Company was 
used by him and his associates as one more way to exploit offices in government to 
accumulate private riches instead of pursuing policies of raison d’État, a dynamic that 	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had been reinforced by the creation of the French absolutist state tax/office and the 
widespread practices of selling and buying state offices.278 In order to make war, the 
king needed money, and in order to obtain money, the king was willing to alienate its 
property by selling public offices to private individuals who were allowed to accumulate 
wealth in their duties of public officers. The ruling class of the ancien régime comprised 
both nobles and bourgeois who shared common economic interests in the state, a 
conflictual situation at the roots of the French Revolution itself, when aristocrats and 
bourgeois within the ruling class fought to gain access to the state: ‘aristocrats had an 
interest in preserving and extending the political privileges of noble status within the 
state which the unprivileged bourgeois had an interest in limiting or reducing.’279  
As the difficulty created by the distance had made it uneasy for the king to keep 
in check the behaviour of local administrators and chartered companies, the king 
successively withdrew the right to trade fur from the Compagnie de Rouen (1614-1621) 
and the Compagnie de Montmorency (1621-1627) because they had failed, as promised, 
to establish significant numbers of Frenchmen in Canada. The Company of One 
Hundred Associates that was formed to replace the previous venture never came close to 
fulfilling its charter obligations. Instead, it tried to devolve the responsibility of settling 
the colony to others by subgranting the land to both lay and ecclesiastic seigneurs, 
among whom the Société de Notre de Dame pour la conversion des Sauvages de la 
Nouvelle-France received the island of Montreal. Unsatisfied with the result of the 
colonization, the king withdrew the charter of the Compagnie in 1663, giving it, a year 	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later, to the Company of the West Indies, whose unsuccessful administration ended in 
1674. Levies that had been collected by the Company were then relinquished to the 
Crown who leased it out to another financial intermediary, the Domaine d'Occident tax 
farm.280 Already in 1663, the king, his advisors, and his appointees had started to take a 
much closer look at the affairs of the colony through the establishment of the Royal 
government and the arrival of the first intendant in New France.  
 
Politically Constituted Property in the Colony 
Devised to regain control of the colony against the growing independence of 
local administrators, the Royal government was established in 1663 to direct more 
tightly the settlement of New France. The Custom of Paris was introduced to the 
exclusion of any other and an intendant was nominated.281 In France, the creation of 
‘[t]hese revocable royal commissioners, equipped with extraordinary powers to 
supervise the collection of taxes and the administration of justice in the provinces’ had 
been ‘immediately seen by most patrimonial officers as a direct attack on their 
prerogatives.282 The situation was no different in New France, as testified by the many 
conflicts that opposed New France’s intendants to governors, religious congregations 
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and local administrators.283 While one should be careful not to see in the institutions of 
the Royal Government the activities of a modern civil bureaucracy—their members were 
no less than other officers inclined to use their powers to further their personal 
commercial interests284—they nevertheless allowed the metropolis to exert a significant 
control on the fur trade as well as on other colonial economic activities.  
 By 1680, regulatory social and political institutions had developed to such an 
extent that these institutions were often determining the price of merchandise and the 
number of craftsmen allowed in each craft. Dechêne has given the examples of butchers 
and bakers, who ‘were regulated by the judge, assisted by a few chosen citizens 
[prudhommes] who determined their number, the quality of their products, and their 
prices’.285 On some occasions, the intendant himself decided the number of bakers 
allowed to sell and retail bread under specific conditions.286 The sale and retail of 
alcohol were also regulated, as was the number of cabaret-hotels in Montreal and their 
opening hours.287 All in all, by the mid-eighteenth century, as one historian puts it, 
‘[e]fforts of the Minister of Colonies to check extravagance, and to enquire into the 
accounting methods of colonial governmental officials, threatened to destroy what had 
developed as the most important economic enterprise in the colony—the business of 
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diverting public funds into private hands’.288 
Bosher has investigated this confusion of ‘public’ and ‘private’ means of 
appropriation.289 Like other historians before him, he showed that ‘the great majority of 
government officials […] have used their power or positions for promoting their own 
private money-making ventures’, but he has also pointed out some of the problems with 
the typical interpretation made of these ventures. More specifically, he argued that the 
label of ‘corruption’ is particularly ill-suited to describe the fact that the fusion of private 
enterprise and government administration ‘was commonplace and generally tolerated in 
the ancien régime’, for this labelling ‘usually implies a moral judgment on the times. 
[…] [A] more satisfactory explanation might be found in answer to a sociological 
question: what sort of an administrative system was it which tolerated the intrusion of 
personal or private interests on such a large scale?290 Bosher’s answer to the question is 
that ‘[t]here was an ambiguity in the royal financial administration of New France, 
indeed of the entire French kingdom. The system was almost as much a private 
enterprise as a public function’.291 
One of the rare attempts at making sense of this ambiguity in the case of New 
France has been made by Michael Stewart, who has interpreted the fusion of political 
and economic power in the colony as a form of what Robert Brenner refers to as 	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‘politically constituted property’, that is, the ‘power to accumulate dependent on non-
market factors, such as military coercion, state privilege, and juridical authority’.292 In a 
passage worth quoting at length, Stewart has pointed out to the abundant colonial 
expressions of extra-economic means of appropriation for the colony’s top 
administrators, who ‘controlled the fur, fish and lumber trades for their own profit’: 
 
Especially in the absence of a tax system based on appropriation of the agrarian 
surplus, it was expected that the colony’s officials would profit by their 
administrative functions. The colony’s governing cadre determined the numbers 
and recipients of fur-trading licenses, attached levies on furs delivered to trading 
entrepôts and those leaving ports, and retained fines collected from illegal 
participation. As nobles they were also given free shipping on all royal naval 
vessels. And their authority not only lead to direct revenues but to myriad 
reciprocations deriving from patronage relations. […] [T]he same must be said 
for the fish and timber trades. Officials reaped exceptional profits here, not only 
by repeating their tactics in administrating the fur trade, but also because, as 
seigneurs—and all of them were seigneurs under the French regime—they held 
rights of banalité over lumber and fish harvested from their lands, which gave 
them a monopoly over production. […] [T]he victualling trade for the civilian 
populace […] [and] the military proved valuable as well […].293 
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While offices never became venal or hereditary in New France as they were in France, 
the colonial ruling class nevertheless reproduced itself through occupations and offices 
within the state, the access to which was of primary importance for the lucrative fur 
trade. On this matter, absolutist social-property relations in New France reproduced key 
dynamics of the social reproduction of the ruling class in France. As Dechêne has 
pointed out, in the colony ‘[a]ll officials of whatever rank had a hand in the trade […]. 
[This] can be said of most governors, intendants, judicial officers, and other agents of 
the Crown. […] [T]his is not a question of “corruption” but part and parcel of the 
administrative system of 1’Ancien Régime, where private enterprise and the public 
sector overlapped’.294 The same applies to seigneurs. Jean de Lauson, Sieur de Lisé, 
successively director of the Company of One-Hundred Associates and governor of New 
France, offers an illustrative example: in the mid-seventeenth century, Lauson’s family 
‘held more land than anyone else’ and yet, its principal short-term goal was, like other 
landholders, ‘to participate in, better still to control, those commercial activities from 
which substantial profits could be made’.295 
Examples of this kind can be multiplied almost infinitely, for the systemic logic 
of social reproduction of the colony restricted the ruling class to quite specific strategies 
centred on pre-capitalist forms of surplus extraction without direct control on the 
production process itself in order to maintain or improve their socio-economic positions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal, 92, fn; See also William Eccles, Frontenac 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1959); Bosher, “Government and Private Interest in New 
France.” 
295 Trigger, Natives and Newcomers Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered, 329–330. 
	  119	  	  	  	  
As Bosher has explained, ‘[a]s a basic feature of the monarchy, rank and place were 
fundamentally social, whether administrative, military or ecclesiastical, and the most 
rapid and profitable advancement lay open to those who could marshal the most support. 
Rank and place, once gained, opened further avenues to personal advancement’.296 Seen 
in this way, it becomes easier to understand that with the exception of a few colonial 
shopkeepers exclusively dedicated to commercial activities, those controlling the fur 
trade were almost always state officers and landowners. Nor should we be surprised that 
Jean Talon’s plan to diversify the economy came to a halt as soon as he left the colony 
in 1672, for local administrators got back to their previous obsession with the fur trade 
and showed, again, their lack of interest in populating the country and developing its 
industry.297  
The change of tone after Talon’s departure is well illustrated by the behaviour of 
Count Frontenac, Governor General of New France from 1672 to 1682 and again from 
1689 until his death in 1698. At the core of Frontenac’s policy of expansion was the 
construction of Fort Frontenac on the shores of Lake Ontario. A military establishment 
officially aiming at protecting Native allies against Iroquois, the Fort was in fact owned 
by a seigneur, Cavalier de la Salle, who partnered with Frontenac in the fur trade.298 
Like chartered companies before the establishment of the Royal government, Frontenac 
was far more interested in appropriating private wealth from the fur trade than in 
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satisfying the royal will of populating the country. In this regard, Frontenac’s behaviour 
is no different than other officiers d’épée of the navy and the colonial regular troops in 
that age, who were, as Bosher has pointed out, ‘accustomed to profiting […] from naval 
prizes and other wartime booty’.299  
Many military officers were also able to trade: ‘The ships, forts, and companies 
of men under their command afforded opportunities to those with the right connections. 
Warships commonly took cargoes across the Atlantic. […] [I]t would be a surprise to 
discover that a naval captain in that age did not use his authority to trade on his own 
account’.300 In the colonial regulars, the trade of army officers is even more evident: 
‘Their best opportunities lay in the fur and supply trades at Canadian forts, especially the 
western outposts where a number of well-known military families had established 
monopolies […]. The commanders of some forts farmed the trade out to merchants 
[…] [b]ut certain military names recur in the records of transatlantic trade’.301   
Conclusion  
In this chapter, it has been shown that in spite of the conflicts that opposed the 
absolutist state to the seigneurial class in the French metropolis, the seigneurial regime 
was established by the Crown as the mode of land tenure in New France. This strategy 
of socio-territorial organization was chosen by the French state as it drew on the 
repertoires of social relations existing in the metropolis to design a strategy of 	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territorialization of New France that would remain compatible with the workings of the 
absolutist regime and the authority of the king, geographically distant from colonial rule. 
In the colonial context, where only a few tax-gathering offices could be established in 
the absence of a sufficient taxation base to permit the collection of a direct centralized 
colonial tax on household and land, the social-property regime that developed on the 
shores of the St. Lawrence River did not take the form of a tax/office regime. 
Nevertheless, New France remained in the orbit of the specialized instruments of control 
of the French metropolis and its absolutist dynamic of development, since the state 
remained the primary means of appropriation in the colony—whether in the form of 
commercial connections and privileges, the manipulation of credit, or the possession of 
the military and administrative offices of the state. If not exceptionally prestigious or 
lucrative, grants of seigneuries in New France were themselves used as a way to reward 
deserving individuals, not the least because seigneuries provided indispensable local 
territorial roots to pursue lucrative commercial activities, such as the fur trade. The grant 
of seigneuries to merchants companies, individuals, or ecclesiastic communities played a 
central role in building the king’s dependant following of servants in the colony, 
contributing to attaching favoured individuals and their clan of retainers to the political 
interests of the Crown in a way similar to other grâces bestowed by the king, such as 
offices in the justice system, the army and the administration, nominations of religious 
officers of high rank (e.g. archbishops), support to religious congregations, grants of 
nobles titles, and preferential treatment at his royal court. The logic of social 
reproduction of the colonial ruling class of New France was resolutely more ‘absolutist’ 
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than ‘feudal’; it had more to do with access to the state than to the parcellized 
sovereignty of the seigneurial regime. 	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3.  
The British Conquest and its Consequences 
 
 
The cession of Canada to England by France took place under the reign of Louis 
XV as part of the Treaty of Paris which, in February 1763, together with the Treaty of 
Hubertusburg, ended the Seven Years’ War begun in 1754. On the European continent, 
the conflict had opposed Austria and its allies France, Saxony, Sweden, and Russia, on 
one side, against Prussia and its allies Hanover and Britain, on the other. In North 
America, the war that opposed England to France, assisted by Spain, on colonial 
questions, is known as the French and Indian War. In New France, the hostilities ended 
in 1760, with the military conquest of Canada, but war continued for three more years 
against Native peoples on the borders of the Great Lakes and in the Ohio Valley, as well 
as elsewhere in Europe, Africa, India, South America, and the Philippines.  
In the eyes of the Secrétaire d’État de la Marine in charge of French colonial 
policy at the end of the war, Canada ‘was not only commercially barren, but also, far 
from contributing to the defence of more productive colonies such as those in the 
Caribbean, a drain on imperial military resources’.302 As one historian puts it, during the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Paris, ‘the French had one last chance to try to get Canada 
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back’, but ‘[t]hey chose to trade Canada for Guadeloupe, a Caribbean sugar island’.303 
Meanwhile, a majority of ministers on the British side ‘appear to have been less 
concerned by the prospect of American independence than by the possibility that a 
continuing French military presence in Canada would mean that the British colonies 
remained vulnerable to attack’.304 Hence Canada officially became a British colony, an 
event with long-lasting socioeconomic and political consequences for its inhabitants.  
In this chapter, I argue that the changes that occurred in the public sector as a 
result of the change of metropolis directly affected the means of reproduction of the 
French Canadian ruling class. Under the French regime, this ruling class drew the bulk 
of its wealth from commercial and administrative privileges associated with state 
offices. With the change of colonial administration, this method of reproduction was 
blocked, or at least seriously limited, by the closure of access to the state for French 
Canadians. In this context, it became more rational for those who owned a seigneurie to 
revert back to their rights over censitaires and annuities, either tithes or rents, as the 
main source of their revenue. This was made possible by the decision of the British 
authorities to preserve the seigneurial regime in Lower Canada after the Conquest. In 
order to better control the French Canadian population, and for geostrategic reasons 
having to do with American revolutionary aspirations, the pre-capitalist agrarian class 
structure and social-property relations characteristic of New France was indeed 	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preserved. Because this regime provided no incentive to invest in the improvement of 
the means of agricultural production, by the early nineteenth century, the colony 
experienced an agricultural crisis: the fertility of the soil had been exhausted while limits 
had been placed on the seigneurial territory by the British authorities. Before exploring 
this agricultural crisis in the second half of the chapter, I first sketch out the geopolitical 
framework of mercantilist trade wars that eventually led to the final demise of the 
French North American empire during the Seven Years’ War. 
 
Mercantilist Trade Wars in Northeastern North America 
Territorial expansion beyond the shores of the St. Lawrence placed France and 
New France in conflict with Britain and its American colonies. As the fur trade 
expanded westward toward the Great Lakes and the Ohio Valley, the prolonged struggle 
with the British colonies intensified, culminating in the French and Indian War, the 
North American theatre of the larger Seven Years’ War.	  Historian Zenab Esmat Rashed 
has depicted the immediate cause of the conflict in these terms: 
 
Having made themselves masters of the Canadian colonies on the St. Lawrence, 
and of Louisiana on the Mississippi, the two Northern and Southern colonies of 
America, the French aimed at connecting them by a chain of forts along Lake 
Champlain, the Ohio, and the Mississippi. This procedure by the French 
presented a menace to the English colonists, who, with that encircling chain, 
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would not be able to extend their possessions beyond it.305   
 
The French, for a time, arguably had the upper hand in the conflict. Among the feats of 
the French troops, figures the destruction of Forts Oswego and William Henry under the 
order of Montcalm in 1757 and 1758. The French also successfully repelled the British 
army that threatened Canada’s Lake Champlain frontier in 1758, ‘smashing it into 
fragments’, to use one historian’s expression, at the Battle of Carillon.306 A year later, 
however, English troops were besieging the city of Quebec. Three months of siege had 
already left the city in ruins when the General James Wolfe decided to debark at 
L’Anse-au-Foulon, a cove situated southwest of the city. Soon after, on the Abraham 
Plains, English troops faced French troops in a surprisingly short confrontation: ‘Eight 
minutes of gunfire’, one historian says, ‘that shaped a continent’.307  
Since then, French and English Canadians have never ceased to quibble over the 
historical meaning of the event and recast it in the light of hypothetical scenarios. 
Would, for instance, the outcome of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham have been any 
different, if the French metropolis had sent more troops to North America? The subject 
is left to speculation. Over the long-term, however, there is little doubt that Britain had a 
decisive upper hand in the affairs of the continent. A few hundreds miles away, south of 
the St. Lawrence Valley, British American settlers had long developed much more 
populated and thriving colonies, veritable economic powerhouses during that epoch. In 
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the eyes of Peter Kalm, the Swedish explorer who wrote, in the 1750s, the first detailed 
study of natural history in North America, British American colonies ‘have increased so 
much in number of inhabitants, and in their riches, that they almost vie with Old 
England’.308 In the lively words of historian Peter MacLeod, 	  	  
French strategists saw a swarming, acquisitive mass of humanity, marching 
relentlessly forward with all of the awful inevitability of a horde of army ants, 
converting First Nations homelands into productive units of the British empire. 
[…] [None of the French triumphs] ever came close to threatening British 
America, whose strength lay in its coastal cities and countryside and its 
transaltantic link to Britain, not in its frontier forts and settlements. Every French 
victory only made British America stronger as a humiliated Britain reacted to 
defeat by sending more regulars, more ships, and more money to North America. 
As their resources increased and their regular army adapted to local conditions, 
British goals in North America changed from securing dispersed territory to the 
invasion and conquest of Canada. With this shift in policy, the war in North 
America became a war for Quebec.309	  	  
Metaphors aside, these observations hold true. By 1628, New France had seventy-six 
permanent inhabitants in the settlement of Quebec, the biggest French settlement in 
Canada at that date, while British North American colonies had already almost 5,000 	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inhabitants.310 As of 1690, there were 12,000 French settlers in New France, compared 
to the 250,000 inhabitants of the British North American colonies.311 At the beginning 
of the Seven Years’ War, in 1754, the population of New France averaged 70,000, while 
that of the British American colonies had surpassed the million.312 Historian Emile 
Salone had good reason to be astonished: ‘Seventy thousand French in Canada! After 
one hundred and fifty years of effective domination, it is, for the nation which, in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was often the most powerful, and always the most 
civilized and populous in Europe an absurdly low result’.313  
As Hamilton has noted, what is surprising here is not so much the weak 
development of the French settlement venture, but the incredibly strong development of 
the English one.314  Indeed, England was exceptional among all European powers in the 
massive scope of its emigration. This distinctive trait has everything to do with the 
development of specifically agrarian capitalism: as a result of the enclosure movement, 
the peasantry was dispossessed from direct access to the land, which was appropriated 
by the aristocracy and increasingly subjected to market competition, at the same time as 
the feudal tenure progressively wore away. As the number of dispossessed peasants 
grew, many of them ended up barely able to sustain themselves, even when they found 
tenant farmers to whom to sell their labour power. ‘In this context’, Hamilton has 
explained, ‘the idea of sending the country’s surplus population overseas gained 	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currency. Men of capital began to find it lucrative to export emigrants across the 
Atlantic; once established in America, the settlers became the most promising markets 
for the growing array of British manufactured goods’.315 France did not experience a 
similar enclosure movement and therefore lacked both the surplus population and the 
surplus capital for full-scale colonization. French peasants had resisted landlords’ 
attempts at dispossessing them; as they preserved their means of subsistence, the 
conditions for systematic improvement and specialization did not exist. Even when 
France explicitly wished to have more settlers in New France, its peasant majority at 
home had not generated a surplus population of the scope generated in England by 
agrarian capitalism and its dispossessed.316 From the beginning, therefore, more people 
and capital could be sent from England to the thirteen American colonies than could be 
sent to New France from France. 
At the end of the seventeenth century, New France ‘does not have industry or 
marine, all its wealth resting on subsistence agriculture and exportation of beaver pelts. 
Here already appears the contrast that will grow during the eighteenth century: French 
America has vast land while English America has men’.317 American industries 
developed at a much more rapid pace than in New France, a fact that, I argue, has to be 
accounted for by examining variations in social-property relations and the consequences 
of these variations for patterns of settlement and socioeconomic development. Historians 
who have pointed out the low pace of development of New France and described 
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Quebec’s development until the mid-twentieth century as ‘backward’ or ‘laggard’ are, 
therefore, not off the mark in comparative terms. New England unquestionably 
experienced a more powerful and rapid industrial growth than New France. Part of this 
economic superiority was based on its close ties with England, whose agriculture in the 
eighteenth century had been subsumed under the specifically capitalist mode of 
production, and developed to such an extent that the Industrial Revolution was about to 
unfold, giving the English state and its imperialist aims an unprecedented power.318  
By then, England had the most remarkable war machine in the world, and could 
align four times more vessels and five times more men than France.319 Furthermore, 
William Pitt the Elder, the British Whig statesman who led Britain during the Seven 
Years’ War, obtained from the Parliament eighty million sterling pounds in war 
credits—the equivalent of one billion six hundred million French pounds, that is, credits 
twenty-five times superior to the funds devoted to the war by France.320 Futhermore, 
England was endowed with a credit system so efficient that, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, it was characterized by Immanuel Kant as an ‘ingenious invention’, ‘a 
dangerous means of pecuniary power, a treasure of war, higher than that of all other 
countries taken together’.321 Without understanding the full implication of the 
transformation of social-property relations occurring in England, Kant, nevertheless, 	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identified one of the main peculiarities of this transformation: as a class represented in 
Parliament, landowners were able to raise taxes upon themselves, which resulted in the 
strongest European financial system and conferred upon the British ruling class an 
unrivaled capacity for collective action.322 As Cain and Hopkins have argued, ‘Britain 
was able to borrow extensively and efficiently because investors had confidence that 
their money would be returned, whereas France was forced to rely much more heavily 
on taxation’.323 
In this sense, British victories during the Seven Years’ War—including the 
Conquest of Canada—were largely based on the greater productivity of capitalist social 
relations.324 So dominant, in fact, were British forces that, by the end of 1762, they had 
taken control of ‘French colonies and outposts in India, Africa, and the West Indies’, as 
well as ‘raided the coast of France, and landed in Germany to support their Prussian 
allies. Immediately after Spain entered the war, on the side of France, the British 
captured Manila and Havana, key Spanish ports on opposite sides of the globe’.325 By 
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contrast, the French absolutist regime, racked by internal contradictions, was on the 
brink of a collapse which was to be accomplished less than three decades later, with the 
French Revolution. By then, ‘the fiscal-military superiority enjoyed by capitalist Britain 
[had] undermined absolutism’s ability to engage in successful geopolitical competition, 
exhausted its tax basis and state finances, and sharpened the domestic social conflicts 
over redistribution’.326 
 
Changes in the Geo-Territorial Configuration 
By theorizing the Conquest as a geopolitical confrontation between polities that 
were the theatre of class struggles rooted in fundamentally different social-property 
regimes, I argue that it is possible to grasp some of the consequences of the British 
Conquest for the transition to capitalism in English Canada, while accounting for the 
long-term economic ‘backwardness’ of the French Canadian countryside. Without being 
the catastrophe depicted by the Montreal School,327 the change of metropolis did result 
in a profound reorganization of political rule in the St. Lawrence. This political 
reorganization had significant repercussions on the processes of colonization that had 
shaped the socio-territorial organization, economic development, and class structure of 
Laurentian society over the two preceding centuries.  
When the British Conquest occurred, many members of the colonial ruling class 
had no choice but to go back to France, for they were tied to the absolutist state through 	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military offices or administrative duties which were rendered obsolete, or through 
commercial and clientelist connections that would have been of no use within the British 
empire.328 An additional incentive to return to France were the domains that many held 
on the old continent, which were often worth more than their North American 
possessions. The return to France after the Conquest was, nevertheless, quite 
challenging, for the Canadian nobility was generally held in low esteem by its 
metropolitan counterpart.329 It is now estimated that approximately 5% of the colonial 
population, that is, 4,000 people, left the colony between 1754 and 1770.330 The 
sociopolitical background of those who left was varied: sword and robe officers, with 
their family and their domestics, were hoping to  
 
be reused or rewarded for their loyal service to Canada. Other, lower in the social 
hierarchy but also at the king's service, like midwife ‘maintained by the King’, 
pilot and surgeon of the king, militia major, etc. also left with their families for 
the same reasons. Some of them would later be reused in Guyana: career officers, 
ex-soldiers of Canada, specializing former employees of the shipyard, etc. Others 
moved to France to pursue their professional activities: traders wanting to 
reorganize their trade within colonial mercantilism, sailors making their living on 
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ships whuch could not come back to Canada […].331 
 
The members of the ruling class that left New France after the Conquest were not grands 
bourgeois capitalistes, but a mixture of pre-capitalist bourgeois and nobles who had had, 
in New France, a central interest in the colonial administration. The Conquest deprived 
them of their access to the state and, as a result, their primary means of surplus 
extraction. Many important seigneurial families stayed nevertheless, such as the Boucher 
de Niverville, Chartier de Lotbinière, Chaussegros de Léry, Juchereau Duchesnay, Saint-
Ours and others.	  Most of those members of the ruling class who stayed behind were 
however non-noble seigneurs or noble seigneurs of low rank, who could continue to 
accumulate private rents without being directly tied to the new British administration, as 
long as this administration recognized their seigneurial rights and status quo, which it 
did in order to secure the cooperation of what remained of the French Canadian elite in 
dealing with the recently conquered, and potentially hostile people, in a broader Atlantic 
context marked by American revolutionary agitation.  
Undoubtedly, British administrators first considered abolishing the seigneurial 
regime and imposing the English traditional system of tenure on the entire territory of 
New France, on which more than 250 seigneuries existed at the time.332 Among a series 
of important measures proposed by the new administrators, also featured the elimination 
of customary law, the disappearance of the French language, and the conversion of 
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Catholics to Protestantism. Measures of outright assimilation were, however, quickly 
abandoned. The view of the newly appointed governor, James Murray, prevailed:	  	  
En bonne politique, it [the colony] should be perhaps destroyed, but there may be 
reasons why it should remain, as it is a guarantee for the good behaviour of its 
neighbouring colonies. […] The Canadians […] begin now to be astonished with 
our conduct, will soon be convinced that there was no deceit in it, and hardly will 
hereafter be easily persuaded to take up arms against a nation they admire.333	  	  
Had the British administrators abolished the seigneurial regime and replaced it by the 
free and common socage, they would have provoked the general indignation of what 
was left of the French Canadian elite. Religious communities, which controlled over a 
quarter of the land in 1760, and seigneurs fiercely opposed the first measures envisaged, 
for the implementation of the free and common socage would have stripped them of 
their only source of income and the basis of their local power.334 As Grenier has pointed 
out, the new rulers also realized that they could themselves take advantage of the 
seigneurial tenure and, in 1762, before the Treaty of Paris was even signed, the governor 
James Murray granted seigneuries to two Scottish officers. The others seigneuries 
acquired by Englishmen or Scots in the second half of the eighteenth century were 
purchased, rather than granted.  	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Of the forty-four seigneuries sold by nobles and bourgeois who left for France 
between 1760 and 1766, twenty-nine were purchased by the British, among whom 
featured Murray himself, as well as many military officers. Some of the new seigneurs 
were also merchants who had accompanied the army during the military campaign.335 
This was only the beginning, as Grenier has noted, of a tendency that was to reinforce 
itself to the point that, by the mid-nineteenth century, more than half of the seigneuries 
were owned by non-French Canadians:  
 
The acquisition of seigneuries by the British is a gradual but steady process […] 
[that] continues in the nineteenth century […]. It is the bourgeois, and in 
particular the English bourgeois, who have an increased interest in seigneurial 
property, to the extent that it can play a role in their economic activities while 
ensuring a enviable social position. Several areas can benefit from the seigneurial 
property, starting with the production of flour.336	  
 
The interest of anglophone merchants in seigneuries peaked, according to Fernand 
Ouellet, ‘when agriculture was at its most prosperous’, that is, between 1782 and 1802. 
During this period, the British bought fifty-five seigneuries, but only forty-two between 
1802 and 1840.337 Not only had British administrators and merchants realized that they 
could take advantage of the seigneurial regime for their own personal enrichment, but 	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they were also aware of the need to preserve the seigneurial regime in order to gain the 
support of the French Canadian seigneurial class in preventing the spread of the 
revolutionary agitation blowing from New England.338  
Many of the provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 intended to implement 
the British system of law and government in the colony of Quebec were never applied, 
or not in full, and many fundamental traits of the French regime persisted. Four months 
after the Boston Tea Party, the Quebec Act of 1774 reasserted the political and juridical 
privileges of seigneurs, while officially keeping the Coutume de Paris in function. The 
Act reasserted the application of the French civil law in the colony, allowing seigneurs 
to continue to play a central role in the management of the habitants’ domestic affairs, 
such as testaments and legacies. The Act also abolished the ‘Serment du Test,’ which 
had been imposed after the Conquest to exclude Catholics from state and judicial 
offices, and it reaffirmed the clergy in its powers while confirming its right to receive 
tithes. In addition, seven Catholic Canadians, chosen from the minor nobility and the 
seigneurial class, were appointed among the seventeen members of the legislative 
council.339 
The contrast with the strategy of deportation adopted during the Seven Years’ 
War to deal with French Acadians—one of the gloomiest chapters in Canadian history—
could hardly be larger. As Louis-Philippe Lavallée has argued, the new military and 
geopolitical situation was largely responsible for this radical change in attitude: ‘at the 	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beginning of the war, French Catholics were perceived as enemies rather than subjects: 
let’s recall here the thousands of Acadians who were expelled and dispersed among 
British colonies with the goal of assimilating and anglicizing them’.340 Given the war 
with France, the British were afraid of leaving behind a population of French settlers that 
could take arms against them at any time and assist French and Canadian troops in their 
fights against the British American empire. These strategic considerations changed with 
the end of the war. By that point, imperial rulers had modified their stance toward the 
recently conquered population, ‘modulating exclusion policies into an approach that 
sought “to bring” order and justice to a “backward” society and a willingness to make of 
French Canadians good and true British subjects’.341  
No wonder that, excepting the writings of nationalist historians, so many 
accounts of the British rule in the St. Lawrence have insisted on its benevolent and 
compassionate character.342 For one thing, the size of the population of New France—
which, while small in comparison with that of New England, was more than four times 
that of Acadia—would have made highly difficult a forced removal of the kind practiced 
in Acadia. For another, the defeat of France had been decisive, and the French Crown 
showed little sign of willingness to reconquer Canada. In the new context, rebellious 
British American colonies represented a more substantial politico-military threat than 
the newly conquered French Canadian population. It even became possible to envision 	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French Canadians as allies in dealing with rebellious British American colonies to the 
South.  
Back in 1732, James Logan, Pennsylvania’s chief of justice, could confidently 
deduce that as long as Canada was so near, American colonies would not rebel.343 Kalm 
shared a similar opinion: ‘As the whole country which lies along the seashore is 
unguarded, and on the land side is harassed by the French, these dangerous neighbors in 
times of war are sufficient to prevent the connection of the colonies with their mother 
country from being broken off’.344 Once ceded to Britain, however, ‘Canada was just as 
close, but no longer a threat [to American colonies]. Some British soldiers, among them 
James Murray, had thought all along that a British Canada would be less a conquered 
colony than an incitement to American rebellion. […] With the French threat eliminated, 
the American colonies no longer needed British protection’.345 Relieved as they were of 
the acutely felt menace of fortified French holdings to the north and west, and gaining an 
ally in the French metropolis, American colonies could now push toward greater 
autonomy and expansionist ideas.346 ‘In this context, the Quebec Act reflected the 
primary objective of British policy after 1765: to gain the support of the seigneurs and 
the clergy so as to a secure military base on the continent which could be used to 
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suppress if necessary too strong a spirit of independence within the English colonies’.347  
Not only had victory in the war against France ‘brought to the English colonies 
an enormous confidence in their own strength’,348 it had also generated debt for the 
British state. As a result, the latter was determined to strengthen its grasp on the 
mainland colonies in order to raise revenues and ‘limit the independent economic 
development of the colonies’.349 The mercantilist regulations imposed on the North 
American colonies in the aftermath of the French-Indian War disappointed the 
expectations of the colonists, who, rather than being rewarded for their loyalty during 
the war, saw a series of direct and indirect taxes (the Sugar Act, the Currency Act, the 
Stamp Act, the Townsend duties, the Tea Act, etc.) imposed on them.350 The mix of 
favourable concessions given to the French Canadian population, together with the 
annexation of the vast Ohio territory to the province of Quebec, made the First 
Continental Congress, held in Philadelphia in October 1774, look upon the Quebec Act 
as yet another Intolerable Act. A few months later, the American colonies took arms 
against Britain in the first military act of the American Revolution. 
 
The Cooptation of French Canadian Elites 
In Quebec itself, the Act displeased the British merchants that had established 	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themselves in Montreal and Quebec after the Conquest. It refused them the assembly 
that had been promised in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and thwarted their ambition 
to establish their commercial and political hegemony on the colonies: ‘[i]ndignant at the 
generosity of the metropolis to “papists”, [English merchants] considered themselves 
stripped of their rights as British subjects, namely their rights to the representative 
system, to the Habeas Corpus, the Common Law and the jury trial’.351 While fanning the 
flame of the American rebellion, the Quebec Act was successful in ensuring the 
cooperation of French Canadian elites: the clergy and the seigneurs combined their 
efforts in an attempt to recruit militia and secure the loyalty of the French peasantry to 
England in the face of the imminent American invasion. Yet, the support of the French 
Canadian elite did not translate into the conquest of the hearts and minds of the rural 
population. Despite zealous exertions of the gentry and the clergy, the French Canadian 
population remained reluctant to fight the American rebels, ‘to the great disappointment 
of the governor and those he believed to be their natural leaders’.352  
Marked class antagonisms operated between the French Canadian habitants and 
their leaders, the former unwilling to fight on behalf of the seigneurs who had exploited 
them, or the British rulers who had conquered the territory. As such, the Quebec Act was 
not warmly welcomed by everyone among the French Canadian majority. The latter, 
according to one British merchant in Montreal, ‘is greatly alarmed at being put under 
their former laws, of which they had long severely felt the ill effects; though the French 
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Noblesse and gentry, indeed, are very pleased with the new Act, which restores the old, 
as they expect to lord it over the industrious farmer and trader, and live upon their spoils, 
as they did before’.353 The following year, a letter written from Quebec by Francis 
Maseres, English lawyer and attorney general of the Province of Quebec, similarly 
stated that ‘[i]f we dare to apply to the Canadians for an union with us to petition the 
King or an amendment of the Quebec bill, we should find the tradesmen, most of the 
merchants, and all the country-inhabitants, unanimous in our favour’.354  
Other correspondence during the years following the Quebec Act point toward a 
similar discontent and displeasure among French Canadians.355 Canadians ‘declared that 
it was not at their desire or solicitation that it was passed […]. They said that the 
persons, who had signed that petition, consisted principally of their ancient oppressors, 
their Noblesse, who wanted nothing more than, as formerly, to domineer over them’.356 
French Canadians had ‘greatly preferred the situation before the passing of the Quebec 
Act where the priests had no means of enforcing the payment of tithes and events during 
the summer and autumn of 1775 clearly revealed that the habitants had had no wish to 
see restored to the seigneurial class the privileges and powers they had enjoyed before 
the British conquest’.357 
In this context, it became extremely difficult for British authorities and Canadian 
seigneurs to recruit militias among the francophone population. Even those recruited 	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refused to fight when the army of the American Richard Montgomery reached the 
Canada-US border on the Richelieu.358 Resistance to martial law and the calling out of 
the militia was such, in fact, that ‘[i]mmediately there developed a widespread 
movement of resistance on the part of the habitants which amounted almost to rebellion 
against the state’.359 In many parishes, residents assembled in armed mobs of many 
hundreds, and even thousands, to resist enlistment, threatening to burn and destroy the 
possessions of those willing to cooperate with seigneurs and British officers. One of the 
mobs went as far as making two seigneurs prisoners in Ste-Anne.360 When the American 
troops arrived in the St. Lawrence Valley, they were supplied with food by the 
peasantry, advancing fairly easily through the countryside and onto the invasions of 
Montreal and Trois-Rivières.361 Quebec City, however, withstood the siege, and there 
ended the American military adventure on Canadian soil, as the troops left the territory 
upon the arrival of a British fleet commanded by General Burgoyne. Following the 
announcement of the Franco-American alliance and the hopes that France would want to 
take back its old colony, many French Canadians considered joining the Americans in 
their rebellion against Britain, but little action was taken.362  
Due to the reliance of British administrators on the seigneurs and clergy to 
control the French Canadian population, the aftermath of the Conquest provided the 
French Canadian elites with renewed opportunities to appropriate surplus labour from 	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peasants. It became ‘the deliberate policy of the local governors, and more particularly 
of Carleton, to restore as far as possible that whole system of special privileges which 
had secured the close identity of the colony with the interests of old-world empire’.363 In 
the words of one historian, by 1774 ‘[t]he strengthening of Quebec as a military […] 
base, the restoration to the seigneurs of the privilege of calling up the inhabitants for 
military service, and the effort to make of the whole western region a preserve of the fur 
trade under the close control of Quebec’ had led to ‘a structure of government and a 
system of economic, social, and ecclesiastical control […] more authoritarian in 
character and extensive in sweep than anything that had existed under French rule’.364 	  
 
The Reinforcement of the Seigneurial Regime 
At the same time as they were losing their privileged position in the colonial state 
in favour of a foreign class of British and American merchants, the French Canadian 
seigneurs and the clergy were given opportunities to reinforce their local power within 
seigneuries. This was a limited yet significant power, given that the growth of the 
population had finally made it possible, as Ouellet has pointed out, ‘to live from rents. In 
1765, 42 percent of settlements had more than seventy-five resident families, which 
exceeded the minimum number of censitaires necessary to support their lords (about 100 
censitaires); in 1790, this rose to 75 percent. […] [A] great many seigneurs could draw 
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substantial revenues from their fiefs for the first time’.365 Seigneurs also adopted ‘more 
archaic forms of exploitation: reinforcement of banalities, careful collection of lots et 
ventes, monopolies on fishing, on energy providing watercourses, on forest resources, 
reappearance of corvées, of the droit de retrait, etc’.366  
More severe obligations with regards to banal rights on grain had important 
consequences for the life of censitaires, whose alimentation relied heavily on bread. As 
Greer has argued, ‘[i]n the seventeenth century, only grain used for home consumption 
had to be ground at the seigneur’s mill’ and the fine for processing flour elsewhere was 
relatively small.367 By the 1790s, however, ‘the formula in concession deeds subjected 
all grain grown to the banalité, whether it was consumed at home or sent abroad, and 
piled penalty on top of penalty: not only would a fine equal to the milling toll be 
exacted, the illicit flour could also be seized and additional arbitrary fines imposed’.368 
Seigneurs also succeeded in significantly increasing rents themselves. They could not do 
so in old seigneuries, since the cens et rentes, even those set in the seventeenth century, 
were not ‘subject to change, even after several decades or centuries’.369 They could 
increase rents, however, when new concessions were granted in newer parts of the 
seigneuries or fiefs.370 ‘The movement [...] accelerates at the end of the century and 
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explodes after 1815 [...]. This is manifested by higher rents, but also by an increase in 
other expenses of concession contracts and the use of a variety of sampling 
strategies’.371	  
Part of the movement toward higher rents was facilitated by the absence of the 
French intendant to protect the peasantry. Until the Conquest, the intendant had, among 
other things, rendered evictions of peasants for failure to occupy the land or pay rents an 
exceptional phenomenon, as he would generally allow recalcitrants ‘a year or more 
grace period in which to pay arrears and fulfil settlement duties before ordering 
repossession. […] Repossession became easier after the British Conquest, however, as 
no official filled the functions of intendant and seigneurs seem to have proceeded on 
their own authority to evict negligent habitants’.372	  
Not only had the strategy adopted by British rulers given French Canadian 
seigneurs the means to reinforce their hold on censitaires, it had also given them the 
reason to do so. In what José Igartua has described as the new ‘climate’ of the post-
Conquest’,373 French-speaking merchants no longer had access to the lucrative military 
and government contracts that had been so important for their living under the ancien 
régime.374 After the war, the British rulers were naturally suspicious of the participation 
of the defeated in the military affairs of the new colony, so that, for a time, military 
careers were out of the reach of most French Canadians. To be sure, some seigneurial 	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families received the favour of the new governors and managed to do well in the new 
circumstances.375 Yet, French Canadians were ‘generally absent from the ranks of those 
[colonial administrators] with salaried and highly lucrative positions’.376 Moreover, 
‘their access to the markets and credit facilities of France was now useless as London 
had taken on primary importance’.377 In these circumstances, they ‘were slowly 
squeezed out of the fur trade by English speakers, most notably by the establishment of 
the North West Company in 1779’.378 	  
Historians Dale Miquelon, Louise Dechêne, and Peter Moogk have attempted to 
demonstrate that French Canadians, because of their expertise in the fur trade and a 
thorough knowledge of regional realities, would not have been at a real disadvantage in 
the fur trade and the import-export sector if they had been willing to continue in the 
business. A good knowledge of the territory was indeed essential to succeed in the 
business. However, more was at work than old habits in the inability to compete with 
English merchants and seigneurs, for the political basis of French Canadians’ access to 
trade networks and territories through close links with state and army officers had been 
profoundly damaged.	   French Canadians were largely excluded from positions of 
authority and, by extension, the networks of favouritism that were so important to 
anyone looking to enrich oneself. Furthermore, importers and exporters were deprived of 
their contacts in the French empire, where the greatest proportion of international trade 	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by French Canadian merchants had been done until the Conquest. By 1777, English 
merchants were powerful enough ‘to command the majority of investments in the fur 
trade’.379 The retail trade was also affected by the flood of English manufactured goods 
with which French Canadian retailers could hardly compete.380 Ultimately, the 
integration of New France into the extensive commercial and industrial circles of Britain 
(and America) represented a move away from absolutism, a transition in the dominant 
form of class relations, since the English were more decisively and successfully engaged 
in trade, but did not seek to maintain absolutist social relations.	  
At the same time as the most lucrative positions of the state were monopolized 
by the new British rulers and opportunities for the French Canadian seigneurs to make a 
living in trade were seriously hampered—leaving them with little choice but to fall back 
upon land-holding and the labour of censitaires to reproduce themselves as a class—a 
whole range of second order positions within the colonial administration and justice 
system were opened to the French Canadian bourgeoisie. Donald Fyson has recently 
shed new light on the complexity of this situation in his study of the possibilities and 
limits of mutual adaptation between French Canadians and British newcomers. He has 
pointed out, for instance, that far from disappearing from the public sphere and the 
colonial administration, as historians have long assumed, French continued to be the 
language of everyday administration, ‘at least at the level experienced by the colony’s 
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population’.381 He has also shown that, while only Protestants were entitled to be 
justices of the peace, many positions of court clerks and court bailiffs, along with 
judicial auxiliaries, such as notaries and lawyers, were actually opened up to French 
Canadians out of mutual interest and pragmatism. This was also the case with 
participation in juries and employment in the lower ranks of the civil administration.382 	  
Historians have often interpreted the rise of the French Canadian professional 
petty bourgeoisie in the second half of the eighteenth century in Smithian terms, that is, 
as the consequence of the diversification of activities and social groups assumed to more 
or less automatically unfold from increasing commercialization of agriculture.383 It 
must, rather, be attributed to the traditional strategy of reproduction of the French 
Canadian rural elite seeking social status and to take advantage of the new range of 
careers opened up to professionals within the colonial state. As Finlay has pointed out,  
 
[t]he farmers who were the main beneficiaries of the boom conditions […] did 
not use their growing purchasing power to consolidate their newly won positions 
and to move on to higher levels of economic organization. Rather, they 
consumed their surplus in buying status, sending their sons to school and college 
and having them enter the professions. Notaries, advocates, doctors, pharmacists, 
surveyors—all increased their ranks in the opening years of the nineteenth 	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century. The swing was mirrored in the composition of the assembly; whereas 
the professions were but 18 percent in 1792, they were 29 percent by 1800 and 
35 percent by 1810. On the other hand, the merchant element had declined from 
59 percent through 37 percent to 31 percent.384	  	  
In terms of its consequences, the Conquest also laid the ground for the introduction, in 
1791, of a form of free land tenure unknown to French Canadians in territories outside 
seigneuries: the ‘free and common socage’. Grenier sees in the introduction of this new 
tenure—more than in the Conquest itself—the beginning of the slow process of abolition 
of the seigneurial regime in Canada, for ‘after 1790 it will become increasingly difficult 
to justify the co-existence, within the same province, of two systems of land tenure’.385 
From then on, with a few exceptions, all new grants of land from took the form of 
townships: ‘Ninety-five townships were established in the South-West part of Quebec, 
and many more later in the regions newly opened to colonization (Outaouais 
Laurentides, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, Gaspésie, Côte-Nord, Abitibi)’.386 Those lands  
 
were not turned or subdivided into capitalist farms. In the overwhelming majority 
of cases, they remained undeveloped, a fact that provoked a welter of complaints 
from the burgeoning peasant population. Grantees preferred to speculate on their 
land’s future worth […]. In so doing, they barred peasant families from renting or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 John L. Finlay, Pre-Confederation Canada: The Structure of Canadian History to 1867 (Scarborough: 
Pearson Education Canada, 1990), 219. 
385 Grenier, Brève histoire du régime seigneurial, 152. (my translation) 
386 Ibid., 153. (my translation) 
	  151	  	  	  	  
purchasing small plots, leading to many peasants fleeing to the US’.387  
 
The population was increasing rapidly in these decades: from 70,000 people in 1760, it 
reached 511,000 in 1831, and 890,000 in 1851. As Grenier has explained, ‘[t]his growth, 
given the absence of new concessions of fiefs, had for result to lead to the saturation of 
agricultural land in the seigneurial world. […] From 1815, access to land begins to pose 
serious problems for Canadians’.388  
 
The Pattern of Agricultural Development in Lower Canada 
One of the main historiographical debates about early nineteenth century Lower 
Canada’s agricultural development is whether it experienced an ‘agricultural crisis’. The 
thesis of the agricultural crisis was initially put forward by Fernand Ouellet in the 1960s. 
According to Ouellet, the first signs of the agricultural crisis appeared in the 1800s. The 
few preceding decades constituted a period of relative prosperity for French Canadian 
wheat producers, since the fuller integration of Lower Canada into the imperial market 
following the American Revolution resulted in new economic opportunities for Lower 
Canada’s agricultural surpluses. As historian Peter Russell has recounted with regard to 
this early boom, the statistical basis of Ouellet’s argument rests on the quantity of wheat 
and flour exported from the port of Quebec, adjusted to take account of Upper Canadian 
and American shipping: ‘[t]he export records show a rising trend from the early 1770s to 	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a peak in 1820’.389 This led Ouellet to conclude ‘that habitants responded to strong if 
occasionally uneven demand within the British Empire […]. First peace in North 
American and then war in Europe and a long string of poor British harvests successively 
stimulated British demand and restricted competing European wheat producers’.390  
Central to Ouellet’s argument is the claim that French Canadians responded to 
the opportunities offered by the British market ‘by accelerating the clearing of their 
lands rather than by any improvement in their farming techniques of practices’.391 The 
lumber trade also became a major economic activity in the colony as the Napoleonic 
Wars forced Britain to turn toward the imperial market in order to find its supply. It is 
‘[a]gainst that backdrop of shifting commercial opportunities’, Russell has specified, 
that Quebec’s agriculture, according to Ouellet, ‘went from prosperity to crisis. While 
Lower Canada continued to export wheat in substantial quantities up to the War of 1812, 
Ouellet argued that a longer-term trend of declining production set in after the bumper 
harvest of 1801-1802’.392  
Chief among the factors that help to explain the longer-term trend of declining 
production are demographic pressures due to large families. As colonization reached the 
natural limits of the land suited for agriculture in the St. Lawrence Valley, as well as the 
territorial limits politically imposed on the seigneurial system by the British 
administration, ‘[i]ncreasingly, the new generation had to either see the subdivision of 
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their parents’ land or be forced onto less fertile (and more distant) lands as colonists. In 
either case—on small farms already too frequently cropped for years or on new farms 
cut from marginal lands—the habitants practised the traditional techniques of extensive 
cultivation that now produced falling yields’.393 On this issue, Ouellet repeatedly 
criticized French Canadian peasants for not having adopted more efficient farming 
techniques available at the time. In his view, improved techniques would have mitigated 
the demographic and land pressures and prevented yields from falling.  
Wheat production declined so much that, by the 1820s, Lower Canada became a 
net importer of grains from Upper Canada. In other words, a ‘crisis’ struck the Lower 
Canadian countryside, where inhabitants continued to work the land with traditional 
techniques within a pre-capitalist framework of social relations. As Russell summed up, 
the soil was not ‘adequately drained’, was not ‘harrowed thoroughly before planting’, 
was not ‘kept clear of weeds when in fallow’; crop rotation was primitive, without the 
use of forage crops ‘to vary the demands made on the soil’s capacities and enhance those 
capacities where possible’; herds of livestock were small and not ‘improved by careful 
breeding and attentive feeding with the forage crops’; finally, animal manure was not 
‘regularly returned to the soil to enhance its fertility’.394 It must be added that ‘[e]ach of 
these processes called for farm equipment beyond the rude tools of clearing, planting, 
and harvesting’.395 This portrait of the state of agriculture in the province echoes the 
analysis and recommendations put forward by the 1816 Agricultural Committee of 
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Lower Canada, which ‘reported that a considerable agricultural progress since the 
conquest was marred by defects in cultivation, carelessness regarding seed—particularly 
in wheat—and deficiency of manures; by the fact that “the instruments of agriculture 
now used, are the same as were in use before the conquest”; by the failure to rear good 
livestock’.396 
The most vocal critics of Ouellet’s thesis have been Jean-Pierre Wallot and 
Gilles Paquet, who have tried to show that early nineteenth century Quebec was a 
dynamic society advancing along the path of modernity. As Russell has pointed out, to 
criticize Ouellet, they attempted to provide ‘a rough view of the general plausibility’ of 
Ouellet’s thesis concerning the apparent retreat from the market of Lower Canadian 
peasants towards subsistence agriculture in the early nineteenth century. The rest of 
Wallot and Paquet’s analysis, Russel contends, lay ‘more in logic than evidence,’ and 
failed ‘to recognize the differences in soil quality’.397 Moreover, the post-mortem 
inventories that they used to assess the increase in living standards did not represent a 
universal reality. It tended toward  
 
disproportionately recording the success of the successful, the achievements of 
the wealthier habitants and their heirs in […] expanding their landed patrimonies. 
But rural Quebec contained another reality: the increasing numbers of landless 
children of the poorer habitants, some working part-time as farm labourers, in the 
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forests, or at trades, others renting land in the hopes of regaining their old 
independent status.398  
 
In 1974, T. J. A. Le Goff, a European social historian, reviewed the debate and assessed 
the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. While pointing out that many of the 
claims on both sides were lacking supporting evidence, Le Goff was particularly 
sceptical of Wallot and Paquet’s attempt to show the betterment of French Canadians’ 
standard of living on the basis of the price indices that they created with fragmentary 
data.399 Following Wallot and Paquet’s reply to his criticism, Le Goff re-examined the 
case again and concluded once more  
  
[t]hat he considered the economists’ model of export price relations to be 
meaningless; that they had still not made a case for sufficient domestic demand 
to account for the fall in exports; that the scarcity of good land had to be 
addressed, not just any sort of unallocated land; and the indices used in their 
standard-of-living argument remained defective. He chided them for not paying 
attention to problems of supply (as well as demand). He concluded that Lower 
Canada had experienced a ‘structural crisis’—the onset of a long-term decline in 
the productivity of Quebec agriculture—rather than a ‘sharp, sudden crisis’, 
which Wallot and Paquet seemed to think Ouellet had identified.400 
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Le Goff’s own contribution not only favoured Ouellet’s argument about the decline in 
wheat exports and the fall in wheat productivity, but also added weight to it by 
introducing into the debate birth and death rates which contradicted the idea of rising 
standards of living for the majority of the rural population.401 As Russell has pointed 
out, recent studies of specific localities in the seigneurial territory, including the 
Montreal District, have also added  ‘a measure of support’ to Ouellet’s analysis.402  
In all, evidence suggests that even the larger and most commercially-oriented 
farms of the province were not of the capitalist kind: they ‘were not specializing 
commercial farmers but large-scale farms that sought to be as self-sufficient as possible, 
ready to sell onto the market whatever they had in excess of their own needs’.403 As a 
long-term pattern of economic development, the productivity of Lower Canada’s 
agriculture in the second quarter of the nineteenth century declined so much that direct 
producers became unable to compete on foreign markets, even with the advantage of 
transportation that the proximity of the transatlantic trade through the St. Lawrence 
River had given them over their Upper Canadian counterpart.  
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Social Roots of the Agricultural Crisis 
Having discussed how Ouellet’s description of the crisis offers the most 
persuasive account of the state of Lower Canada’s agriculture in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, it is time to examine his explanation. In this regard, Ouellet’s 
narrative is highly unsatisfactory. Ouellet portrayed Lower Canada as a society with 
specific cultural traits: it was an agricultural society centred on its Catholic religion, its 
French language and the absolutism of its political institutions. Absent among French 
Canadians was a particular set of values associated with liberalism and capitalism. 
Compared with Englishmen, they lacked the attributes characterizing successful 
entrepreneurs, such as a concern for efficiency, a meticulousness discipline in affairs, the 
ability to assess the risks, anticipate the possibilities, and seize the opportunities of 
investment, and the quality of being economical with money and food. The French 
Canadian habitant ‘disliked the routine of farm work. Without disciplining himself, he 
nevertheless had an innate propensity for authoritarian attitudes’.404 French merchants, 
for their part, ‘prefer[ed] prestige and lavish spending to more rational economic 
pursuits’.405 The problem, here, is that while some of the differences between French 
Canadians and English-speaking settlers identified by Ouellet might reflect reality to 
some extent, they say little in themselves about the social relations in which these 
cultural traits were embedded. 
The judgemental stereotypes underlying Ouellet’s explanation of French 	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Canadians’ backward agrarian techniques are hardly new. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
Lord Durham, the commissioner sent by Britain to study and identify the source of 
discontentment among the Canadians, already saw in Lower Canada ‘two nations 
warring in the bosom of a single State’. Each nation was different not only in its 
language, its race, and its religion, but also in its degree of evolution. According to 
Durham, French Canadian society was inherently stagnant and doomed to remain so, 
while the English Canadians were much more responsive to the new realities of the early 
modern epoch and the rise of capitalism. Many French Canadian historians, such as 
Thomas Chapais and Arthur Maheux, also put espoused similar stereotypes in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, but in no work other than Francis Parkman’s is the 
disgust for French Canadian culture most blatant.  
Parkman saw the Conquest of New France as nothing less than deliverance, for 
the action of British merchants and colonial rulers, he argues, uprooted the ancien 
régime and freed economic activity from its shackles. Until then, French Canadians had 
been ‘[a]n ignorant population, sprung from a brave and active race, but trained to 
subjection and dependence through centuries of feudal and monarchical despotism 
[…]—the condition, in short, of a child held always under the rule of a father’.406 What 
is deemed ‘normal’ in Parkman’s narrative is epitomized by the English liberal culture—
considered ‘superior’ when compared with the French one. In Parkman’s view, 
alternative forms of social development cannot but be symptoms of deviance and 
anomaly. While using a language less coarse than Parkman’s, Ouellet continued to 	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identify the culprit of Lower Canada’s delayed development in the cultural traits and 
social mentalities of French Canadians, said to be unsuited to business activities and 
impermeable to liberal ideas of progress and economic laissez-faire.  
Ouellet departs from Parkman on one crucial point: while the latter saw the 
Conquest as a liberation, Ouellet thought that it had little impact on the French archaic 
mentalité, which he argued, survived in the St. Lawrence Valley up until the mid-
twentieth century.407 Yet, this position only makes sense, as Roberta Hamilton has 
pointed out, if one disregards land tenure and class relations. Ouellet, indeed, ‘was 
referring to a society which, in his opinion, clung to old ways of life, preferred authority 
to freedom, poverty to risk-taking, and ignorance to knowledge’.408 He never really 
asked why French Canadian peasants and merchants behaved the way they did and held 
to their habits, somehow content to blame the peasantry on moral grounds. In this sense, 
the argumentative logic of Ouellet’s explanation, opposing as it does a liberal British 
culture to an autocratic French culture, rests on normative assumptions about the 
‘superiority’ of the British, and fails to explain the historically specific trajectory of 
Canadian socioeconomic development. As Charles Post has pointed out, ‘[t]he attempt 
to make “economic culture” or mentalités a determinant of economic relations and 
actions tends to ignore how the structure of social-property relations places limits on all 
individual economic actions’.409 
Ouellet was right to insist that the members of the colonial merchant bourgeoisie 	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were recruited from two different societies: ‘the French Canadian merchant comes from 
a society that is increasingly ruralising and the English-speaking immigrant, arriving 
from England, comes from a society engaged in the industrial process’.410 Yet, he failed 
to point out the sets of social relations underpinning these different developmental 
dynamics and ended up presenting mentalités as the products of given, fixed, or free-
floating cultural essences. Differences in mentalités between French Canadians and 
English-speaking settlers were rooted in different sets of social-property relations, and 
they changed over time according to the pressures, incentives, and constraints that 
informed how classes in their struggles to reproduce themselves made choices and 
adopted various strategies of accumulation, territorialisation, and social reproduction, 
with diverging outcomes.  
Here, it is not a question of opposing the disembodied ontology of Ouellet’s 
interpretation to a crude materialism that would treat ideas, culture, and politics as 
simple reflections of an economic infrastructure. Historian Gérard Bouchard has 
recognized part of the challenge, which is to develop ‘an analytical framework that 
respects more the complexity of the social object and its interactions by integrating the 
analysis of demographic, economic and social dimensions’.411 It seems to me that the 
theory of social-property relations offers such a framework, as it endeavours to inscribe 
the ‘rationality of social agents in their relational and historically specific context’.412 By 
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putting the emphasis on the historical analysis of substantive class struggles, rather than 
the conceptual dichotomy ‘agency/structure’ or the metaphor between ‘base’ and 
‘superstructure’, the theory of social property regimes provides an alternative to cultural 
essentialism without returning to the structuralism of orthodox Marxism.413 As 
Frederick-Guillaume Dufour has explained, the historical method at the heart of the 
theory of social property regimes is one of synchronic and diachronic comparisons of 
social relations that rejects structuralist explanations in terms of ‘modes of production’ 
and focuses instead on the historical analysis of class relations.414   
The theory does not define class relations in economistic terms: it considers 
political, legal, and military institutions as fully constitutive of relations of production, 
since these are relations of domination, rights of property, and power to organize and 
govern production and appropriation415. Social relations of production cannot be 
considered independently of the legal, political, and military forms that determine their 
configuration: the establishment and maintenance of a production system, while 
economic, is equally political. A mode of production, therefore, is ‘not only a 
technology, but a social organization of production’ in which ‘the relationship of power 
that determines the nature and scope of operation is a question of ‘political organization 
within and between the contending classes’.416 This means that, ‘from an historical 
point of view even political institutions like village and state enter directly into the 	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constitution of productive relations and are in a sense prior to them […] to the extent 
that relations of production are historically constituted by the configuration of political 
power that determines the outcome of class conflict’.417 Gender relations and the 
question of families and social reproduction in the feminist sense must also be theorized 
as constitutive of social relations of production.418  
Within this framework, French Canadians do not appear as backward-looking or 
apathetic peasants, as Ouellet has claimed they were, but animated by a distinctive logic 
and rationality that are intelligible when understood in relation to the constraints and 
incentives provided by social-property relations. In Chapter 1, I have argued that the 
traditional relationship of the peasant to the land was not ‘irrational’, but made plenty of 
sense in pre-capitalist contexts, given the risks presented by strategies aimed at the 
pursuit of profit maximization through specialization. Traditional rural economies, even 
as they were opening themselves to external markets, ‘remained largely tributary of the 
imperatives of familial reproduction, following a model that was long refractory to 
capitalist values’.419 ‘Safety-first’ strategies were at work in the French Canadian case, 
as peasants, faced with increasing economic hardship during the agricultural crisis, 
responded to their own impoverishment in a typically pre-capitalist fashion: they 
withdrew from the cultivation of wheat, rather than increasing labour productivity and 	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transforming the methods of production in a competitive way. Instead, they fell back 
upon the production of subsistence crops—potatoes, oats, peas and barley—intended for 
domestic consumption or local markets, rather than for export.420 Within two decades, 
this transformation took on dramatic proportions: while, in the early 1820s, wheat was 
still, by far, the most dominant crop, in 1831, the volume of oats reported in the province 
surpassed that of wheat (3.2 million bushels of wheat compared to 3.4 million bushels of 
oats); in 1844, the volume of wheat diminished to less than one million bushels, while 
that of oats rose to 7.2 million bushels.421 According to Ouellet, potatoes—‘the 
subsistence crop par excellence, not just in Lower Canada but, most famously and 
disastrously, in Ireland’422—had replaced wheat in the agriculture of most censitaires by 
1827-1831, when it constituted 46% of their agricultural production.423 Only in the 
1870s was ‘the vacuum created by the collapse of the wheat production […] really filled 
[…] with the new dairy specialization. Dairy activities appear in the eyes of many as the 
new driving output of the agricultural sector’.424 
Key among the events that led to the agricultural crisis was the Constitutional 
Act of 1791, which specified the territorial limits of the seigneurial regime while 
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introducing the free and common socage tenure outside these boundaries. During the 
1800s, demographic pressures, due to population growth, the increasing scarcity of 
fertile land within the seigneurial territory, and the inefficient techniques of extensive 
farming traditionally associated with French Canadians’ strategies of agricultural 
production, combined to trigger a crisis in the countryside. As the crisis deepened, 
French Canadians increasingly came to see British immigration in the Eastern townships 
as a conspiracy to assimilate them and take their land away.425 In Montreal, the British 
immigration that followed the War of 1812 also contributed an ‘ethnic’ colouration to 
the growing discontentment of French Canadian urban workers, who increasingly had to 
compete with Irish immigrants in Montreal for jobs. In seigneuries, the crisis was further 
deepened by the behaviour of some seigneurs, who tended to slow down the rhythm of 
concession of new plots in order to speculate on the value of land. Seigneurs also sought 
to benefit from the development of the trade in lumber by keeping for themselves the 
wood found on seigneuries, clearing plots before selling them, or imposing easement 
rights on new concessions.  
The agricultural crisis, therefore, is best understood as a result of the distinctive 
strategies for developing production imposed upon French Canadians by the 
preservation, upon a delimited territory, of French civil law and the seigneurial tenure in 
the few decades following the British Conquest. These strategies encouraged farming 
practices which led to soil-exhaustion and a decline in agricultural productivity.426 
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When demographic, political, and ecological factors converged to push agriculture to the 
limits of its specific ways of reproduction in the 1820s and 1830s, French Canadians 
gradually abandoned wheat farming and fell back upon subsistence farming.427 It is 
difficult not to see in this tendency—toward the long-term decline in labour productivity 
resulting in agricultural crisis—pre-capitalist mechanics of economic evolution similar 
to those that characterized the pre-industrial European economy. These mechanisms 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was irregular, the Hessian fly, for instance, destroying a great quantity of the wheat crop in some regions 
of Lower Canada between 1805 and 1816, and the wheat midge in 1834, 1835 and 1836. Their impact on 
wheat yields during other years is far from evident. Ouellet, however, has shown that the decline in wheat 
yields was a relatively steady, continuous tendency during the first half of the nineteenth century as a 
whole. Moreover, the insistence on the destructive impact of pests on agriculture does not discharge us of 
the need to pay due attention to the broader conditions that made wheat crops vulnerable: soil-exhaustion, 
such as created by poor farming practices, helps to explain the unhealthy state of wheat plants and why 
they were not strong enough to resist attacks from pests. This was recognized by agricultural 
commentators of the epoch. Also telling is the differentiated response of Lower Canadian peasants and 
Upper Canadian farmers to the existence of similar pests. Lower Canadian peasants never systematically 
changed their practices in a way that would allow them to deal sucessfully with these pests. Rather, they 
progressively gave up on wheat. By contrast, Upper Canadian farmers innovated by introducing new 
cultivars of wheat, most famously the Red Fife, more suited to a diversity of growing conditions. They 
also improved drainage techniques, so that they could more successfully plant winter wheat, which was 
less vulnerable to insect pests, as these appeared to be most destructive during dry summers. Insights on 
these matters can be found in Charles Louis Flint, “Progress in Agriculture,” in Eigthy Year’s Progress of 
the United States, to Which Are Annexed Articles on Canada, ed. New National Publishing House 
(Chicago: J.N. Whidden, 1864), 70–71. 427 The issue of how French Canadians were able to pay for imported grains and flour while they reverted 
to subsistence farming has been sketched out by Marvin McInnis, who suggests that timber became the 
staple that provided the province with the cash it needed for commercial exchanges. See Perspectives on 
Ontario Agriculture: 1815-1930 (Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1992), 38–39. It is important to note that 
the presence of casual wage-labour in the timber industry is not an index of the existence of capitalism in 
Quebec’s peasant society. One must consider the extent to which the relation between seigneurs and 
peasants, as well as non-market access to land, restricted the form and extent of wage-labour. On this 
matter, family-labour long remained the predominant productive force. As Wood has pointed out, ‘[h]ired 
labour has, after all, never been the predominant form of surplus appropriation, until the very recent and 
localised predominance of capitalist appropriation. Where wage-labour has existed in precapitalist or non-
capitalist economies, it has generally been an adjunct to other forms of labour and surplus-appropriation, 
often as a means of supplementing the incomes of smallholders whose land—whether owned or held 
conditionally—has been insufficient for subsistence. In such cases, wage-labour has tended to be casual or 
seasonal […]. Wage-labour as a predominant form presupposes a labour-force composed of people who 
are juridically free, but devoid of land or any other property essential to production […] and therefore 
dependent for their livelihood upon the sale of their labour-power for a wage on a regular, continuous 
basis’. The Ellen Meiksins Wood Reader, ed. Larry Patriquin (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013), 85–86. 
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imposed upon the members of the major social classes […] strategies for 
reproducing themselves which, when applied on an economy-wide basis, were 
incompatible with the requirements of growth. In particular, reproduction by the 
lords through surplus extraction by means of extra-economic compulsion and by 
peasants through production for subsistence precluded any widespread 
tendencies to thorough specialization of productive units, systematic 
reinvestment of surpluses, or to regular technical innovation.428  
 
Once the limits of the seigneurial territory had been reached in Lower Canada, there was 
no more fertile land onto which to simply expand extensive agriculture. The associated 
decline in the productivity of labour resulted in an agricultural crisis that rendered 
French Canadian peasants unable to compete on grain markets, and forced them to revert 
to subsistence agriculture in order to survive. As I discuss in the next two chapters, the 
opposite trend can be observed in the neighbouring province of Upper Canada, where 
farmers had more	   in	  common with the farmers of the United States, who engaged in 
commercial wheat farming to maintain their economic independence. It will be argued 
that neither in Upper Canada nor in the Unites States is there truly capitalist agriculture 
at this stage, nor the agrarian capitalism that had been characteristic of England down to 
the nineteenth century. Yet, the distinctive social relations of the farmers (who were in 
no position of political subordination) by contrast to the peasants (who were), made it 
structurally easier for the former to shift their methods of farming away from the mix of 	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subsistence agriculture and extensive wheat farming characteristic of the pioneer period 
toward an extensive capital-intensive type of commercial wheat farming. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I recast the specific process of colonial state formation in New 
France as a spatial result of conflicts over territories and their resources between the 
French pre-capitalist absolutist state and the capitalist British state at a time when the 
need to delineate boundaries was making itself felt strongly on imperial powers. After 
two centuries of existence, the process of state-formation in New France experienced a 
profound upheaval as the British Conquest in 1760 separated the colony from the French 
metropolis, which had hitherto administered it according to strategies of territorialization 
shaped by absolutist social relations. Since the strategies of social reproduction within 
the colony were strictly limited by pre-capitalist property relations that tended to 
encourage ‘extra-economic’ means of appropriation through access to the state, rather 
than investment in production, the transformation of the public sector which occurred 
with the change of metropolis deeply transformed the road to private enrichment of the 
French Canadian ruling class.  
With the change of administrative and military personnel, and the concomitant 
loss of access to state offices and commercial networks, the foundation of the specific 
strategies, which had permitted the French Canadian colonial ruling class to maintain 
itself in its established socio-economic positions and seek profitable advancement, 
	  168	  	  	  	  
crumbled. It thus became all the more rational for French Canadian merchants, 
administrators, and religious communities who owned a seigneurie to revert back to their 
rights over censitaires and annuities, either tithes or rents, as sources of revenue. This 
was made possible by the decision of the British imperial authorities to preserve the 
institutions on which rested the local power of the French Canadian traditional elites 
with the Quebec Act of 1774. The preservation of the seigneurial regime and patterns of 
inheritance associated with French civil law in the aftermath of the Conquest 
discouraged French Canadian peasants from adopting the most efficient agricultural 
techniques available at the time, which over time, led to an ‘agricultural crisis’. I 
concluded the chapter by offering a reinterpretation of Fernand Ouellet’s thesis in order 
to show how the strategies of reproduction of French Canadian peasants were rooted in 
the generative grammar of a distinctive set of social-property relations, rather than in 
mentalités whose essence lays in stereotyped and fixed cultural traits. 	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4. 
Land Settlement and Agrarian Class Structure in  
Upper Canada  
  
 
The Constitutional Act of 1791 divided the old Province of Quebec into two 
separate political entities. The eastern polity was given the name of ‘Province of Lower 
Canada’. It encompassed the southern portion of modern-day Quebec and the Labrador 
region. Lower Canada was populated mainly by French Canadians and retained the 
seigneurial regime as the predominant mode of tenure. The western polity, originally 
made up of a few Loyalist settlements whose estates were converted to the free and 
common socage tenure, was given the name of ‘Province xof Upper Canada’. It included 
all of modern-day Southern Ontario and the territory west of the Ottawa River to the 
Northern outskirts of Lake Superior. Having examined, in Chapter 3, the transformation 
of Lower Canada’s agrarian class structure after the British Conquest and its long-term 
consequences for the economic development of the province, I now turn to the 
distinctive agrarian class structure that was established during Upper Canada’s 
formation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
My argument is that the absence of a peasantry that could be expropriated to 
create a class of market dependent tenant farmers and a mass of rural wage labourers 
forced to work for others, precluded the reproduction, in Upper Canada, of the agrarian 
capitalist class structure of Britain—the ‘triad’ of landlords, tenant farmers, and wage 
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labourers. Unlike the British ruling class, whose primary means of appropriation rested 
on commercial rents paid by tenant farmers who sought to maximize surplus value 
through the improvement of labour productivity, the Upper Canadian ruling class was 
forced to fall back on speculative land practices for the reproduction of their wealth and 
their power. The conditions of social reproduction of Upper Canada’s ruling class also 
differed from those of the British ruling class in the way they accessed land.  
In Britain, by the nineteenth century, land had been very much commodified and 
the bulk of the population had become market dependent. By contrast, in Upper Canada, 
access to land was dependent on the state, which rewarded services and loyalty with the 
only asset of the Crown that could be made valuable in the absence of centralized 
property taxation—land. The primary means of appropriation of Upper Canada’s 
dominant propertied class therefore laid within a network of clientelism and patronage 
which I theorize as a colonial ‘land/office state’ based on the geopolitically constituted 
process of dispossession of Native peoples. While this network of clientelism and 
patronage has received considerable attention by standard texts on Canadian political 
development,429 and while speculative land activities have also been extensively 
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examined,430 my point is that the literature has overlooked the extent to which the 
strategies of land access and land use adopted by the dominant propertied class in Upper 
Canada contrasted with the strategies favoured by the dominant propertied classes in 
British agrarian capitalism.  
To explore this contrast, the chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I 
give a general account of how the ‘free’ land-granting system at the core of the process 
of colonial state-formation resulted on the creation of a landowning ruling class made up 
of a minority of influential individuals endowed with political or military appointments. 
In the second section, I show how the land-granting system created a class of 
independent household producers composed of smallholders and tenant farmers whose 
existence precluded the formation of a pool of wage-labourers large enough to allow the 
reproduction of the British agrarian capitalist class system in Upper Canada. In the third 
section, I explore how, as a result of the absence of rural wage labourers to work 
permanently on farms, the uses that could be made of the land in the possession of this 
landed ruling class were limited to speculative activities whose success relied on the 
colonial land/office state. In the last section, I sketch out some of the long-term 
consequences of this structure of appropriation for the development of agriculture in the 
province, especially how it made difficult the improvement of estates toward greater 
land productivity. On this matter, even ‘gentlemen farmers’ eager to introduce in Upper 	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Canada the most up-to-date agrarian technologies and management principles in use in 
Britain failed to derive a large income from agricultural activities.  
 
The Making of Upper Canada’s Dominant Propertied Class 
In the aftermath of the British Conquest of New France, the British government 
had no serious intention of populating the territories west of the St. Lawrence River. 
Prominent members of the Board of Trade thought that, isolated as inland colonies 
would be, they ‘would not find it profitable to export their produce to Great Britain or 
the West Indies. Being unable to sell, they would be unable to buy, and therefore would 
begin to establish manufactures of their own to the detriment of their trade with the 
mother country’.431 In other words, the peninsula between the upper St. Lawrence and 
Lake Huron was destined to remain the preserve of Native peoples, fur traders, soldiers, 
and a few merchants. The outbreak of the American Revolution, however, was game-
changing, as thousands of Loyalists were forced by the circumstances to move north of 
the border. Between 1775 and 1795, recent research estimates that 32,000 Loyalists took 
refuge in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 6,000 in the territory of the old province of 
Quebec that became Lower Canada in 1791, and 8,000 in the territory that became 
Upper Canada.432  
In Upper Canada, ‘[t]he Tories were convinced that a strong and loyal gentry was 
essential for maintaining a peaceful colonial population; had this existed in the Thirteen 	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Colonies, they argued, the American Revolution would not have occurred’.433 As a 
consequence, British authorities sought to create a landowning aristocracy by 
distributing land to Loyalists according to status and rank. While every single man was 
entitled to 50 acres, the head of a family would receive 100 acres, plus 50 for each 
member of the household. Non-commissioned officers were given 200 acres. Far larger 
grants of land were given to officers: 500 acres for subalterns, staff officers, and warrant 
officers, 700 acres for captains, and 1000 acres for field officers.434 A further distinction 
existed between ‘official’ grantees (namely loyalists, military officers, and government 
officials), who would be granted land free of patent fees and settlement duties, and ‘non-
official’ grantees, who would receive land by payment of fees without statutory right.435 
Non-official grantees also needed to fulfil the duties described in the location tickets that 
were given to them by the Land Commissioner’s Office at York, the land boards, or the 
magistrates.436 
Interestingly, instructions were first given to grant land on seigneurial terms. The 
aim was ‘to restore the feudal system in Canada as a means of keeping the colony under 
control through its seigneurs, who would be bound to the Crown by the ties of self-
interest’.437 The grant of land in fief and seigneurie, however, irritated Loyalists, unused 
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to French customs and laws. The settlers immediately raised strong objections. As 
historian Randall Keith White has explained, ‘[i]n contrast to the French, the Loyalist 
settlers saw land not as a feudal obligation but as a “freehold” commodity that could be 
bought and sold’.438 Among the many petitions made to the King on behalf of Loyalist 
settlers, one written in 1785 by a group of officers expressed the hope to see his Majesty 
establish a new district encompassing the Loyalist settlements under ‘a liberal system of 
Tenure, Law, and Government’ of the kind expected to rule the lives of British 
subjects.439 To appease some of the discontentment, in 1788, four new districts were 
created, each of them endowed with a land board and a court of common pleas.440 With 
these new boards, land granting schemes became even more generous: those who had 
fought during the American Revolution would now be granted 300 acres or more, 
according to their rank, and other Loyalists were to receive initial grants of 200 acres.441 
Grants to field officers were raised to the amount promised in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, that is, 5,000 acres, while captains were to get 3,000, and subalterns 2,000.442 
By 1791, the number of Loyalists in the Great Lakes region had grown to about 
10,000.443 ‘It consisted of discharged soldiers of the regular army, the “original” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Randall Keith White, Ontario 1610-1985: A Political and Economic History (Toronto & London: 
Dundurn, 1985), 63. 
439 Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of 
Canada, 1759-1791, vol. II (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1918), 773–776. 
440 Craig, Upper Canada, 12, 30. 
441 Ibid., 12. 
442 Ibid.; Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of 
Canada, 1759-1791, vol. I (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1907), 166. 
443 In the first few decades of settlement, a great number settled around the new capital at York (Toronto), 
‘then expanding generally inland away from the St Lawrence River and the Great Lakes in the 1820s and 
1830s, and finally foundering at the limits of good land along the Canadian Shield edge and at the Bruce 
Peninsula by the 1850s’. David Wood, Making Ontario Agricultural Colonization and Landscape Re-
Creation Before the Railway (Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 24. 
	  175	  	  	  	  
loyalists, comprising under that term loyalist regiments and their families, the associated 
loyalists who had come from New York, loyalists who were refugees from the rebellious 
colonies, and “late” loyalists, some of whom were suspected of being mere land 
seekers’.444 As the population grew in importance, demands for British laws and 
institutions loomed increasingly larger in the strategic considerations of imperial 
statesmen, who sought to ensure the settlers’ cooperation in ruling what was left of the 
British North American empire. French Canadians were no longer the only group whose 
support was vital to ease the governing of inland regions. To reward Loyalist settlers for 
their loyalty and discourage rebellion, British rulers acquiesced to dividing the old 
province of Quebec in two with the Constitutional Act of 1791, which was one the 
demands of the Loyalists. In the newly created province of Upper Canada, the 
seigneurial tenure was abolished.445  
Speaking about the two new provinces, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Grenville, 
made explicit the conservative design behind the new constitutional arrangement: ‘The 
Object of these regulations is both to give the Upper branch of the Legislature a greater 
degree of weight and consequence than was possessed by the Councils of the old 
Colonial Governments, and to establish in the Provinces a Body of Men having that 
motive to attachment to the existing form of Government, which arises from the 
possession of personal or hereditary distinction’.446 How this ‘Body of Men’ would 
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concretely be created was to follow a different design in each province. In Lower 
Canada, given the majority of French-Canadians, French civil law and the seigneurial 
land tenure was retained, while the ‘free and common socage’ became the tenure 
prevailing in Upper Canada. There, English-speaking settlers were expected to create a 
bulwark of Protestant Loyalism and keep popular impulses in check, especially 
republican aspirations.447  
John Graves Simcoe, the first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, sought to 
further the erection of a pro-monarchical Anglican gentry to counter-balance the 
influence of republican ideas from the United States by reserving, for the Executive 
Council and the Church of England, one-seventh, respectively, of all surveyed Crown 
lands. The idea was that the value of land locked in this way would increase as the 
colony developed and could eventually be sold to provide a revenue outside the control 
of the elected Legislative Assembly. Meanwhile, Crown and Clergy reserves would be 
leased to tenants, so that a regular income would be obtained from rental arrangements 
to help pay the costs of the Church and the provincial administration.448 The reserves 
could also be used to reward those who performed public and military services.449 
 In 1794, as an additional measure to support the creation of a landed aristocracy, 
Simcoe authorized new grants of land to members of the Executive and Legislative 	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Councils, as well as to other ‘leading families’ among the Loyalists of the 1780s, and a 
few gentile families close to the King’s army or arrived from England to fill government 
jobs.450 Anxious to avoid the ‘Convulsions’ that had shaken the United States, Simcoe 
insisted that ‘[t]here are inherent Defects in the Congressional form of Government, the 
absolute prohibition of an order of Nobility is a glaring one. The true New England 
Americans have as strong an Aristocratical spirit as is to be found in Great Britain; nor 
are they Anti-monarchical’.451 His hope ‘to have a hereditary Council with some mark 
of Nobility’452 was never fulfilled, but his successor, Peter Russel, continued to support 
the creation of a dominant propertied class. Like Simcoe before him, Russel believed 
that ‘in the new province, where democratic and republican winds blew so strong from 
across the border, the bounty of the Crown could not be better exercised than in the 
creation of a class of landed gentry who would maintain those social gradations found in 
older and better established societies’.453  
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the interests of a group of settlers, drawn 
from the rank of British military officers and expected to serve the British Crown with 
utmost loyalty, had been well entrenched in the region. In accordance with the wish of 
the British Authorities, the most predominant among these men soon organized 
themselves, together with influential merchants, into an oligarchy that came to be 
commonly known as the ‘Family Compact’. Ideologically, the Family Compact shared a 	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deeply conservative outlook.454 Supported by the Colonial Office until after the 
rebellions of 1838, key to the ability of the Compact to maintain itself in power for so 
long was its ability to draw strong support from the population of settlers despite 
political divisions and political opposition. The distribution of land to immigrants played 
an instrumental role in achieving this purpose. 
 
 ‘Here We Are Laird Ourselves’ 
 Land grabs have a long history in North America—as old, in fact, as America 
itself. Since the first attempts at settling the continent in the early seventeenth century, 
Native peoples have seen their land appropriated by white settlers and their 
governments. Native peoples in territories where Upper Canada was created were not 
spared by the North American land rush. Their title on territories west of the established 
colonies was recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but their land was 
nevertheless gradually acquired by British authorities in subsequent decades.455 As 
historian John Clarke has put it, ‘within a few years the British would be eager to keep 
the tribes apart, to divide and rule, to inculcate clientage, to foment jealousy, so that […] 
the price of land could, in this way, be kept low’.456 By the late 1790s, through treaties 	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and surrenders, the process of dispossession of Native peoples was well under way along 
the shoreline of Lake Ontario.457 It continued in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century: ‘[b]etween 1815 and 1825, nine Indian treaties were concluded which 
extinguished the Indian title to practically the entire peninsula between Lakes Ontario, 
Erie, and Huron’.458 In the New World, it is Native peoples—not peasants—who have 
been subjected to dispossession by displacement.  
Land was to be settled anew with British subjects under the aegis of the colonial 
administration charged with redistributing Native homelands to white settlers. Given the 
abundance of land and the need to populate the country, it was first decided by the 
administration to give the land for ‘free’ to common people, creating a class of rural 
freeholders with no equivalent in Europe. To be sure, to speak of the grants of land to 
‘non-officials’ is, ‘in any event a misnomer’459, since they had to pay fees which 
doubled many times over the first quarter of the nineteenth century. These fees were 
such that even in the early days of the province, a significant portion of new immigrants 
opted for tenancy as their means to make their first steps in the province. Rental 
conditions, however, bore very little resemblance with the rental conditions of English 
tenant farmers. 
Anne Catherine Wilson’s rigorous studies of tenancy in Upper Canada have 
shown that tenants’ leasing conditions in the first half of the nineteenth century had 
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much to attract settlers, even if land could be acquired for ‘free’ through the land-
granting system. Rental arrangements were, in fact, extremely various, the least secure 
of them being those of ‘tenants “at will” who were obliged upon notice to quit the land 
at any time. Following them were yearly tenants who were subject to removal at the end 
of the year. More secure were tenants who held “leases” for a specified number of years, 
anywhere from one to nine hundred and ninety-nine, for life or in perpetuity’.460 As 
Wilson has explained, ‘[w]ithin this hierarchy of arrangements those at the bottom had 
the least security and faced the greatest risk of rack-renting (frequent rent increases), 
distraint (having their cattle or goods seized to satisfy rent arrears), or eviction’.461 There 
were also ‘squatters’ who occupied the land illegally without any kind of lease or rental 
arrangement. 
That said, the most common length of tenure on land held by private individuals 
was three to seven years. ‘From an agricultural point of view, […] leases of this length 
still promoted a short-sighted policy regarding land maintenance. There was little 
incentive to improve the property if the rent was going to be raised at the end of the term 
or if a new tenant was going to move in’.462 On land owned by the government or by 
land companies, longer leases were more frequent: ‘The Canada Company leased lots 
for ten- to twelve-year terms. The Crown and clergy reserves were let for twenty-one-
year terms’.463 ‘By British and North American standards, the twenty-one-year lease 
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[…] was very advantageous to tenants’.464 Fixed by the government rather than by the 
market, rents levels on the reserves were also very advantageous. Even if they were 
raised in 1811, 1819, and 1846, during the whole period examined by Wilson (1799-
1871) they ‘remained some of the lowest available’.465  
Low rents and long, legally secured, leases help to explain why ‘[e]ven in the 
free-grant days immigrants found it less expensive and more expedient to rent than take 
a government grant and pay all the associated fees and the cost of inland travel and 
scouting’.466 In addition to the survey fee imposed in 1796, patent fees were imposed on 
land grants in order to raise a revenue that could be used by the civil government to pay 
for its expenses.467 The aggregate fee was so high as to impede poor settlers’ ability to 
obtain land in Upper Canada.468 As a result ‘they could not get land on any terms unless 
they would take a Crown Reserve on lease or be content to labour on other people’s 
land’.469 Among these immigrants were many young people newly arrived in Upper 
Canada, eager to establish families but lacking the financial means to become 
proprietors and without the possibility of inheriting land from already-established 
parents. More generally, it ‘made good sense for immigrants to avoid buying land in the 
backwoods, where they would face immediate toil and privation, and instead rent a 
partially cleared farm near town’.470  
Even without owning a piece of land, Upper Canadian tenant farmers were much 	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better-off than tenants in the British Isles. Rather than living under the threat of 
dispossession, Upper Canadian tenants could hope to amass, with a few years of hard 
work and privation, the means to a standard of living ‘considerably higher than most 
could have realized in anything like an analogous social position in England, Scotland, 
or Ireland’.471 Even poor immigrants had some chance of climbing the ladder of social 
mobility and accessing the coveted status of freeholder. Trying to convince his brother 
to join him in Upper Canada, George Forbes, the son of a tenant farmer from 
Aberdeenshire, Scotland, illustrated this aspiration in evocative terms: ‘We in Canada 
have this glorious privilege that the ground whereon we tread is our own and our 
children’s after us. […] No danger of the leases expiring and the laird saying pay me so 
much more rent, or bundle and go, for here we are laird ourselves’.472 Free from 
exploitation by the old feudal power of political surplus extraction, freeholders and 
tenant farmers constituted themselves as a class of independent household producers.  
 
Family Labour and Commercial Wheat Farming  
This is not to say that life was easy. The pioneer family ‘had to make a new start 
in a country where great virgin forests came everywhere down to the water’s edge, 
defying the settler to find space to plant his seeds or even for his cabin’.473 Most houses 
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were, for a time, ‘simply rough shanties’ with, for fences, only the ‘trees felled in line 
along the edge of the cleared land and roughly trimmed. Because harvests were small, 
there were no real barns’.474 The first task of the settler, after having cleared a first 
parcel of land, was to sow those crops—wheat and vegetables—which would allow the 
family to survive. A small field was enough to do so, as ‘[a]n acre or so in vegetables 
and one to one and a half acres of wheat met the crop needs of a family of four’.475 On 
the fringes of inhabited areas, the life of settlers would continue to resemble this picture 
until late into the second half of the century. There, ‘in general life was just as crude and 
primitive as that experienced earlier by hundreds of thousands’.476 
Even if local markets provided by the small urban nucleus or local garrisons were 
sometimes available to procure basic products, keeping part of the land dedicated to 
subsistence agriculture long remained important. Most of the labour was done by 
household family-members, rather than by wage-labourers: rural families ‘expected to 
supply most of their own needs from within the farm. […] The responsibility for 
subsistence fell largely to the women in the household and the children working under 
their direction. The wife and older daughters produced and processed the food to feed 
the family and the textiles to clothe them’.477 Taking the family as the primary 
production unit, Marjorie Griffin Cohen has insisted that ‘[t]he imperatives of a pioneer 	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economy, characterized by poor transportation, underdeveloped local markets, and an 
unstable staple-exporting market, made women’s subsistence-oriented labour crucial to 
the success of the agricultural unit.’478 Women took part in clearing the land, stifling the 
recolonization of cleared land by invasive weeds, and stumping. In this context, farm 
families ‘could allocate relatively little to actual farming operations. This was one reason 
why an extensive type of agriculture was mandatory during the early years of 
settlement’.479 
The clearing of the land, together with the fencing and the erection of a few 
rudimentary agricultural buildings (a house and a barn, for instance), were often referred 
to by contemporaries as ‘improvements’. Here, however, the term ‘improvement’ does 
not have the same connotation as it had in Britain since the seventeenth century, where it 
designated the adoption of capital-intensive methods of mixed-farming and the 
rationalization of agrarian labour-processes directed at increasing productivity. Except 
for a minority of improving landlords familiar with British mixed-farming and its 
improved management techniques designed to maintain long-term soil fertility, 
‘improvement’ was generally understood as the simple geographical extension of the 
cleared superficies of farmland. Generally, a family was able to clear between one and 
half to three acres per year.480 
Reliance on family labour was not a choice. Given ‘free’ grant policies in such a 
vast country as was Upper Canada, only the most desperate immigrant would end up 	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becoming a permanent wage labourer, the majority of settlers preferring by all means to 
remain ‘free of the constraint of having to exchange labour for subsistence on the local 
market’.481 Undoubtedly, settlers did engage in various practices that would bring cash 
into the household in order to pay for debts and essential supplies: ‘the need to provide 
subsistence to their family, and possibly also some of the “conveniences” of life, 
frequently led pioneer farmers (and others much longer on the land) to seek out what we 
might call parallel occupations to supplement what the farm itself could provide’.482 
Where it constituted a significant regional industry, lumbering offered such an 
occupation to farmers during the winter time. Farmers would also, occasionally, offer 
their labour to other farmers in exchange for a wage. Ultimately, however, when a 
considerable parcel of the farmer’s land had been cleared, a surplus crop—usually 
wheat—was produced beyond the subsistence needs of the family to bring cash into the 
household.483 
Settlers of little means needed credit to start up their new lives in the bush and 
purchase provisions, seeds, livestock, tools, off-farm articles (i.e. salt and iron), and farm 
implements. According to Catherine Anne Wilson, it took ‘one hundred pounds to set up 
a workable farm unit with cleared fields, house and barn, yoke of oxen, wagons, seed, 
implements, and enough livestock to support a family’.484 Even settlers who had 	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received their land for free could thus quickly end up with debts for which cash was 
needed,485 something the culture of wheat, one of the only resources for which there was 
a ready market, could provide. Of course, local urban markets and recently settled areas 
demanded a variety of farm products, but even ‘[w]here there was no American 
competition […], the marketing procedures were so cumbersome and time-consuming 
that most farmers did not feel it worth their while to produce for them’.486 Barter and 
exchange were the norm for farm produce other than wheat.  
By contrast, ‘[t]he demand for wheat was large and payment was both immediate 
and in cash. Furthermore, grist millers acted as intermediary marketing agencies in the 
wheat trade, paying cash for wheat and arranging for the transportation of flour to the 
ports’.487 This cash was attractive to settlers who had direct access to their means of 
subsistence—food and land—but little capital. It was also a necessity for tenants in old 
settled districts close to urban areas, where cash rents were common.488 Here, the War of 
1812 seems to have played a role in shifting payments from crops to cash, as merchants 
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increasingly insisted on being paid with cash during the war.489 That said, many rental 
agreement long kept the form of ‘share tenancy’ that did not require tenants to pay rents 
in cash. Instead, these tenants had to concede to the landlord between one-third and 
more than two thirds of their crop, depending on the amount of capital and farm 
implements the landlord provided.490 
In any case, the quest for financial autonomy led a great number of Upper 
Canadian farmers to engage in growing ‘wheat as largely, and to repeat the crop as 
frequently, as any decent return could be obtained’, without attempts to improve the 
quality of the soil.491 These ‘wheat-mining’ practices appeared as an irrational habit—
the fruit of ignorance and lack of education—in the eyes of agriculturalists. While 
mixed-farming aimed at cost-cutting, specializing, accumulating surpluses, and 
innovating, wheat-mining consisted of extracting the most from the soil by planting the 
same crop year after year in the same plots, without rotation or the use of lime and 
manure. Dr. William Dunlop, an army officer and surgeon who eventually became 
member of the Parliament, ‘said he had known farmers to take twenty-seven consecutive 
wheat crops from their land’.492  
As historian Edwin Guillet has explained, ‘this obviously wasteful habit of 
growing nothing but wheat is not hard to excuse, though difficult to defend’.493 ‘Not 
hard to excuse’ because new settlers had rarely enough means to establish and operate a 	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mixed farm beyond their immediate needs.494 By contrast to grain farming, mixed-
farming of the kind practiced in the English countryside called for large investments in 
buildings, livestock, and labour.495 Improved techniques such as ‘breaking chalk into the 
soil to sweating it with slowly dissolving lime’, for instance, required the hiring of wage 
labourers that were not easily found in Upper Canada.496 As another example, ‘to pull a 
dung cart through the heavy bottom land’, horses were needed, an investment that 
farmers of limited means could not make.497 Applying manure, in fact, cost the farmers 
not only horses, but also extra labour, as more cattle and hogs were required: these 
animals needed to be fed, fenced in, and protected from the winter cold by a barn. To 
allow for mixed-farming, significant changes had to be made in the layout of the farm, in 
the equipment, as well as in the allocation of labour inside and outside the farm. 
Since labour was scarce and dear, but land plenty and cheap, time and money 
were better spent on clearing the land and sowing larger areas than on better tillage and 
fertilization.498 A few more acres logged and burned each year in anticipation of wheat 
farming yielded more wheat than the extra wheat produced by adding manure to the soil. 
As the land became less and less productive over the years, yielding ever smaller 
marginal returns, new clearings, instead of more manuring, provided farmers with rich 
soil in which to sow. The Honourable Adam Fergusson, author of two books on the state 
of Upper Canadian agriculture in the early 1830s, and ‘improving farmer’ who 	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contributed much to introducing veterinarian knowledge and improved stock in Upper 
Canada, thus excused wheat-mining practices by pointing out that the ‘system was 
perfectly natural if not perfectly wise’.499 Indeed, ‘[w]heat was found to be always less 
or more in demand, commanding a cash payment, while most other articles of farm 
produce were only to be disposed of in barter or in trade. Land was cheap and abundant, 
and when fields began to exhibit unequivocal symptoms of exhaustion a new clearing 
was commenced’.500  
Wheat-mining offered high yields for the first few years, allowing settlers to 
obtain sound currencies from the sale of their crops, without having to invest the sums 
required to adopt the more up-to-date technologies and principles of mixed-farming. 
Clearing land also considerably increased the value of a lot, since arriving middle- and 
upper-class immigrants were often willing to pay significantly more for land that had 
been cleared instead of starting their farm from scratch in the bush.501 For this reason, 
even owners of leased land could see the extensive wheat farming of their tenants as a 
good thing, for it implied that a greater area of land would be cleared every year, the 
value of the land increasing accordingly, even if the soil was impoverished. There even 
existed ‘clearing leases’—unknown to Europe—according to which the requirements of 
the rent were to be fulfilled neither by a sum of cash or by crops, but by clearing a 
certain number of acres every year.502 Tenants with this form of agreement had little 
incentive to improve the means of farming, but all the more reason to engage themselves 	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in ‘chopping down trees, removing underbrush, [and] burning logs’.503  
 
The Sales System of Reserve Lands 
Advantageous conditions of access to land were to be found in other British 
colonies where land was abundant. In Australia, for instance, ‘innumerable settlers with 
little cash or credit participated in the great land rush and derived earnings from farming 
or selling out.’504 Much like in Upper Canada, this meant that little rural wage labour 
was available to work for capitalists, a problem which became ‘a fairly common theme 
in British mercantile literature’.505 Marx himself had noted that capitalism could not be 
directly exported to white settler colonies, for, there, ‘the bulk of the soil is still public 
property and every settler on it can therefore turn part of it into his private property and 
his individual means of production, without preventing later settlers from performing the 
same operation’.506 The expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil would thus 
be inevitably precluded by local conditions, as a consequence of which wage labour 
would be scarce and dear—in other words, unprofitable to employ in agriculture. In 
Upper Canada, ‘[t]he difficulty […] was caused by the fact that […] land was so cheap 
and plentiful that even the poorest emigrants […] could obtain their own means of 
production and therefore would not be forced, except on their own terms, to work for 
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wages’.507  
Aware of this issue, influential individuals like John Elmsley and Robert Gourlay 
argued for the need to terminate the ‘free’ land granting system and replace it with a 
sales system. They made the case that labour would become more plentiful if land was 
made dearer. The logic was that, as land would be sold instead of given, only people of 
some means—those said best-positioned to put the land into productive use—would 
become owners. The others—the majority of new immigrants—would be forced to 
engage in wage labour, at least for the time necessary to accumulate an amount of 
wealth sufficient to the purchase of property.508 By disposing of Crown reserves through 
a sales policy, the hope was to provide the local conditions for the development of a 
capitalist agrarian class structure in which landlords and tenant farmers would have 
access to the means—labour—necessary to make improvements to produce more at 
better cost: ‘they considered this the only effective method of fostering colonial 
economic development’.509  
A series of measures inspired by the theories of the proponents of the sales 
system were adopted in the late 1810s and early 1820s to curb speculation and 
absenteeism. A new tax, for instance, was imposed on wild land, and settlement duties 
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were revised. One had to wait until 1826, however, to see the ‘free’ land-granting system 
finally abolished.510 It was replaced by a sales policy on Crown land that gave no other 
choice to new settlers than to buy or rent their plots on the market to access ownership. 
As such, it represented a landmark in the commodification of land: ‘the vacant Crown 
Lands in each district were evaluated and a sale of minimum prices in each was 
established. Lands available for sale were then advertised in the newspapers, and by 
other means, with the minimum (or ‘upset’) price stated, and to be sold to the highest 
bidders’.511 With the exception of grants to Loyalists and ‘a provision for grants to poor 
settlers on a quit-rent basis […] all lands would henceforth be sold, with the proceeds to 
go into the provincial treasury’.512 
Those aspiring to create a pool of wage labourers in the province had not been 
the only ones demanding the end of the free land-granting system. Settlers themselves 
had long complained about vacant land owned by absentee owners and the way that 
Crown reserves were dispersed in settlements following a checkered layout that had for 
effect to isolate settlers from one another and create inutile obstacles to the development 
of roads and farms.513 To give a sense of proportions, by 1825, about 62% of all land 
granted was held by absentee owners.514 The sales policy, however, failed to put an end 
to speculation and absenteeism, for much of the land, including 1.1 million of acres in 
what came to be known as the Huron Tract, was sold to the Canada Company in return 	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for annual payments.515 The Canada Company was denounced by Reformers as ‘a group 
of favoured absentee speculators’516 which had privileges not granted to other 
landowners, holding huge amounts of Crown reserve lands received at a low price fixed 
by the government. Moreover, the unpatented and unoccupied land it possessed was not 
subject to the wild land tax.517  
The effects of the new sales system on the ability of young settlers and new 
immigrants to access land does not, however, unequivocally point out in the direction of 
a restriction of acquisitions. For one thing, the Canada Company made vast areas of land 
available to purchase in more remote and newly developing regions, where prices were 
lower, hence relieving poor settlers of the obligation of purchasing land in established 
areas, where it was more expensive.518 For another, public reserves that were sold to 
settlers through auction had to be paid for by instalment, easing the credit problem of 
poor settlers.519 Moreover, not all grants of land had been abolished with the end of the 
free land-granting system—‘the Crown continued to give away land as pauper lots or for 
settlement roads’.520 While the sales system may have favoured speculation and 
absenteeism in some aspects, it is thus far from certain that it met success in creating the 
pool of wage labourers that many wished to constitute in the colony: ‘[t]he vast amount 
of uncleared land already in private hands and the allowance of credit by speculators, 
such as the Canada Company, continued to make land readily available to poor able-	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bodied immigrants’.521 
 The context of economic depression of the 1830s and the political turmoil that 
culminated in the Canadian Rebellions in 1837-1838, retarded immigration, so that the 
rise of land prices that would have rendered access to free holdings more difficult was 
delayed.522 That said, the sales policy did help public authorities achieve at least one 
their objectives: to provide the government with a revenue to pay for its expenses, 
among which were compensation to civilians for the destruction of their property in the 
War of 1812.523 
This search for revenues was decisive in the Executive Council’s decision to 
adopt the sales policy in a context in which the Executive Council could not turn toward 
taxation without jeopardizing its relative power within the government. Here, it is well 
to recall that the imposition of direct taxes on the Thirteen American Colonies by the 
British Parliament to pay for military expenses incurred during the French and Indian 
Wars played a central role in the series of events that led to the American Revolution. In 
a vain effort to address the primary grievance of the British colonists in the Thirteen 
Colonies concerning taxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in the Colonies, the 
Colonial Tax Repeal Act, adopted in 1778, declared illegal the imposition of taxes by the 
King and Parliament on any of the Colonies, Provinces, and Plantations in North 
America and the West Indies (with the exception of duties intended to regulate 
commerce). From that time on, direct taxation from London would contravene the 
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widely-held principle of ‘no taxation without representation’, according to which only 
the elected representatives in each British colony had control over the appropriation of 
local revenues.  
This principle having been reasserted during Upper Canada’s formation under 
the terms of the Constitutional Act of 1791,524 taxation raised by provincial legislation 
would be controlled by the representative body of Upper Canada—the Legislative 
Assembly. This was considered as an extremely liberal gesture by the Colonial 
Office.525 The Governor, nevertheless, controlled certain revenues—among which were 
export duties and transfers from the British government—that allowed him to ‘carry on 
the administration without consulting the Assembly on financial matters’.526 Since the 
British Treasury had decided to limit, in 1817, its financial assistance to the annual 
Parliamentary grant for the salaries of the chief officers of government, the financial 
independence of the Governor and the Executive Council was seriously threatened.527 
The other principal source of revenue—export duties—were collected in Lower Canada 
before being shared between the governments of the two provinces. They had always 
been the object of acrimonious disputes between the two governments. In this context, 
the Governor and the Executive Council had limited options to increase their revenue 
since they could not raised direct taxation. 
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The Colonial Land/Office State 
The impossibility of the Executive Council to have direct recourse to taxation 
had fundamental consequences for Upper Canada’s state-formation and the reproduction 
of its ruling class. For one thing, it delayed the establishment of a representative 
government and hindered the functioning of modern political institutions, undermining 
the creation of a modern bureaucracy and the economic development of the province by 
renouncing the public revenue that could have been used to pay the salaries of the 
magistracy and local governmental officials528 or spent on badly needed 
infrastructure.529 At the same time, by imposing an inescapably low threshold on 
taxation and limiting the financial means with which public officers could be rewarded, 
the restricted possibilities of taxation of the Executive also blocked the establishment of 
a tax/office state of the absolutist type. In these circumstances, the desire of the 
Governor and the Executive Council to retain their independence from the Assembly by 
selling the Crown reserves intensified their political dependency on a network of 
speculative landowners (corporate and individual) that impeded the production of the 
agrarian economy.  
While the sale of Crown reserves constituted an important landmark in the 	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commodification of land, it did so in a way that did not depart fundamentally from the 
structure of social reproduction that had been established in the early days of Upper 
Canada’s formation. This social structure, I suggest, can be understood as a colonial 
‘land/office state’ within which power and wealth rested on the appropriation of public 
land and the preservation of business relations dependent on aristocratic pretentions and 
loyalty to the British Empire. Much like the absolutist tax/office state, the colonial 
land/office state precluded the modern differentiation between the political and 
economic.530 The reproduction in Upper Canada of the fusion of domination and 
exploitation characteristic of pre-capitalist societies was expressed through the 
consolidation of a ‘quasi-official coalition’ of central and local elites ‘for the purpose of 
distributing honours and rewards to the politically deserving’.531 One thing that 
distinguished it from the absolutist tax/office state was, however, the centrality of land, 
rather than taxation, for social reproduction. 
Within the colonial land/office state, the ruling class managed to appropriate 
great amounts of public land through a network of patronage whose scope was ‘beyond 
the wildest imaginings of English domestic politics’, due to the ‘truly enormous 
quantities of fertile land’ that had to be disposed of ‘in the span of a few brief 
decades’.532 ‘To find a comparable moment in English history’, as one historian puts it, 
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‘it is necessary to go back to the period of the Norman conquest’.533 One John Clarke’s 
succinct formulas also helps to grasp the essence of the logic of appropriation at the core 
of Upper Canada’s state-formation: ‘Those who served received land and those with 
land qualified to serve and so received more’.534 The result was the creation of a 
dominant propertied class organized by a system of clientelism in which the possession 
of land and the access to the highest public offices gave, in Lord Durham’s words, ‘all 
powers of government’.535  
These powers allowed members of the ruling class to fill ‘the bench, the 
magistracy, the high offices of the Episcopal church, and a great part of the legal 
profession’, as well as ‘the large number of petty posts which are in the patronage of the 
government all over the province’.536 This system of clientelism ‘hardened into a 
complex network joining officials at the capital to interest groups in every locality, in a 
bewildering maze of inter-relationships. As early as the 1820s, and probably well before 
then, each community had a local oligarchy—in effect, a party machine—through which 
the provincial government dispensed its favours’.537 Admittance to this network was 
reliant upon, and gave access to, land, making speculation one of the main roads to 
become rich and rise to a position of social prominence. Having dedicated thirty-five 
years of his life to studying Upper Canada’s political culture, environment, and 
government land policy, historian John Clarke has concluded that ‘[t]his nexus of 
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interconnection was not just how land speculators proceeded, it seems to have been how 
the very society worked, with networks of influence organized from the local to the 
larger scale’.538 
Already in Upper Canada’s early formative years, the logic of the colonial 
land/office state can been observed. Membership on a land board was then one of the 
surest roads to achieve prominence. For one thing, it conferred interpretative powers in 
regard to policy directives that could be used to one’s own and one’s friends’ advantage. 
More generally, members of land boards ‘decided who would become landowners and 
thereby determined social status. It [the membership] also gave access to a great deal of 
information which could be beneficial to one’s own business’.539 The land boards were, 
in that sense, perhaps the first instance of a long-term process of colonial state-formation 
that ‘required loyal agents at the local level who could gather and transmit specified 
elements of intelligence. This intelligence would enable the central authority to monitor 
local provision, to identify sources of conflict, to discover and generalize administrative 
innovation, and to interve to overcome barriers to the realization of policy or the success 
of police’.540 
Of course, membership in land boards was limited to a privileged elite. To be 
recommended, candidates had to have ‘already begun to establish their positions in the 
social hierarchy either through prior military service or acquired wealth or both’; they 
also had to be ‘right-minded and had proven themselves committed to British colonial 
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society’.541 In this way, ‘the process of selection reflected the personal, hierarchical 
character of the society’ rather than any qualifications based on competence or 
experience in land administration.542 In 1794, the replacement of land boards by a 
petitioning process to the Executive Council (directly or through the local agency of the 
magistrates) did not significantly alter the principles of favouritism at the core of the 
process of land-acquisition established during the time of the land boards.543 Land 
boards were, moreover, re-established in local districts in the years following the War of 
1812, ‘so that immigrants need not attend at York’.544 For decades, most of the business 
of the Upper Canadian state would revolve around surveying, mapping, and dividing the 
landscape into lots and concessions, as well as administrating the Crown reserves, a 
permanent object of contention in the colony.545 
Clarke has suggested that Upper Canada’s system of offices mirrored in 
fundamental aspects the system of clientelism prevailing in early nineteenth century 
Britain. After all, there, too, public offices conferred ‘the capacity to dispense patronage. 
[…] [T]he few dribbled out offices of state to reward loyalty in friends, family, and 
clients or to buy off the disaffected. There, too, marriage and personal connections were 
the mechanisms used to secure the profits and perquisites of the state’.546 While correct, 
this comparison fails to acknowledge that, with the development of agrarian capitalism 
in England, the landed ruling class had turned the land into a productive asset which 	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now constituted, together with economic rents derived from leasing agreements with 
tenant farmers forced into the competitive improvement of land, the basis of its wealth 
and power at a distance from state offices. In Upper Canada, this strategy of 
reproduction was blocked by the scarcity and dear cost of wage labour: the dominant 
propertied class had to find other ways of reproducing themselves. Appropriating land 
from Native peoples  
far more land than they could put into productive use, Upper Canadian ruling 
class members saw their holdings primarily ‘as sources of valuable timber or as 
desirable locations from which they hoped to profit as land values rose’.547 Their 
strategic use of land consequently rested on various sorts of speculative activities—
constantly on the outlook for land whose value was expected to rise, in the hope of a 
capital gain at the time of resale.  
Crucially, the success of these speculative ventures was less dependent on 
competitive production than on factors associated with the political ability to get land in 
the best physical environment, which meant access to road systems and rural 
infrastructure, a proximity to towns, quality soil, the presence of exploitable natural 
resources, and regional monopoly privileges. The simple fact of holding large tracts of 
land was not sufficient in itself to make land speculation profitable. Accessing public 
monies to improve local roads and rural infrastructure was also essential in making an 
area attractive to settlement and concomitantly raising the price that could be obtained 
from land sales. While they locked up land in anticipation of future sales, speculative 	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owners also looked to rent lots of land to tenant farmers in order to make an additional 
revenue. As discussed above, this appropriation of surpluses from direct producers, 
while partly relying on commercial leases, was nevertheless almost always on terms 
which were advantageous to tenants.  
Absentee speculators could also sell the land to the tenants, whenever the value 
of land became interesting enough. If improvements had been made over the years by 
enterprising tenants, it was all the better for the speculator, who could obtain a better 
price without having laboured the land or provided the capital to achieve improvements. 
Land was also often sold ‘to poor immigrants at inflated prices. Profits of 50 to 100 
percent were not uncommon, although most received returns around 2 to 8 percent’.548 
In all, the social reproduction underpinning the colonial land/office state departed 
considerably from the ways rural land was made profitable in England, where peasants 
had been driven off their land, their holdings being consolidated and leased out to large 
capitalist tenants who employed wage-labour to farm commercially.549 Appropriation 
thus became directly ‘economic’ as opposed to the ‘extra-economic’ forms of 
appropriation that had characterized pre-capitalist societies.  
By contrast, the general pattern of investment found in Upper Canada revolved 
around speculative practices that relied on geopolitical forms of appropriation whose 
basis was, at its most fundamental level, the process of dispossession of Native peoples. 	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Like other cases of European colonization in the New World, this appropration occurred 
through the displacement and removal of indigenous peoples from traditional lands by 
the encroachment of colonizing and invading agricultural farmers—the ‘pioneers’. 
Although the land appropriated was held under different tenurial arrangements, this 
geopolitical form of appropriation made state-formation in Upper Canada and New-
France/Lower Canada colonial processes of state-formation different from processes of 
state-formation in Europe. Colonial state-formation in North America extended the reach 
of European rule into the ‘New World’, supported the establishment of white farming 
communities on Native homelands, and imposed a new property settlement on settled 
areas of the continent, areas whose moving frontier line ceaselessly expanded 
Westward.550  
 
Gentlemen Farmers and the Emulation of ‘Improved’ Farming 
Members of Upper Canada’s dominant propertied class were not impervious to 
the possibilities of increasing income through greater production on lands appropriated 
from Native peoples. In fact, the spirit of improvement had gained much popularity 
among better-off Lowland Scotch and English ‘half-pay’ officers who were not 
dependent upon immediate cash returns on their land.551 While most members of the 
dominant propertied class left the land idle in the expectation of making profits along the 
principle of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’ on markets separated by a temporal (rather 	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than geographical) distance, some officers carried out plans for adopting improved 
farming practices with the capital it required and the considerable risks it entailed. They 
experimented, invested in specialization, and could afford to wait while cattle were 
reared.552 As they tried to emulate British agriculture and improve agrarian techniques, 
these officers, however, could hardly get around the fact that labour was not available in 
the colony to sustain capitalist farming. 
Half-pay officers had started to emigrate in Canada as early as 1776, but most did 
so only after peace had been concluded with the United States, in 1783. By then, there 
were a few hundreds of Loyalist troops, together with some civilians, who had 
established themselves and started to cultivate the land in the Niagara region, at Detroit, 
and near Cataraqui.553 Reports on the high quality of the soil led the colonial 
administration to favour the Great Lakes region as the location to welcome the first 
wave of Loyalist immigration drawn from disbanded regiments and rangers that had 
been recruited, for the most part, from farming communities in the hinterland of New 
York and Pennsylvania.554 As historian James Johnson has explained, many of them 
 
had served as officers of British Loyalist regiments—the King’s Royal Regiment 
of New York, the 84th Regiment, Butler’s Rangers—or had been attached to the 
Indian Department or other units during the American Revolution. When their 	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units were disbanded, these men qualified for half pay, which, depending on 
rank, entitled the recipient to some £50 to £150 per year. Compared to the very 
little or no liquid assets enjoyed by the ordinary struggling settler, half pay of 
necessity bestowed a substantial advantage on those who received it.555 
 
Prior to the War of 1812, a great number of ‘late’ Loyalists had arrived in Upper 
Canada, many of them having not fought the republicans during the American 
Revolution, and some of them even openly hostile toward the Crown. They were 
considered by many early Loyalists as mere ‘land-hunters’ trying to take advantage of 
the free land-granting system of Upper Canada, and by the authorities as a potentially 
disloyal group, suspected of republican sympathies. The British government thus wanted 
to encourage emigration from the mother country, or from the British army, surer 
sources of loyal subjects than the republican United States.556 Upper Canada was indeed 
‘in a state of permanent siege if not from American troops then from American ideas. 
This made “loyalty” the crux of the conservative vision’.557 Various measures were 
adopted by the government to make it difficult for Americans to engage in Upper 
Canadian politics, at the same time as it put in place a series of schemes to assist would-
be emigrants of British origin to settle in British North America. These schemes 
typically provided several hundred emigrants at a time with lots of land and ratios, as 
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well as farming implements, for a few months.558  
Among the assisted emigrants, were thousands of soldiers and officers to whom 
were offered special terms to take land in Upper Canada, many having fought in the 
Napoleonic Wars. Among the military personnel who accepted this opportunity of 
settling in Canada, there were a large number of half-pay officers who came ‘some 
fifteen or twenty years after Waterloo, when financial depression and changing 
conditions had greatly circumscribed the opportunities for a genteel, idle, or sporting life 
in the Old Land’.559 Could such a life be reproduced in Upper Canada? In any case, the 
agrarian class structure of British capitalism could certainly not, which put a limit on the 
income associated with rents and greater production. In the absence of a pool of wage 
labourers readily available to work on farms, half-pay officers had to labour the land 
themselves if they hoped to make a good living out of their farms—engaging ‘in the 
business practically’ by relying on the labour of the family, ‘the price of labour being so 
high, and that of produce so low, that the agriculturalist cannot derive much profit from 
the returns made by the soil, if he employs hired men to work it’.560 Gentlemen farmers 
often attempted to solve their labour problems by leasing part of their farms to tenants 
who would improve—meaning clear—the land for them.561 
These obstacles did not prevent half-pay officers from becoming the agents of a 
cultural transfer of more up-to-date farm technologies and implements in the colony: 
‘these Britons were foremost in introducing better crop rotations, pure-bred stock, and 	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labour-saving machinery’.562 By the early nineteenth century, the existence of 
agricultural societies as well as farm journals and newspapers testifies of the spirit of 
improvement that was gaining popularity among Upper Canadian ‘would-be gentleman 
farmers’ or ‘investing farmers’,563 some of whom even attempted to introduce certain 
traits of the British class system in the Upper Canadian countryside by bringing capital 
to the land and renting it to tenants who provided labour to work the soil. They ‘spent 
fortunes to transmute their Upper Canadian wildlands as rapidly as possible into English 
country seats that would become income-producing dynastic holdings’.564 In their 
hands, ‘improved’ farms did develop, albeit rather marginally, during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The social foundations of the British model of capitalist agriculture 
with its three classes was not, however, reproduced beyond some of its technical aspects. 
In the 1820s and the 1830s, gentlemen farmers started to employ ‘their land more 
intensively than the great majority of agricultural settlers, making higher investments per 
cleared acre in labour, livestock, and buildings, and employing lengthier and more 
complex rotations’.565 The new farm methods and techniques they introduced included 
experimental crops, the raising of a considerable number of animals, and the systematic 
application of manure to the soil, all techniques informed by British systems of land 
management, which emerged out of several centuries of social transformation in the 
English countryside. There, as Comninel has explained, rural productive activities and 
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the terms of leases between English landlords and tenant farmers had been altogether 
‘increasingly driven by market competition’.566 This ‘created an unprecedented social 
space where all production was virtually completely “free” from consideration of the 
immediate community’s needs’.567 In certain regions, this transformation was 
accompanied by 
 
a permanent shift from grain crops to pasture. Yet arable farming too was 
transformed, by combining greatly increased flocks of sheep (producing manure 
as well as meat, wool and hide) with more intensive corn production (made 
possible by the sheep)—‘improved agriculture’. Fallow was eliminated entirely, 
while, over time, new fodder crops made possible still more intensive sheep-corn 
farming. Other specialisation emerged as well.568  
 
The development of the revolutionary up-and-down husbandry in England allowed, as 
Brenner has insisted, ‘the interdependent growth of both animal and arable output’, an 
essential condition for improving agriculture, since animal production had ‘to provide 
manure and ploughing to counter the tendency to declining fertility of the soil’.569 Yet 
this was not ‘a thing any one could do. It took boldness, patience, and plenty of 
capital’.570 The up-and-down husbandry was, therefore, not a type of farming that every 
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Upper Canadian settler could engage in, only the minority of improving farmers who 
applied manure from enclosed livestock and mineral fertilizer, especially lime and 
gypsum, on the land. After a few years of work, their farms ‘could approach more 
closely to the best of the British systems of land management’.571 Because initial 
investment outstripped the profits that could be made from mixed farming during many 
years, the possibility of increased output from individual holdings was seen, at best, as a 
distant and uncertain prospect, rather than a generally accepted value.572 As a result, the 
emulation of British improved farming in Upper Canada long remained the exception 
rather than the rule.	  
  Admittedly, gentlemen farmers did try to diffuse ideas about improvement 
through agricultural fairs and associations. In the County of Northumberland, for 
instance, on the north shore of Lake Ontario, an agricultural society 
 
had been holding annual agricultural fairs, cattle shows, and ploughing matches 
since 1828. The best farms were reported to be experimenting with drainage; 
they had commodious and well-arranged barns, good stock, high yields, and 
gardens and orchards. These farms may have been using reapers, revolving hay 
rakes, and threshers as these new machines made their appearance in the 
county.573 
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Agricultural societies contributed to the diffusion of more up-to-date technologies and 
management methods among the larger population: many who assisted fairs and 
meetings found inspiration in what they saw, joining ‘in the progress when they could 
see at fairs what their neighbours were doing’.574 That said, agricultural societies were 
generally seen as the domain of gentlemen farmers, and often described by journals as 
‘clubs’ that ‘had little of value to teach ordinary farm folk’.575 In the words of one 
historian, ‘the majority came to fairs to gamble and to be amused’.576 Of the nearly 
100,000 people who occupied lots of ten acres or more at the middle of the century, ‘the 
great majority were undoubtedly […] averse to agricultural advances engendered by 
lectures or reading’.577 The agriculture they practiced was designed to generate ‘the 
greatest immediate profit from a very small investment of labour and capital’.578  
Most farmers, for instance, kept little cattle. They also tended to stay away from 
improved breeds, even if available: many settlers ‘considered it preferable not to 
purchase large and high-priced oxen for bush use; for they needed more food and care 
but they were not proportionately more useful. In addition to miserable treatment in the 
Canadian backwoods, they were as well subject to all sorts of accident’.579 ‘Livestock-
raising, except as part of a self-sufficient economy, scarcely existed in Upper Canada in 
the eighteen-thirties’.580 Early nineteenth century Upper Canadian agriculture was, 	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therefore, characterized by the quasi-absence of the revolutionary up-and-down 
husbandry—an absence many times noted by European travellers, especially Scots and 
Englishmen, who were likely to consider the agrarian techniques of Upper Canadian 
farmers ‘backward’ and inefficient in comparison to those of Britain. The Englishmen 
John Howison, having spent two and a half years travelling in Upper Canada—visiting 
Glengarry County, Prescott, and Kingston en route to York (Toronto), from 1818 to 
1820—observed that Canadians 
 
are very bad farmers. They have no idea of the saving of labour that results from 
forcing the land, by means of high cultivation, to yield the largest possible 
quantity of produce. Their object is, to have a great deal of land under 
improvement, as they call it; and, consequently, they go on cutting down the 
woods on their lots, and regularly transferring the crops to the soil last cleared, 
until they think they have sufficiently extended the bounds of their farms. They 
then sow different parts of their land promiscuously, without any attention to 
nicety in the tillage, or any regard to rotation of crops. There is hardly a clean or 
a well ploughed field in the western part of the Province; nor has any single acre 
there, I believe, ever yielded nearly as much produce as it might be made to do 
under proper management.581  
 
Howison was not alone in condemning the farming practices of Upper Canadian settlers, 	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who were in the habit of ‘letting manure accumulate around the barn in huge quantities, 
preferring to remove the building rather than carting the manure to the fields’.582 In his 
Journal of a Tour (1832), another observer, Thomas Fowler, noted that ‘farmers appear 
to have little knowledge of the use of dung, and scarcely anyone thinks of putting a 
single load upon the fields; so that, at any farmer’s barn or stable, one may see a 
dunghill as old as the building’.583 The fact is that extensive wheat monoculture was 
inefficient only in the long run, as it exhausted the soil; in the short run it could do 
extremely well—better, actually, than improved farming, which required the investment 
of great amount of capitals and could only be implemented over a relatively long period 
of time.  
After a few years of ‘wheat-mining’, the soil, of course, would be depleted of its 
nutrients by the crop succession of wheat-fallow-wheat farming or the continuous 
cropping of a succession of grains without the presence of enough livestock to provide 
manure to put nutrients back into the soil.584 But farmers had their own ways to cope 
with soil exhaustion. A common practice was to sell the land to new immigrants, happy 
to buy land that was cleared from trees without realizing that the soil had already been 
exhausted. The phenomenon was so widespread that the agricultural literature of the 
time  
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warned settlers against buying cleared land in any part of Ontario. […] 
Agricultural writers urged Ontario farmers to learn from the experience of others 
and frequently noted with regret that while in Europe soils were being built up, in 
Ontario they were being destroyed. […] The literature frequently warned the 
would-be immigrant that he would find few signs of the fruits of the agricultural 
revolution in Ontario.585 
 
Similar denunciations are found in agricultural periodicals of the time.586 Yet, ‘[d]espite 
the barrage of criticism heaped upon them, very few wheat-fallow-wheat farmers had 
intensified their agriculture as late as 1850 and fewer still had turned to cash crops other 
than wheat. The farm journals repeatedly pleaded with farmers to at least try the 
smothering crop as a preparation for wheat, but apparently with little result’.587  
 
Conclusion 
Interestingly, even if Upper Canadian farming techniques were a far cry from the 
kind of agricultural revolution that had occurred in England, the agricultural sector 
seems to have been dynamic in comparison to the state of crisis that blighted the Lower 
Canadian countryside. It could be tempting to assume that this dynamism of Upper 
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Canada’s booming agricultural sector was associated with capitalist imperatives to 
improve labour productivity, but in the light of what has been shown in this chapter, up 
until the 1840s, it is the geographical expansion of a type of extensive wheat farming 
based on family labour that characterized Upper Canada’s agricultural dynamism. 
As for the ruling class, it had, through the colonial land/office state that was 
established with Upper Canada’s formation, others means to reproduce itself than 
capital-intensive agriculture. To be sure, a minority of ‘gentlemen farmers’ attempted to 
practice an improved form of agriculture. However, given the absence of a pool of rural 
wage labourers large enough to provide the labour needed to intensify productive 
processes on farms, and in the dearth of a class of market dependent tenant farmers 
forced to produce competitively in order to retain access to land, they met with limited 
success. Since most Upper Canadian farmers refused capital-intensive developments and 
remained profoundly sceptical of what they perceived as ‘book-farming’, a handful of 
improved farms long remained surrounded by multitudes of farms managed according to 
traditional methods of extensive agriculture. Things, however, changed in the 1840s, as 
Upper Canadian rural producers started to switch away from extensive types of 
agriculture toward capital-intensive types of agriculture. It is to the this change that I 
turn in the next chapter. 
5. 
 
The Development of Capital-Intensive Agriculture in 
Upper Canada 
 
 
The adoption of capital-intensive agriculture on an extensive scale of production 
became a defining characteristic of Upper Canada’s agricultural economy from the 
1840s onwards. Revolutionizing, labour-saving implements developed by American 
industries during this period, including cast iron ploughs, revolving hay rakes, seed 
drills, and Hussey and McCormack reapers, found their way across the border where 
they were welcomed by Upper Canadian farmers. First developed in the north-eastern 
United States, where the agrarian population, subjected to the imperatives of market 
competition by the burden of taxation, mortgages, and other debts resulting from the 
American Revolution, was impelled to intensify agricultural production, these farm 
implements were readily sought and willingly applied by Upper Canadian farmers not 
subject to the same conditions. ‘[B]y 1871 there were 37,874 reapers and mowers in 
Ontario and 5149 in Quebec. Agricultural machinery was originally imported from the 
United States, but increasingly it came to be made in rural Ontario as domestic demand 
rose. By 1870 value added in this industry was $1.5 million in non-metropolitan Ontario 
and less than $300,000 in non-metropolitan Quebec’. 
This transformation, in the seeming absence of the discipline of market 
imperatives, requires explanation. What compelled Upper Canadian farming families to 
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adopt capital-intensive means of production at almost the same pace as their American 
counterparts? A comparative perspective, which considers the American and Canadian 
societies as each characterized particular sociohistorical conditions but, nevertheless, far 
from insular, is necessary to make sense of this problematic.  
Canada experienced no event of its own similar the American Revolution in its 
scope and consequences during this period. As discussed in greater depth below, this 
epoch-shaping event resulted notably in public and private debt, which changed the 
relationship of farmers to the means of production, and therefore, of social reproduction. 
Indeed Charles Post’s incisive analysis of the origins of American capitalism has made it 
clear that north-eastern and mid-west American farmers in the nineteenth century were 
compelled to adopt more efficient methods of production to compete on the market, 
because failure to do so would result in ‘the loss of effective possession of the main 
means of production in agriculture, land’.588 By contrast, Upper Canadian farmers, not 
obliged by debt and the resultant threat of dispossession to revolutionize production 
and/or procure their means of reproduction through market competition, nevertheless 
sought to adopt capital-intensive means of production. How they were able to do so, and 
for what reasons, is the subject of the analysis that follows. As we shall see, the 
American Revolution had consequences for Canada as well, in so far as it created a new 
set of conditions, not limited by political boundaries, in which subsequent trade, 
development, and political decision-making on the continent would unfold.  
The argument of this chapter is that once the revolutionary transformation that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Post, The American Road to Capitalism, 91.
	  217	  	  	  	  
heralded industrial capitalism had occurred in the north-eastern United States, Upper 
Canadian farmers were able to adopt capital-intensive types of agriculture, taking 
advantage of the technical developments provided by the ‘early developer’ without 
progressing in a linear fashion through the same ‘stage’ as their northern American 
counterparts. While not faced with the peril of dispossession under the burden of 
taxation, mortgages, and debts, Upper Canadian farmers, nonetheless, confronted new 
economic pressures stemming from the United States. They also had a new interest in 
seeking to transform agricultural practices for the purposes of efficiency and profit-
making: the novel opportunity to participate in the material culture opened to them by a 
burgeoning American industrial capitalism, which was beginning to radically transform 
consumption and production patterns, as well as cultural norms and expectations. In this 
sense, Upper Canadian farmers were ‘late developers’ benefiting from the ‘advantage of 
backwardness’. This allowed them to take advantage of the new implements designed by 
their ‘early developer’ neighbours south of the border to undertake the transformation of 
the agriculture of the province, under the decisive influence and pressure generated by 
the development of capitalism in the northern United States. In this sense, the 
‘compulsion’ to eventually adopt capital-intensive agricultural practices in Upper 
Canada was not an internal one, but rather an external one, intimately bound up with a 
shifting international context to which a variety of social actors, including farmers, 
merchants, and policy-makers, were forced to respond.  
To substantiate this argument, I first review Post’s analysis of the origins of 
capitalism in the United States in order to draw out the specific mechanisms by which 
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independent household-producers in the northeast and mid-west were made market 
dependent for their economic survival. In the second section, I sketch out the features of 
international trade between the US, Canada, and Britain at that time by examining the 
competitive conditions that existed within and between the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes 
commercial system, which organized trade in Upper Canada, and the Hudson-Mohawk 
commercial route, which was dominated by New York, and the role of local merchants 
from Montreal and Upper Canada within the system. Following this is an examination of 
Canadian merchants’ dual commercial strategy in their struggle for competitiveness with 
American merchants and the consequences of this strategy for the integration of Upper 
Canada’s pre-capitalist commercial agriculture into the orbit of the American industrial 
sector of the northeast. In the fourth section, I highlight, through a comparison with the 
American Revolution, the limited impact of class struggle on the social structure of 
Upper Canada’s agricultural economy during the 1830s. Finally, I explore how, in the 
absence of a palpable threat of dispossession, Upper Canadian independent household-
producers were, nonetheless, presented with both economic pressures and incentives to 
intensify agricultural production. Capitalism’s transformation of agricultural practices, 
along with the rise of industrial capitalism, in the north-eastern United States profoundly 
altered the conditions for subsequent economic transformations elsewhere in North 
America and opened up an alluring material culture. 
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The American Road to Capitalism 
Charles Post has theorized the transformation of the north-eastern American 
countryside between 1776 and 1861 as the transition from independent household-
production, which he defines as ‘a social-property form relatively impervious to market-
forces’, to petty-commodity production, ‘a social-property form dependent upon 
competitive markets’.589 This transformation, he suggests, was the outcome of social 
conflict between household producers, who held and cultivated small landed estates, and 
the merchant class, composed of ‘local storekeepers, larger town and urban wholesales, 
land-speculators, etc.’.590 The decisive issue at stake in these class struggles was land—
the principal means of production in agrarian society.  
 Due to the sheer abundance of land and the inability of absentee owners to 
effectively enforce their property rights, poor and ‘middling’ settlers were, up until the 
American Revolution, able to take possession of unoccupied land in the northern 
colonies and retain their autonomy from ‘market-discipline’ by producing for 
subsistence.591 Undoubtedly, this situation, complicated as it was by the predatory 
activities of urban merchants and land speculators, far from corresponded to Frederick 
Jackson Turner’s utopian vision of an egalitarian ‘frontier society’ constituted by 
independent free-holding pioneers with unobstructed access to land. Indeed, the access 
of the ‘yeomanry’ to small landed estates was far from guaranteed: it required ongoing 
struggle to resist merchants and land speculators’ attempts at creating a social monopoly 	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of land. Through illegal occupations and ‘rent-wars’, which frequently took the form of 
armed uprising (for instance, in the case of Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts), farmers 
and rural artisans managed to ‘establish, maintain and expand their landholding without 
extensive commodity-production’.592 This independence from market imperatives did 
not mean that the ‘yeomanry’ refrained from engaging in exchange-relations with local 
and regional merchants593; they did so, however, in a way that did not jeopardize their 
ability ‘to produce the bulk of their own subsistence’.594 In the north-eastern United 
States, what Marxist economics refers to as the ‘independent household mode of 
production’ was successfully established by farm families free from the obligation to 
‘compete or go under’. 
While the ‘independent household’ mode of production, based on self-
sufficiency, is unregulated by the law of value, the ‘petty-commodity’ mode production, 
as ‘a form of household-based production is subject to the operation of the law of value’. 
The  law of value is introduced as households come to depend ‘upon production for the 
market for their survival as small property owners’, for in doing so, ‘a dynamic of 
specialisation, competition, accumulation and technical innovation similar to capitalism 
ensues’.595 Independent household-producers are thereby subjected to market 
imperatives which reorient their production away from subsistence practices. In other 
words, what distinguishes the latter from petty-commodity producers is that their 
economic survival—especially ‘their ability to obtain, maintain, and expand their 	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possession of landed property’, that essential ingredient of their social reproduction—is 
not dependent ‘upon the profitable sale of agricultural goods’.596  
 
[N]orthern-colonial farm-households were able to devote the bulk of their land 
and labour to production for their own consumption, providing the basis for the 
dense web of kinship and communal relations that structured neighbourly 
exchange of goods and labour among households. Households and communities, 
secure in their possession of landed property, could pursue safety-first 
agriculture—producing food, livestock and crafts for their own and their 
neighbours’ consumptions and marketing only surpluses.597 
 
It is important to emphasize that independent household-production ‘was neither 
stagnant nor without distinctive social dynamics’.598 The familial nature of farm labour, 
for instance, together with parents’ need to provide some security for themselves in old 
age, encouraged the rearing of many children. Through squatting or accessing land ‘at 
non-market-determined low prices’, north-eastern household-producers were able to 
escape, for a time, the threat of population growth exceeding production, without 
transforming productive capacities.599  
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Since independent household-producers were under no direct ‘compulsion to 
specialise, innovate, or accumulate’,600 they initially engaged in extensive methods of 
agriculture, which sought to put greater quantities of land under cultivation—thereby 
geographically expanding the limits of this practice through ‘the multiplication of 
technically unchanging family-farms into the frontier’601—rather than introduce new 
techniques to intensify agricultural production on existing parcels of land. While 
preserving their independence from market-compulsion through subsistence production, 
northern farmers simultaneously produced large agricultural surpluses (of grains and 
meat) that could be sold ‘to the northern ports of Boston, New York and Philadelphia 
and to the growing sugar-plantations of the Caribbean’.602 This changed, however, 
during the American Revolution: the revolutionary-war effort demanded that farmers 
direct much of their labour to the production of commodities destined to supply state 
governments and the Continental Army—ultimately to the detriment of their self-
sufficient way of living.603  
The manifold socio-economic and political consequences of the American 
Revolution eventually undermined independent household production. Forced to 
purchase many essential goods from merchants for domestic consumption, northern 
farmers quickly amassed debts that were difficult to pay off once the war was over. The 
war also generated large public debts, which were dealt with by state governments 
through the levy of heavy taxes imposed on smallholders. At the same time, land 	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speculators took advantage of new state institutions created on the heels of the war to 
secure their property rights on the frontier, the result of which was an increase in 
inequality on the frontier and rising land prices throughout the northeast. All of these 
circumstances contributed to render unfeasible the extensive production methods that 
had formerly met farmers’ basic needs. As Post has explained, ‘[b]y the mid-1780s, 
farmers and rural artisans found themselves needing “to sell to survive”—to participate 
successfully in competitive markets in order to keep their farms’.604 Hard pressed, the 
least efficient farmers were faced with the hitherto unimaginable possibility of losing 
their land through foreclosure.605 
Farmers fought back in a series of vigorous class-conflicts against ‘tax-collectors, 
merchant-creditors and land speculators over the conditions of their economic 
survival’.606 Ultimately, however, they lost. The Constitutional Settlement of 1787 
‘established the political dominance of the mercantile capitalists and created state-
institutions (a corps of tax-collectors and a federal army) capable of implementing pro-
merchant state-policies’.607 These state institutions aided absentee landowners in 
enforcing their legal claims to land in the interior against those of independent farmers 
and ‘squatters’.608 As such, access to cheap or inexpensive land on the frontier was 
increasingly impeded by legal and institutional mechanisms. Combined with 
burdensome taxes and the intransigent demands of the merchants to be paid in specie, 
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farmers were soon forced to sell on the market ‘both the “surplus” and portions of their 
“subsistence”-output. In other words, the farmers became dependent upon successful 
market-production for their economic survival—they became agrarian petty-commodity 
producers’.609 
During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the north-eastern 
‘yeomanry’ attempted ‘to meet the new conditions for the acquisition, maintenance and 
expansion of landholding’ by increasing and reorganizing ‘labour devoted to the 
production of marketable “surpluses”,’ while, at the same time, attempting to continue 
production of the bulk of their ‘subsistence’.610 In the mid-Atlantic region, many 
households responded to the new pressures by introducing ‘improved’ techniques of 
farming into their fields. ‘“Up and down husbandry”, the crop-rotation method between 
fields, pastures and meadows that allowed the interdependent growth of animal- and 
arable output associated with the development of capitalist agriculture in England in the 
seventeenth century, radically increased labour and soil-productivity in the north-eastern 
US in the early nineteenth century’.611  
By the 1830s, the ‘yeomanry’ had decisively been compelled to specialize its 
agricultural production according to the needs of urban markets. Members of the 
farming household were, furthermore, increasingly pressured to engage in ‘capitalist 	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domestic outwork’, by which ‘[t]he capacity to work of women and children in poorer 
rural families’ was made ‘available to merchants and manufacturers who organised a 
verlag-system of ‘proto-industrialisation’ in the northeast’.612 Crucially, the rural 
household’s growing reliance on the market for its subsistence fuelled the development 
of ‘a massive home-market for industrially produced capital- and consumer-goods, 
sparking the US industrial revolution of the nineteenth century’.613 
 
The St. Lawrence/Great Lakes Commercial System 
In the period following the American Revolution, permanent settlements were 
established in the Ohio Valley and Great Plains southwest of the Great Lakes. For a 
time, pioneer settlers there were able to develop and maintain independent production,  
 
as Native Americans were ‘removed’ and white settlers occupied land at little or 
no cost. Even when the federal public land-system gave legal title to land 
companies, ‘squatters’ were able to organise ‘claims-clubs’ to force landowners 
to sell the land to the settlers well below market-prices. As a result, most farmers 
in the north-west prior to the 1820s were able to market only physical surpluses 
and produce most of their own food, clothing and simple tools.614 
 
A similar situation prevailed in Upper Canada, where independent household-production 	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was established with the arrival of the first Loyalist settlers. Most white settlers that 
came to Upper Canada between 1785 and 1826 continued to secure non-market access to 
their means of subsistence, including land, and avoided becoming dependent upon the 
market for their economic survival. This is undoubtedly the case of Loyalists and other 
‘official’ grantees who were given possession of land at no cost. ‘Non-official’ grantees 
could also obtain free and common socage grants without having to purchase land on the 
market, but, in addition to paying patent fees, they needed to fulfil the duties described 
in the location tickets that were given to them by the Land Commissioner’s Office at 
York, the land boards, or the magistrates.615  
The increase in patent fees during the first two decades of the nineteenth century 
constituted a significant barrier to full legal possession of land for many immigrants 
arriving in the province without capital. Yet, smallholders could work around this 
obstacle by postponing the patenting of their land, contenting themselves with the 
security of ownership conferred by location certificates and tickets. If these documents 
were not as secure legal instruments as patents, they nevertheless conferred on the 
possessor a basic recognition of ownership that could be used as a basis to sell and 
transfer land.616 While for speculators, ‘whose acquisitive nature required constant 
trading’, the certificate was not secure enough, for ‘[f]or those seeking to enter the world 
of farming and seeking permanency, this was no problem’.617 
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Even in the days of the ‘free’ land-granting system, many settlers chose to 
become tenants. A number of them leased lots on public reserves, where rents were kept 
low by the government in order to attract settlers who would provide the Crown with 
rental revenues. In general, rental arrangements outside public reserves also offered 
advantageous terms to tenants, albeit not quite so advantageous as reserve leases.618 For 
settlers who were discouraged by the cumbersome process of acquiring land, but who 
did not want—or could not afford—to rent, access to land was still possible through 
‘squatting’ the reserves or speculators’ land.619 The practice was illegal but widely 
tolerated. Public authorities even recognized pre-emption privileges for squatters, and 
‘usually upheld the deserving squatters’ claims to be paid for their improvements’ if they 
were dislodged.620 In many instances, squatters ‘successfully petitioned for legal 
possession of the lots they occupied’.621 In sum, Upper Canadian pioneer settlers had a 
wide range of options at their disposal to access a parcel of land—the primary means of 
subsistence—without having to buy it on the market.  
This is not to say that life was easy. I have already described in Chapter 4 how 
settlers of limited means had to find the credit necessary to purchase the provisions, 
seeds, livestock, tools, and farm implements required to create a farm in the bush. In 
need of capital, Upper Canada’s pioneer farmers were driven to cultivate wheat, the only 
cash crop for which there existed a ready market. Much like north-eastern household-
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producers before the American Revolution and pioneer settlers in the Ohio Valley and 
the Great Plains until the 1830s, Upper Canadian farmers’ easy access to their means of 
subsistence meant that they were not compelled to produce competitively, even when 
they actively participated in market-exchanges. Upper Canadian households availed 
themselves of the abundance and low cost of land by growing large cash crops according 
to extensive methods of farming—for instance, ‘wheat-mining’—without relinquishing 
independent homespun production and subsistence farming. How this was possible has 
been perceptively sketched out by Marjorie Griffin Cohen in her feminist analysis of the 
farm as a familial unit: men attended to capital formation activities (especially the 
clearing of land) and the production of cash crops, while women’s labour was primarily 
subsistence-oriented. This subsistence labour, in turn, mitigated the risk associated with 
commercial farming and enabled men to concentrate their labour on cash cropping.622  
While the gendered familial division of labour was the backbone Upper Canadian 
households’ social reproduction, the so-called ‘transportation revolution’ of this period, 
which involved the building of roads, canals, and railways, contributed to its viability 
and eventual transformation by facilitating participation in the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes 
commercial system. On the frontier, Upper Canadian settlers were isolated in the 
backwoods, where importing equipment and supplies was expensive.623 Carrying their 
agricultural products to the St. Lawrence navigation road to access the Lower Canadian 
and British markets was also challenging. Roads and canals were required to connect 	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pioneer settlements to each other and to larger commercial networks. The transportation 
network thus became an important object of political struggles early on. Clashes over the 
financing and improvement of transportation were frequent, and intensified with the 
canal projects that emerged in the 1820s, and by the 1850s covered some 3,321 miles.624  
Americans began the construction of the first major canal, the Erie Canal, in 
1817. To counter the advantage of this new transportation development for New York, 
and to retain their share of transborder trade, Canadian merchants engaged in their first 
canal building project in 1819, with works on the Welland Canal, between Lake Erie and 
Lake Ontario. As Norrie and Douglas have explained, the ambitious project, ‘once 
completed, would overcome one of the longer portages in the Great Lakes system. At 
the other end of the system, a group of Montreal businessmen had begun work on the 
Lachine Canal near Montreal’.625 With few sources of finance capital existing in Upper 
and Lower Canada, the funding of these projects was arduous. In the construction of 
both the Welland and Lachine canals, private investors ran out of funds well before the 
canals were finished, forcing provincial governments to intervene, up to the point where 
they took over the projects entirely.626  
Canals opened up new opportunities for farmers to sell what had previously been 
unsalable, or to sell existing goods at better rate of profit, due to the lower cost of 
transportation. The immediate result was to increase, rather than threaten, Upper 
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Canadian farmers’ ability to earn an income without having to improve agrarian 
techniques. Besides, no pressures to improve were directly imposed on them by 
merchants, whose operations consisted, for the most part, in gathering local wheat 
surpluses and conveying them to distant markets, dictating neither the amount of wheat 
produced nor the conditions of its production. Merchants’ primary interest, indeed, lay in 
the sphere of circulation: they had been ‘drawn northward’, as historian Donald 
Creighton puts it, ‘by the promises of the river; and they came with the single, simple 
objective of making money by trade’.627 The Laurentian business class must be 
comprehended, in the words of one of Creighton’s followers, ‘as a mercantile one, 
accumulating wealth through circulation rather than production’ in a way that could 
hardly lead to independent capitalist development.628  
There is no need to agree with Creighton’s romanticized depiction of the 
merchant class or with the staple approach that informs his analysis to take seriously the 
fact that, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the profits of Upper Canadian 
merchants came primarily from transportation activities (circulation) rather than 
investments in productive facilities or the revolutionizing of agriculture (production). 
Here, it may be useful to be reminded that, historically, commercial activities were not 
the ‘natural’ outgrowth nor instigator of capitalist production. In a passage worth 
quoting at length, Ellen Wood insists that 
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even specialized production does not change simply because profit-seeking 
middlemen, even highly developed merchant classes, intervene. Their strategies 
need have nothing to do with transforming production in the sense required by 
capitalist competition. Profit by means of carrying trade or arbitrage between 
markets has strategies of its own. These do not depend on transforming 
production, nor do they promote the development of the kind of integrated 
market that imposes competitive imperatives. On the contrary, they thrive on 
fragmented markets and movement between them, rather than competition within 
a single market, and the links between production and exchange may be very 
tenuous.629 
 
During the eighteenth century, we witness a classic pattern of rivalry between the 
merchant middlemen of the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes and the Hudson-Mohawk 
commercial routes, dominated by Montreal and New York respectively, for control of 
the fur trade and its profits. As the fur trade began to wane in economic importance, 
Montreal merchants, forwarders, and bankers increasingly sought profits in the trade of 
agricultural products, maintaining their control of commercial activities in Lower 
Canada, but shifting the focus of their affairs to Upper Canada.630 Montreal merchant 
houses also established the Ottawa River timber trade, which immensely benefited from 
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the Napoleonic blockade, as Great Britain had to turn toward its colonies to acquire the 
natural resources no longer available from the European continent (especially the 
Baltic).  
Under the Montreal merchants’ hegemony, the St. Lawrence River remained the 
major transhipment point for Upper Canada’s wheat and timber: ‘Everything Upper 
Canada bought and sold had to pass through the hands of middlemen in Montreal. The 
province was an outlying hinterland of a vast commercial empire […]. To the extent that 
the province contributed to trade it was to the advantage of the exporting and importing 
houses of Montreal’.631 Behind Upper Canadian country retailers and middlemen based 
in Montreal were lines of credit and trade running from Glasgow, Liverpool, and 
London. As historian Douglas McCalla has explained, it was through this system that 
‘imported textiles, groceries, iron and hardware’ were imported and that ‘most of the 
exports that Upper Canada was able to produce and sell’ were handled.632 This 
commercial system was also ‘often directly involved in the exchange of local produce’ 
and ‘in physical processing, such as sawing, grinding, carding and fulling, distilling, and 
potash boiling’.633 Until the 1840s, sawmills, grist mills, flour mills, and distilleries in 
Upper Canada existed, however, only on a limited scale, ‘complementing the 
agricultural economy by sawing its lumber, grinding its grain, manufacturing 
agricultural equipment, and producing the beer and whiskey needed to sustain life on a 
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fast-changing but still difficult frontier’.634 The scope and the pace of production within 
these industries was largely dependent on the rhythms of rural producers’ patterns of 
production and consumption.  
 
Merchants’ Dual Commercial Strategy 
In their pursuit of competitiveness, merchants solicited British diplomats for the 
commercial unity of the St. Lawrence on the basis of a dual trade policy.635 On the one 
hand, they defended continental inland free trade with the Americans.636 Their hope was 
that American goods and agricultural products would enter Upper Canada by the Great 
Lakes without facing high duties, before then going into circulation on the St. Lawrence 
River, where they would become of ‘Canadian’ origin in principle, and thus be 
exempted from heavy taxes on the imperial market. This wish was granted in 1831, with 
the Colonial Trade Act, by which the British government eliminated all duties on 
American agricultural products entering Canada, to the benefit of Canadian merchants 
and forwarders, whose interests did not lay primarily in production, but in trade.637 As a 
consequence, wheat and flour produced in the United States could be imported into 
Britain as Canadian produce without any distinction, as long as it first passed through 
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Canada, and therefore through the hands of middlemen, for export.638 
Montreal merchants hoped to reap the benefits of carrying goods, whatever their 
origin—‘it mattered little whether the products came from a domestic or a foreign 
hinterland’.639 Upper Canadian merchants ‘wanted to ensure that it was they who 
shipped American wheat to England and supplied the growing back-country population 
of both British North America and the United States with the latest luxuries and 
manufactures from the United Kingdom’.640 In allowing American competitors to enter 
the British imperial market with both their agricultural and manufactured products at the 
same cost as Canadian products, at a time when Canadian producers faced high tariffs 
and duties when entering the American market, this mercantile strategy had adverse 
effects on Upper Canadian farmers. The advantages previously conferred upon these 
farmers by British mercantilist policies were thus undermined to the benefit of 
merchants. 
On the other hand, for their commercial strategy to function, merchants needed 
protective measures to shield Upper Canada’s commerce with Britain from American 
seaborne competition. Only such a measure could guarantee Americans’ dependence on 
the St. Lawrence commercial empire to access the imperial market at lower costs. In this 
regard, the competition between the St. Lawrence commercial empire—with Montreal at 
its core—and New York’s Hudson-Mohawk trading network bears resemblance to the 
competition that characterized pre-capitalist European trade networks in the early 
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modern epoch. Examining the case of mercantile competition between of the 
Netherlands and the Hanse, as well as within the Dutch Republic itself (between 
Amsterdam and rival commercial cities), Wood has shown that these rivalries were, first 
and foremost, about dominating the supply of a particular commodity for domestic 
producers in what was ‘an essentially  “extra-economic” contest. It had less to do with 
the methods and costs of production than with either politically enforced restrictions and 
privileges or with superiority in the instruments, methods and range of commercial 
activity, to say nothing of superiority in shipping and navigation, and military might’.641  
The wheat market, which ‘accounted for nearly three-quarters of net exports 
from the Canadas’ in the 1830s,642 operated according to similar principles. 
Specialization in wheat-farming was, indeed, neither the cause nor the symptom of 
market dependence. Upper Canadian farmers did not specialize, at least not at first, 
because they were economically compelled to adopt more efficient methods of 
agricultural production to face cost-competition under threat of dispossession, but rather 
to take advantage of high prices during the War of 1812, which had reduced the food 
supply at the same time as hungry British garrisons had increased demand. Later on, in 
the 1820s and 1830s, the demand for wheat created by the agricultural crisis in Lower 
Canada became a large and secure market for Upper Canada’s wheat. 
As historian Marvin McInnis has shown, even with the preference given to 
colonial over foreign imports, the tariff and transport costs took ‘such a large bite out of 
the price’ that ‘much of the time it was just not profitable to produce wheat in Canada 	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for exports to Britain’.643 Exports destined for the Lower Canadian population were 
more important: ‘[t]he quantities of wheat coming into Montreal from the west were 
greater, on average, than the total exports from the St. Lawrence system’.644 With 
agricultural difficulties plaguing the Lower Canadian countryside, yield there decreased 
so much that, by the 1830s, imports from Upper Canada became a vital source of grain 
to feed the peasant population. ‘[F]rom 1838 to 1847, the annual consumption of wheat 
and flour from the West was equivalent for Lower Canada to 190,000 barrels of flour. 
This was a reality which had existed since 1833, but whose permanent character could 
no longer be denied. […] Through it, the destiny of Lower Canada was linked to that of 
the West’.645  
In this sense, the Upper Canadian wheat ‘boom’, like most commercial ‘Golden 
Ages’ in pre-capitalist Europe, was ‘a period of growing market opportunities for more 
total output with more or less guaranteed sale, rather than a period of market imperatives 
requiring the systematic improvement of labour productivity to meet the demands of 
competition’.646 Upper Canadian independent household-producers took advantage of 
these opportunities for sale by engaging in ‘wheat-mining’, thus availing themselves of 
the abundance of good arable land in the production of agricultural surpluses, without 
initially seeking to improve labour-productivity or output per capita. Extensive wheat 
production on family farms in Upper Canada during the early-nineteenth century was a 
pre-capitalist commercial form of agriculture, distinct from commercial agriculture in a 	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capitalist context or from capitalist agricultural production in an industrial capitalist 
society. In the absence of improved farms worked by wage labourers and supervised by 
capitalist tenant farmers under competitive pressures to produce efficiently, family 
farming in Upper Canada was in no way akin to ‘agrarian capitalism’, the distinctive, 
three-class system of agriculture that developed in England.  
 
Class Struggle in the Colonies: A Comparison 
A more immediate point of comparison with the situation of Upper Canadian 
household producers is provided by American farmers. While north-eastern independent 
household-producers had been gradually transformed into petty-commodity producers in 
the aftermath of the American Revolution, mid-western farmers in the Ohio Valley and 
the Great Plains managed to retain their independence from market-discipline for a time. 
Yet, their independence did not last long, for class struggle in the mid-west was not 
impervious to the activities of the state institutions created in the aftermath of the 
American Revolution which sought to enforce property rights. Acting as a mechanism of 
market subordination, by supporting land-speculation and raising the cost of landed 
property, were ‘the federal laws administering the distribution of the vast “public 
domain” stretching from the Appalachian mountains westward’647. As Post has 
explained, these ‘federal land-policies radically altered the relationship of rural 
households to landholding, making the appropriation, maintenance and expansion of 
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land dependent upon successful commodity-production’.648 
Class struggle in Upper Canada took a significantly different course. Unlike 
American merchants, whose independence from British merchants and the British 
empire had grown as they organized the inter-colonial, coastal trade, during the 
eighteenth century,649 the English Canadian merchants controlling the St. 
Lawrence/Great Lakes commercial system did not seriously seek independence from the 
empire in the late-eighteenth or early-nineteenth centuries. On the contrary, in Montreal, 
the economic hegemony established by English Canadian merchants after the Conquest 
of New France rested entirely on British political support, given the small size of the 
English-speaking population in the province. In Toronto (known as York before 1834), 
the capital of Upper Canada, the interests of the merchant class were tightly linked to the 
colonial land/office state—a network of patronage and clientelism that rested in large 
part on expressions of loyalty to the British Empire.  
In such conditions, while in the Thirteen American colonies ‘[t]he development 
of an independent, pre-capitalist colonial economy laid the foundation for the settler-
colonists’ bid for independence, under the leadership of the merchants’,650 Upper 
Canada’s colonial economy long remained decisively harnessed to the British Empire. 
The movement for independence consequently remained weak for a protracted period. It 
was composed mainly of American émigrés who had been exposed or sympathetic to 
American republican ideology and politics before settling in Upper Canada. Upon 
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arrival, they were accused of being ‘land-seekers’ and regarded with suspicion by Tory 
Loyalists, who made of the ‘Alien Question’—the problematic of the rights and 
naturalization of non-Loyalist American-born Upper Canadians—one of the major 
political debates of the 1820s.651 Unfairly treated, American-born settlers’ resentment 
grew, together with their contempt for the Family Compact’s Tory outlook. As such, it is 
not surprising that American-born settlers constituted the core of the Rebellion that 
shook the province in 1837 and 1838.  
William Lyon Mackenzie, the leader of the Upper Canadian rebellion, though not 
American-born, had strong sympathies for the republic and was greatly influenced by 
American democratic ideals. His political views had been buttressed by visits to the 
United States and a meeting with President Andrew Jackson. As Wilson has explained, 
‘[l]ike other agrarian idealists and civic humanists of his age, such as proponents of 
Jeffersonian republicanism, Jacksonian democracy, and English radicalism, Mackenzie’s 
philosophy rested on the belief that the most healthy, natural, and unified society was 
based on agriculture and a widespread freeholding farm population’.652 Gathering 
support from male smallholders in the western and central parts of Upper Canada, 
Mackenzie and other rebel leaders sought to take advantage of the fact that the 
province’s troops had been dispatched to Lower Canada since October of 1837 to 
repress the rebellion there, to launch their own armed uprising in December. Their 
outlook, as Allan Greer has pointed out, was no different than the outlook of many 
American revolutionaries, ‘labelled for shorthand purposes, […] masculine-democratic-	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republican’.653 It was an outlook promoting ‘the rights of the people (read propertied 
men), the dangers of corruption, and the need to defend the independence and 
prerogatives of the colonial Assembly’.654 
 The Upper Canadian rebellion saw the same fate as the Lower Canadian 
rebellion that occurred around the same time: after throwing the colony into turmoil for 
two years, it was militarily crushed. In Lower Canada, skirmishes and battles during the 
months of November and December 1837, as well as in February and November 1838, 
resulted in a few hundred casualties. In Upper Canada, the rebels were, however, too 
poorly armed and organized to offer any serious resistance to loyalist militias. While the 
rebellion temporarily disrupted the economy of a few localities in Lower Canada, where 
the rebels were violently repressed, the same cannot be said of Upper Canada, given the 
limited scale of the armed uprising there. In all, the Upper Canadian rebellion had little 
immediate impact on the agricultural economy of the province. 
Politically, however, the results of the Rebellions were considerable. The Special 
Council which governed Lower Canada between 1838 and 1841 introduced the free 
tenure in Montreal and created new institutions for the urban working classes. It also 
recognized and reaffirmed the social role of the Roman Catholic Church, according it 
‘new corporate powers and reinforced property rights. […] New Catholic orders were 
permitted into Lower Canada; rights of religious institutions to hold property without 
taxes (in mortmain) were clarified; seigneurial lands held by religious orders were to be 
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fully compensated in their transformation to freehold tenure; and male religious 
communities like the Sulpicians were permitted to expand their numbers’.655 As a result 
of the Rebellions, the British authorities also decided upon the political union of Canada 
West (Upper Canada) and Canada East (Lower Canada) in the new Province of Canada 
in 1841. Significant efforts were now devoted to developing educational infrastructure 
and the province was granted responsible government a few years later, in 1848, as a 
means of facilitating rule: ‘direct socialization in habits and beliefs congenial to 
bourgeois hegemony was to be provided in schools […]. On the other hands, 
participation in the management of limited agencies of local government […] would 
practically train “the people” (adult male proprietors) to conduct aspects of their own 
governance in limited representative forms’.656 The introduction of responsible 
government also considerably modified the workings of the colonial land/office state by 
putting an end to the reign of the Family Compact and changing the conditions in which 
patronage and clientelism would now operate.657 
There is no evidence, however, that the rebellion significantly impacted the 
social structure of the province’s agricultural economy in the short term—at least not in 
any way that came close to the impact that the American Revolution and the birth of the 
American republic had on the north-eastern countryside of the United States. Unlike the 
Upper Canada Rebellion, the American Revolution was a full-scale revolution and a war 
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between, on the one side, a colony and its foreign ally (France), and, on the other, 
Britain, the most powerful imperial power of the time. The revolutionary war lasted 
eight years. It claimed the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians, and 
involved enormous government expenditures that generated debts to repay in its 
aftermath. In the north-eastern United States, the weight of these debts came to rest 
heavily on independent household-producers’ shoulders, as governments decided to 
raise property taxes on smallholders. The disruption of the agricultural economy caused 
by the war also forced independent household-producers to contract debts with 
merchants in order to buy a greater amount of basic goods. On the frontier, land-
speculators reinforced their advantageous position and benefited the most from the 
auction of public lands.  
In Upper Canada, too, land-speculators were quite active in the first few decades 
of the nineteenth century. Speculation was one of the principal roads to riches in the 
province. Settlement, however, was in the early stages of its development, which meant 
that land prices never rose to the point where access was jeopardized. As I have 
explained in Chapter 4, even the thorough commodification of the land that 
accompanied the sales policies of the mid-1820s did not amount to a threat of 
dispossession for direct producers who failed to produce competitively. Cheap or 
inexpensive land was still being opened on the frontier, and credit was easily available to 
new immigrants. For their part, well-established Upper Canadian independent 
household-producers remained firmly in possession of their farms in older settlements, 
without being threatened with dispossession if they failed to produce efficiently: the 
	  243	  	  	  	  
scale of farms worked with extensive types of farming long allowed the profitable sale 
of ‘surplus’ products without putting into peril the subsistence basis of the family.  
In these circumstances, the adoption of new machinery and farm implements by 
Upper Canadian farmers, from the 1840s onward, was spawned by a different logic than 
the threat of dispossession so central to the switch in north-eastern America toward more 
capital-intensive types of farming. In Upper Canada, it seems, the market did not 
‘threaten’, but ‘attracted’ farm families, who rather willingly operated a reallocation of 
their labour toward greater commercial activities to be able to pay for the ‘goods for 
consumption and production’ that ‘could not be obtained except through foreign 
markets’.658  
 
A Different Path to Market Dependence 
 One crucial aspect of Upper Canada’s long-term pattern of development that the 
comparison with the United States helps to highlight is the absence of a radical shift in 
the rural class struggle that would have made household-producers dependent on the 
market for their access to land. Another aspect is the different set of conditions in which 
Upper Canada’s economic development took place. By creating a massive, rural home 
market for manufactured goods, the American Revolution fanned the industrialization of 
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the northeast, creating a revolution in production and consumption practices that 
fundamentally and forever transformed the conditions in which other regions of North 
America would subsequently undergo economic development.  
By the 1820s, the industrial sector in the northeast was already ‘fairly 
extensive’.659 Given its commercial connections and geographical proximity, Upper 
Canada’s agricultural economy was then presented with a novel opportunity: the 
opportunity to access the fruits of capitalist industrialization without having to undergo 
industrialization. American industries were quick to innovate, ceaselessly producing new 
machinery and farm implements for petty-commodity agricultural production in what 
was resolutely becoming an industrial capitalist society. Labour-saving implements, 
such as cast iron ploughs, revolving hay rakes, seed drills, and reapers, became 
characteristic of American agriculture during this period, and were almost immediately 
transferred to Upper Canada. Rural households there quickly adopted the new 
technologies, which had begun to be produced by American industries at a time when 
many Canadian farms ‘were at or near their peak in terms of having more than enough 
land cleared to support a family’.660 
As historian Edwin Clarence Guillet has pointed out, ‘[w]ithin twenty or thirty 
years pioneer methods were hardly more than a memory in long-settled districts [of 
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Upper Canada]’.661 With the help of the diary kept by Walter Riddell, of Hamilton 
Township, Guillet has described the gradual introduction of machinery in Ontario: 
 
all grain was cut by hand until 1843, when Daniel McKyes imported a Hussey 
Reaper from Rochester, believed to be the first in the province. We hear of the 
first one in Scarborough Township in 1851 […]. Hand rakes were in universal 
use until 1840, but Riddell says that revolving wooden horse-rakes were 
introduced that year. […] About 1850, mowing machines were being imported 
[…]. [M]achine introduction was often the occasion of celebration. This was 
particularly the case in mass deliveries, as for example in 1854, when seventeen 
wagons, each with a reaper, passed in procession from Toronto to Scarborough. 
[…] By the eighteen-seventies the average Ontario farmer might have one of a 
large variety of ploughs, but the rest of his equipment was more stereotyped.662 
 
The ‘stereotyped’ equipment likely included a wheel-cultivator, a set of harrows, a hand- 
or horse-drawn seeder, a few iron rollers (‘but more generally found was the “pioneer 
roller” of logs’), the ‘Buckeye’ Mower and, on some farms, a tedder.663 ‘Horse-power 
was usual […]. A portable steam engine was first used near Cobourg in 1861, but the 
need to draw water for them and the possibility of fire […] made them unpopular for a 
time. By 1880 the steam thresher was being generally accepted as more efficient than the 
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old method’.664 If, at that time, ‘the day of the gasoline tractor and electric power on 
farms was still far off’,665 steam threshers, mechanical reapers, and the combined 
harvester-thresher had made it ‘possible for a two-male household, such as that 
constituted by a father-son team, to carry on successful wheat farming on 200-acre 
farms. These were not peasants aiming at subsistence, but commodity producers buying 
their means of production in the market and selling their product into a market in 
turn’.666 
By the 1840s, capital-intensive agriculture was thus emerging as a defining 
feature of Upper Canada’s agrarian economy, which was ‘comparing favourably with 
the most productive part of the United States at the time’.667 As historian David Wood 
has pointed out, the decade proved ‘to be a period of great activity and innovation on 
many fronts—a kind of fusion of many credible ideas with increasingly available capital, 
much of it foreign. Such capitalization had not been possible in previous decades of 
locally focused and poorly connected interests. Industries more sophisticated than saw 
and grist mills began to appear’.668 Among the factors that intensified this technological 
revolution of the 1850s was the Treaty of Reciprocity signed with the United States 
(1854-1866), which redirected large parts of agricultural exports toward the South and 
offered many opportunities for technical exchange. By that time, market dependency had 
become a tangible reality for most Upper Canadian rural households. 	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Interestingly, while debts, taxes, and mortgages were the financial mechanisms 
that forced north-eastern American farmers to adopt capital-intensive means of 
production, the inverse is true in Upper Canada: it was the adoption of capital-intensive 
means of production that forced Upper Canadian farmers into debt. The purchase of 
machinery and farm implements required specie and credit, so that full participation in 
market-exchanges became more and more unavoidable for those hoping to participate in 
the new material life that was opened to them by the Erie Canal and the St. 
Lawrence/Great Lakes commercial system, by ‘purchasing not only the necessaries but 
also the conveniences of life locally’.669 As a result, family farms needed to reallocate 
an ever-growing portion of their resources away from subsistence agriculture and home 
manufacturing toward the cultivation of wheat and other products that could be sold in 
broader regional markets. As ‘[c]ertain forms of production which had occurred within 
the household were gradually replaced by goods produced in artisan shops or 
factories’,670 the traditional labour of women, for instance, ‘switched from a 
concentration on production for family use to production more oriented to the market, 
such as dairying, poultry raising, fruit growing, and market gardening’.671   
By the middle of the century, ‘self-sufficiency was rapidly declining, creating 
demand for clothing, carpets, pianos, stoves, coal oil lamps, sewing machines and, of 
course, the ubiquitous tavern and general store’.672 ‘Commodity frontiers’, to use Eric 
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Wolf’s expression, were created, where goods from the industrial centres were carried 
and sold or exchanged for local products.673 As the population of these commodity 
frontiers ‘grew more dependent on the merchant for instruments of production such as 
guns, ammunition, steel traps, and metal tools, as well as for items of consumption such 
as manufactured goods and even food, they came to depend increasingly on the wider 
capitalist market’.674 Upper Canadians farmers were no exception to this logic, as they 
‘realized they could reduce the most onerous part of their workload by buying what was 
most difficult to make’.675 The problem was, of course, that this depended ‘on being 
able to sell enough to buy what was needed on an ongoing basis. […] Thus, many 
households faced the issue of borrowing money to purchase desired consumer goods in 
the hopes of paying off the debt at the next bumper crop. In this way an increasing 
dependence on the market could lead a family to a further dependence on credit’.676 
Accepting this argument is not to give reason to neoclassical economists and 
their conception of human being as homo economicus, endowed with a universal 
rationality geared toward the maximization of utility as a consumer and of economic 
profit as a producer. It is, rather, to recognize that the development of industrial 
capitalism did radically transform the subjectivities of even those Canadian farmers far 
from industrial and commercial centres, who ‘were thus gradually drawn into the 
capitalist market and connected indirectly with the industrial bases of the capitalist mode 
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of production’.677 Upper Canada’s geographical location, close to the northern United 
States, and its commercial connection with Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, made 
the province an early recipient of American industrial production. 
As Béatrice Craig has pointed out in her study of consumption patterns in a 
farming frontier of New Brunswick, ‘[c]onsumption was a companion of the Industrial 
Revolution but it also entailed an attitudinal shift. Objects were now acquired for non-
utilitarian reasons even by non-elite individuals without much money to spare, and could 
be discarded before being worn out simply because they had ceased to please 
[…]: consumption was a meaningful activity’.678 In other words, to engage in 
subsistence production at this point meant to forgo all sorts of goods and services that 
industrial capitalism made available. The gap between what one could acquire and what 
one could produce through subsistence production gave independent household-
producers good reason to participate in the market.679  
Market-exchanges were becoming increasingly attractive—as never before—
because so many purchasable instruments and goods could then tangibly improve the 
quality life. Prior to the advent of industrial capitalism, it would have been unthinkable 
for a peasant or an independent household producer to seek to adapt production 
according to a cost/price optimum in the absence of an obligation to do so. The radically 
new reality of American industrialism, along with its agricultural implements and 
techniques, made the improvement of the means of production accessible, and the means 	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of consumption sold on markets attainable. Exposed to the fruits of two hundred years of 
improved agriculture, rural producers were inclined to seek the financial means required 
to procure the goods of industrial capitalism. As subsistence agriculture became less and 
less attractive, Upper Canadian farm families were willing to allocate their labour-time 
to the production of commodities in order to access the means of consumption. 
Subsistence was no longer enough for independent household-producers, who saw with 
their own eyes the goods available and means to work toward them: ‘living’ was no 
longer merely about ‘surviving’, but increasingly a matter of ‘consuming’. 
Specialization was one of the principal ways of generating marketable surpluses 
that could bring greater returns to the farm. If, early in the century, specialization in 
wheat had been a way to take advantage of market opportunities, the growth of the US 
home market opened up possibilities for specializing in other crops and rural economic 
activities other than crop farming. By the middle of the century, tobacco was important 
to the extreme southwest of the province, wool to the communities west of Lake 
Ontario, flax to the Niagara region, and oats and livestock to the area east of Kingston, 
and timber to the Ottawa Valley.680 Progress was also considerable in animal husbandry 
practiced ‘for the purpose of reaching foreign markets. The meat and the dairy industries 
[…] formed the main specialization of this agriculture, which did not owe its 
achievements solely to the richness of the soil but to the gradual improvement of 
techniques’.681  
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Diversification, however, did not slow down the increase in wheat production, 
‘which quadrupled from 1842 to 1851’.682 At a time when French Canadians in Lower 
Canada had largely given up on wheat production and reverted to self-sufficient 
agriculture, the census of 1851 confirms the continuing importance of wheat to Upper 
Canada’s agricultural economy: 
 
twenty-four of the twenty-six well-settled counties west of the Bay of Quinte, 
starting with Northumberland, had over half of the acreage devoted to grain sown 
to wheat. […] It was with justification that an investigator […] remarked, ‘there 
is probably no country where there is so much wheat grown, in proportion to the 
population and the area under cultivation, as in that part of Canada west of 
Kingston.683 
 
By that time, the driving force behind increases in wheat yields was no longer solely the 
geographical expansion of areas ‘under culture’. This expansion was still important, 
indeed, central, to Upper Canada’s agriculture; however, it was combined with the 
adoption of new machinery and farm implements originating from the United States that 
improved production. Much like in the American mid-west, the size of Upper Canadian 
farms, the associated scale of production, and the scarcity of rural wage labourers made 
machinery the perfect companion to agriculture. Machinery, in turn, added costs to 	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production, and these costs had to be spread over ever larger units of production. As 
farmers sought higher returns to scale, they ‘had to go into substantial debt in order to 
practise a more extensive capital-intensive farming. […] The price of such debt, 
however, was a wholehearted commitment to production of a major cash crop whose 
revenue could service that debt’.684 The result, as I.D. Andrews, the compiler of the 
most comprehensive statistics on the trade of the province, has argued in 1851, was that 
‘the export of produce, and the import and consumption of all the substantial and 
necessary products of civilization, [we]re as high, per head, as in the best agricultural 
districts of the United States’.685 
 
Conclusion 
Geographically situated in close proximity to the northern United States, and 
commercially connected by the Erie Canal and the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes system, 
Upper Canada’s agricultural economy was impacted by America’s spectacular 
industrialization. Attracted by the radical transformations in material culture which 
promised an improved quality of life, Upper Canadian farmers did not idly watch the 
American drama unfold, but actively sought a part in the revolution. The threat of 
dispossession, so active in the transformation of north-eastern American independent-
household producers into petty-commodity producers was, thus, not a necessary 
condition for a comparable transformation in Upper Canada. In the absence of an event 	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similar to the American Revolution in its economic and political consequences, Upper 
Canadian farmers, nevertheless, eventually succumbed to capitalist imperatives of 
production. Breakthroughs toward industrial capitalism in the United States decisively 
transformed the international context and the conditions in which subsequent economic 
development would occur elsewhere in the North American context by creating a new 
set of pressures and enticements.  
For those communities directly and indirectly brought into the widening orbit of 
American industrial capitalism, social reproduction and the socially- and historically-
determined standard of living came to mean much more than ‘survival’. Subsistence 
production no longer sufficed, as households longed to purchase goods and foodstuffs 
that were not, properly speaking, necessary to the economic endurance of the family, but 
were nevertheless deemed essential to the improvement of everyday life. To purchase 
such goods and foodstuffs in local markets, Upper Canadian households needed to 
engage much more systematically in market relations, selling an ever larger marketable 
and specialized ‘surplus’ whose production required machinery and farm implements. 
Purchasing machinery required capital, and capital required competitive production. For 
Upper Canadians, market dependence was, in this sense, the price to pay for sharing in 
the fruits of British and American industrial capitalism. 	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6. 
 
The Development of Capital-Intensive Agriculture  
in Quebec 
 	  
In a period when industrial transformation tended to forcefully intersect with 
agriculture in various regions of North America, improving and intensifying production 
methods, the agriculture of Lower Canada was in a state of crisis. Generally speaking, 
the economy and society of Lower Canada were certainly not stagnant; the peasant 
society not only had its own distinctive social dynamic, but was evolving in connection 
with the geopolitically uneven and socially combined development of other regional 
economies in North America. Indeed, while Montreal, at the beginning of the century, 
was still a preindustrial city, its role as an import hub within the St. Lawrence/Great 
Lakes commercial system firmly anchored its development within the set of conditions 
brought about by the emergence of industrial capitalism in the north-eastern United 
States. By the end of the century, artisanal labour in Montreal was largely replaced by 
industrial production, ‘[i]ts metropolitan dominance was enhanced by developing 
waterpower, canal and rail facilities’,686 and ‘capital’, in the words of two historians, 
was ‘increasingly important in determining social relations’.687 
  In sharp contrast to the prosperity of industrializing Montreal, the French 
Canadian peasant economy was characterized by technical stagnation and low labour-	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productivity. The production of wheat, in serious decline, lagged far behind that of 
Upper Canada, as agricultural difficulties had led French Canadian peasants to substitute 
the cultivation of this lucrative crop with that of peas, potatoes, and oats for subsistence 
purposes. Moreover, peasants had begun to feel cramped on long settled seigneuries, 
where over-population and patterns of inheritance had led them to subdivide farmlands 
with every new generation. Between 1840 and 1880, the number of landless labourers 
and out-migrants attained new heights, with no less than 325,000 French Canadians 
leaving the province for the United States.688 In this context, to understand the late 
development of capitalist agricultural in Lower Canada, it is necessary to explain the 
constellation and transformation of the province’s class relations. The manner and 
degree to which demographic factors and commercial activities affected the response of 
the rural population to the new realities of industrial capitalism in North American were 
decisively shaped by various social forces, including the petty bourgeoisie and the 
Church.  
To map these social forces, the first section of this chapter provides an historical 
comparison of the French Canadian peasantry with its feudal European counterpart, 
highlighting how the absence of a collective system of regulation in the former case 
created a very different set of conditions of production than the open-field systems of 
feudal Europe, despite the existence of the seigneurial relation of exploitation. The 
second section highlights the links between the Lower Canada Rebellion and the 
strategy of reproduction of the French Canadian professional petty bourgeoisie. The 	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third section explores how the failure of the Rebellion brought about a period of 
profound change in the balance of class forces in the province, providing the state with 
an opportunity to introduce incremental socio-legal reforms leading to the abolition of 
the seigneurial regime. Section four discusses how, even after censives had been 
commutated into freeholds, the continuation of some aspects of the seigneurial relation 
of exploitation, together with patterns of demographic growth, inheritance, and mobility 
associated with the peasantry’s logic of social reproduction, contributed to agricultural 
backwardness in the long-run. In the fifth section, I examine a further distinguishing 
feature of the French Canadian peasant society that set it apart from rural communities 
of petty-commodity producers elsewhere in North America: the growing authority of the 
Catholic Church over rural direct producers. Finally, section six analyses the social 
conditions under which the shift to capital-intensive agriculture was initiated in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. 
 
Some Distinctive Traits of Quebec’s Peasantry	  
 Relations of domination between peasants and landowners have characterized 
many societies throughout history, but these relations were not necessarily ‘feudal’ or 
‘semi-feudal’. Feudalism, as George Comninel has pointed out, is best used in a 
restricted sense to designate the form of social relations that came into existence in some 
parts of Europe around the year 1000, following the disintegration of sovereign royal 
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power and its appropriation by regional magnates and individual seigneurs.689 The 
appropriation of the royal power of the ban—‘taxation, command and the provision of 
“justice” in courts’690—endowed seigneurs with a specific form of authority taking ‘the 
form of territorial jurisdiction’.691 These powers enabled them to subject ‘villages of free 
peasants, previously independent of lords and manors’ to their personal authority.692  
Herein lies, perhaps, the specificity of feudalism: ‘Pre-capitalist agrarian 
production has in most times and places depended on self-reproducing peasant 
households […]. The feudal mode of production, however, was dramatically different, 
its open-field systems of collective crop and livestock management directly dependent 
upon the court of the lord’.693 The reorganization of production along open-field systems 
entirely revolutionized production in peasant communities, allowing for greater output 
per unit of land under culture, and an improvement in living conditions. The outcome 
was an unprecedented demographic growth that is often wrongly attributed to pre-
capitalist societies in general, but was, in fact, very particular to the dynamics associated 
with the ‘the transformation of early medieval manors and independent villages into 
feudal seigneuries, ruled through parcellized sovereignty in wholly novel ways’.694	  
While the social relations of exploitation of the seigneurie were reproduced in 
New France, open-field systems were not. Characteristically, in open-field systems, 	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the arable land was divided into two or three open fields and these were 
cultivated according to a rotation system, where each of the fields lay fallow in 
turn in order to avoid the exhaustion of the soil. Each field was divided into a 
large number of plots, each of which was divided in turn into several strips, so 
each peasant had to till a great number of strips scattered around in different 
plots. 695	  	  
Where open-field systems existed in Europe, ‘the peasants had to take collective 
decisions about the use of the land’, leading them to live close together in villages, 
which the fields surrounded.696 Nothing of the kind existed in New France, where 
patterns of landscape transformation and spatial occupation followed other principles. 
The censives granted to individuals were rectangles of different sizes, large enough to 
meet the needs of an individual family.697 Rather than being further divided into strips to 
be tilled in rotation by different farmers, as in open-field systems, each censive was 
tilled by a single household, with occasional help from neighbours. Without the need to 
make collective decisions or establish a system of collective rotation, as in the open-field 
systems, no communal regulation or peasant political organization of the kind found in 
France developed in New France. The existence of a few ‘commons’ (36 in the whole 
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colony in 1725, of which 15 were located in Montreal)698 does not modify this claim. 
Few in number, commons tended to be located in spaces unsuitable for crop cultivation: 
shingle beaches (‘grèves’), shoals (‘battures’), coarse hay pastures (‘gros foins’), islands 
and islets.699 	  
The general features of the seigneurial system, including the private possession 
and tillage of the land, the rectangular integrity of the censives, and the lack of 
importance of the commons, testify to the distinctiveness and the non-feudal character of 
the peasant economy in the St. Lawrence Valley. Since legal and customary regulations 
determined ‘virtually every aspect of production’ in feudal Europe,700 it is certain that 
their absence in New France constituted a major departure that was to have implications 
for the economic evolution of the peasant economy. Ex hypothesis, the absence of 
collectively-established production in the St. Lawrence Valley may even help explain 
the poor farming practices that led to severe soil exhaustion in the nineteenth century. It 
may also help to explain peasants’ difficulty in resisting seigneurial attempts to 
‘squeeze’ more surplus out of them in the aftermath of the British Conquest, since the 
departure of French officials and colonial administrators left peasants with only weak 
village institutions to organize themselves politically.	  
While the open-field systems associated with feudalism were not emulated by 
French Canadian peasant communities, the seigneurial relation of exploitation based on 
the territorial authority of the seigneur, nevertheless, existed in the colony. As the 
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historical details of the seigneurial system were discussed in Chapter 2, it suffices here 
to recall that the seigneurial relationship was imposed on the colony in the broader 
context of absolutist social-property relations that had transformed ‘specifically feudal 
forms of politically constituted property […] into state offices’.701 In New France, like 
in France, social relations of appropriation were ‘no longer truly feudal, but still entirely 
pre-capitalist’.702 
Given the non-feudal character of the peasant mode of production and the 
seigneurial relations of appropriation, the peasant society in the St. Lawrence Valley 
clearly emerges as a society that needs to be theorized as a sui generis type of peasant 
society. But what made French Canadian rural settlers ‘peasants’ in the first place? For 
one thing, they produced to meet immediate household needs. However, in contrast to 
independent household-producers elsewhere in North America, their ‘independence’ was 
limited by a political subjection to landlords who directly exploited their surplus-labour 
through non-economic means of appropriation. The limits imposed by this relationship 
of exploitation on economic development703 radically differ from independent 
household-producers’ freedom with regard to the control and distribution of income and 
agricultural ‘surpluses’. Independent household-producers who held and cultivated small 
landed estates elsewhere in North America did not have to deal with a landlord class that 
appropriated their surpluses. 
An examination of the long-term patterns of development in France and Quebec 	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reveals further divergences in their social relations of appropriation. In France, the 
abolition of the seigneurial regime during the French Revolution put an end to the 
exploitation of the peasants by the seigneurs. However, it left intact open-field systems, 
which long remained an obstacle to the development of capitalist agriculture by 
maintaining French rural smallholders’ production embedded in communal systems of 
regulation. In Quebec, the abolition of the seigneurial regime was a much more 
protracted process, which started, but did not finish,704 with the Act for the abolition of 
feudal rights and duties in Lower Canada. This Act did not truly put an end to the social 
relations of exploitation between seigneurs and peasants, but it did significantly impact 
long-term patterns of production by commutating censives, whose management had, 
hitherto, been subjected to the constraints of the seigneurial regime, into freeholds. The 
terms of the ‘peasant question’ were, therefore, about to be significantly transformed 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. But before examining this 
transformation, I turn to the series of events that marked the few decades preceding the 
adoption of the Act in order to map out the constellation of class forces that 
characterized the province in these times of change. 
 
The Lower Canadian Rebellion 
The French Canadian peasant economy was considerably affected by the British 
Conquest of New France, not least because the integration of the colony into the British 	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Empire radically transformed patterns of immigration, resulting in a modification of the 
balance of class forces in the province. Between 1815 and 1851, for instance, some 
50,000 of the 800,000 immigrants who came to Lower Canada from the British Isles 
settled in the province. The Irish majority among them ‘became the rough labour of 
industrial society […], an important source of wage labour. A significant factor in Lower 
Canadian ethnic politics was the fact that by 1831 over 40 percent of the day labourers 
in Montreal were anglophones’.705 The British Conquest also paved the way for the 
arrival of several hundred British and American merchants in Montreal.  
As political subjects, these merchants sought to establish in Quebec many of the 
institutions that they deemed essential for transforming the province into a modern 
colony. For instance, they petitioned the British authorities for the granting of a 
representative assembly. In England, the consecration of parliamentary sovereignty 
during the Glorious Revolution of 1688 had, as Ellen Wood has pointed out, little to do 
with democracy; rather, it affirmed the rights of feudal barons and 
capitalist/entrepreneurial aristocrats over the arbitrary power of the monarchy.706 
Montreal merchants wanted to introduce similar constitutional principles of 
parliamentary rule in the colony to limit the arbitrary power of the British government. 
Of greater concern than the ‘King in Parliament’, however, was the numerical 
preponderance of the French Canadian population and the influence it would have on the 
affairs of the province if a truly representative assembly was granted. The assembly 	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desired by the merchants, therefore, had to be limited to an exclusive political oligarchy 
of propertied Protestants who would rule over the destiny of the province. To this end, 
they ‘made a noise […] out of all proportion to their numbers’.707 The British 
government, however, was in no hurry to respond to the demand; during the three 
decades following the Conquest, it refused to call an assembly. 
After much hesitation, the elected Assembly was finally granted by the imperial 
authorities with the Quebec Act of 1791. For a time, the Assembly functioned in favour 
of the English bourgeoisie. Satisfied with its new political power and its consolidated 
economic domination, the bourgeoisie closed itself to further ideas of reform. The 
French and American revolutions still fresh in memory, the Catholic clergy similarly 
adopted a conservative stance. Both the English bourgeoisie and the Catholic clergy thus 
coalesced with the declining French Canadian aristocracy into a coherent elite opposed 
to change. In these circumstances, the aspirations of the French Canadian professional 
petty bourgeoisie (notaries, advocates, doctors, innkeepers, small merchants, and the 
like) to social mobility were blocked. Put in a position of political and economic 
inferiority, this professional petty bourgeoisie began to voice its discontent and exert its 
political leadership over the rural population.708 Its rhetoric targeted English merchants 
and bureaucrats; it also targeted the population of Irish immigrants who competed with 
French Canadian landless workers for jobs in towns and for land in rural regions.  
Most of the French Canadian professional petty bourgeoisie had been trained in 
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seminaries and classical colleges managed by the Catholic clergy. Their professions 
often rested entirely on an intimate knowledge of traditions, especially of French civil 
law, Catholic religious customs, and the seigneurial regime. Their reproduction as a 
class was, therefore, tied to the preservation of these institutions. This petty bourgeoisie 
sought access to the government structure and its networks of patronage, but had no 
problem with the seigneurial regime, French civil law, or the tithes of the clergy. In fact, 
it saw these as a bulwark against cultural assimilation and a protection of the rights of 
the French Canadian ‘nation’ which it claimed to represent.709 The petty bourgeoisie, 
which had strong support among the peasantry, organized itself in the parti Canadien, 
which eventually became the parti patriotes, the spearhead of the reform movement. 
For the fifteen years leading up to 1837, the French Canadian professional petty 
bourgeoisie maintained control of the Assembly.710 It was clear, however, that despite 
ever growing electoral successes, political power would be limited as long as the 
structure of the colonial state, within which the nominated Legislative and Executive 
councils held the most important powers, remained unchanged. Constitutional reforms, 
including the supremacy of the elected assembly over non-elected bodies, the control of 
public funds by the assembly, and the principle of ministerial responsibility, thus 
became the primary demand. Beyond these reforms, the professional petty bourgeoisie 
had renounced, in all but a minority faction influenced by English and American 
radicals, any social reforms that could threaten the seigneurie or the parish.  
The peasantry, which constituted the backbone of the patriotes movement, was 	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much less inclined to spare the clergy and the seigneurial regime in its criticism. In 
various regions surrounding Montreal, where the burden of dues and tithes was 
particularly heavy, peasants did not hesitate to openly demonstrate their anti-
seigneurialism.711 However, the minority of petty bourgeois who, within the leadership 
of the parti patriotes, professed more radical ideas never came close to gathering 
sufficient momentum to impart upon the whole movement a program of radical reform. 
The conservative influence of the Church over the rural population, combined with the 
conservative nationalism of most local and national leaders, including the charismatic 
leader of the patriotes, Louis-Joseph Papineau, prevented more radical ideas from 
gaining a strong foothold among the majority of the population.712 
The English bourgeoisie, after initially welcoming the Quebec Act of 1791, 
increasingly resented the growing power of French Canadians within the Assembly. 
Their control of the institution blocked any hope for the legal and socioeconomic 
reforms sought by the merchant class, especially the abolition of the seigneurial regime. 
Merchants also looked upon the territorial and political division of Upper Canada and 
Lower Canada as an inappropriate arrangement, for the economic space which they 
dominated encompassed the whole St. Lawrence commercial empire. Without a union of 
the two Canadas, the United States seemed destined to gain the upper hand in the 
economic contest.713 Merchants also saw in the union a means to achieve a new balance 
of political representation in their favour, given the rapidly growing English-speaking 	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population of Upper Canada.  
In March 1837, the British minister of the interior, John Russell, rejected 
altogether the demands of the patriotes with the presentation of its ten resolutions to the 
Parliament in London. The patriotes received this as an insolence and decided to take up 
arms. In a series of confrontation occurring in 1837 and 1838, peasants, labourers, and 
artisans, organized under the leadership of the professional petty bourgeoisie, were 
defeated by British troops in regions south and north of Montreal, where the agricultural 
crisis had been the most severe. ‘The decisive defeat of republican opposition’, as Allan 
Greer has explained,  
 
paved the way for a major transformation of imperial rule. No matter how paltry 
the military contests of the Rebellion may seem, this had been a political turning-
point of the first magnitude. From the summer of 1837 until the end of 1838, the 
central part of British North America underwent a thoroughgoing crisis of 
sovereignty, one in which the very framework of state power was in danger of 
collapse.714 
 
For the military crushed and heavily repressed patriotes, it was time to retreat. 
Maintained in their position of economic inferiority, and disappointed by the refusal of 
the government to approve reforms aligned with their political agenda, the French 
Canadian population fell back on the only social sphere over which it still seemed to 	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have some control: culture. In cultural affairs, as I discuss below, the Catholic Church 
did not take long to fill the leadership vacuum left empty by the petty bourgeoisie. 
Meanwhile, the weakness of the opposition gave the colonial establishment the 
opportunity to proceed with a series of reforms that would reshape and strengthen the 
state, forever changing the face of Lower Canada. 
 
Socio-Legal Reforms of the State and Property 
Until the 1840s, the power of the state was limited ‘by the absence of regular 
connections between centre and locality’.715 The defeat of the patriotes, however, 
opened the door for the state to ‘grow enormously in size, scope, and power. In the short 
run, soldiers and police proliferated, but, before long, more peaceful agencies of 
regulation came to predominate: schools, prisons, asylums, and above all, 
bureaucracies’.716 By then a consensus had grown about the need for representative rule 
among colonial administrators: ‘Men of property were to govern propertyless men 
through public institutions, and men generally would govern women and children 
through their dominance in the household’.717 The authorities also undertook to reform 
the mode of tenure which culminated, in 1854, with the Act for the abolition of feudal 
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rights and duties in Lower Canada. The ideological climate of the new reform era has 
been described by sociologist Fernand Dumont, in his examination of the report written 
in 1839 by Lord Durham, the commissioner sent from Britain to study the causes of 
discontent in the colony. As he explains, Durham 
 
is primarily concerned by the economic development of the Canadas and the 
function of the British colonies within the Empire. Durham notes the delay of 
these colonies compared to the vitality of the United States: the weakness of 
settlement and leakage of immigration to the southern neighbors; the lack of 
communication; the absence of a consistent policy. It was imperative therefore to 
create the conditions necessary for a start-up and, for this, to structure a space of 
growth that goes beyond artificial political boundaries. The duality of ‘races’ is a 
subordinate question. It is important to remember this when one reads the pages 
where Durham carries on a merciless critique of the attitudes and culture of 
French Canadians which, according to him, are contrary to the needs of the 
economy.718 
 
The core of the reforms introduced to remedy to the problems identified by Durham was 
the Ordinance of 1840, promulgated under the military dictatorship of the Special 
Council, to allow the voluntary commutation of feudal property into freeholdings on the 
island of Montreal. The Ordinance made of Montreal ‘the testbed for the modification of 	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the social and legal framework’ as ‘part of a series of measures taken […] in order to 
facilitate the emergence of a capitalist property market’.719 Other reform measures also 
paved the way for the emergence of a capitalist property market. They included: 
 
the repeal of the control system of exchange and use of urban space by the justice 
of peace and its replacement by a council; a fundamental change in the custom of 
Paris by the restriction of hypothèques to introduce ‘mortgages’, an instrument of 
English credit that involves the transfer of title to the creditor; state regulation of 
bankruptcy, eliminating the Scottish feudal practice of settlement agreements; the 
creation of a property registration office for the first time in the seigneurial 
territory; the restriction of the social rights of wives and servants affecting the 
property of their husband or master.720 	  
These socio-legal reforms were decisive steps toward the implementation of an 
institutional framework able to secure the right of private property. The ultimate obstacle 
to this institutional framework was, of course, the seigneurial tenure itself. While 
censitaires had frequently denounced seigneurial abuse, few of them sought its complete 
abolition. More radical in their criticism of the seigneurial regime were ‘businessmen, 	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especially of British origins, frustrated by the weight of seigneurial rights that limit[ed] 
their possibilities of enrichment’.721 To them, the seigneurial regime was an 
anachronism when compared with the capitalist logic of production entrenched in the 
north-eastern United States and beginning to develop in the American mid-west and 
neighbouring province of Upper Canada. By the mid-century, the marked decline in 
agricultural productivity of the previous decades provided the economic context of the 
general crisis of the seigneurial regime.	  
Benoît Grenier has identified the two main obstacles ‘to entrepreneurship, free 
property, and freedom of contract’ that aroused the discontent of British businessmen: 
seigneurial monopolies and lods et ventes.722 Seigneurial monopolies prevented free 
competition in the construction of fulling, carding, and sawing mills, for instance, and in 
the control of water streams, which were one of the prime movers of early 
industrialization; lods et ventes constituted a heavy levy on any purchase of property 
within the seigneurial territory, including Montreal, where transactions were frequent 
and often expensive.723 	  
The question of the abolition of the seigneurial regime in Quebec had not ceased 
to occupy the minds of British rulers since the Conquest of New France. As early as 
1801, a commission of inquiry had recommended its replacement by the free and 
common socage. One has to wait until the 1820s, however, to see significant actions 
being undertaken in this direction, at which time two laws passed in London, one in 
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1822, the other in 1825, partially reformed the regime. As Grenier has explained, the 
first, the Canada Trade Acts, allowed the purchase of the lods et ventes in the censives 
of the king. The second, an Act to provide for the extinction of feudal and seigniorial 
rights and burthens on lands, authorized the voluntary commutation of censives and 
seigneuries. Between 1825 and 1846, nine seigneurs seized the opportunity offered by 
this law to commute their seigneuries, in whole or part.724 During the second quarter of 
the century, other inquiries were led (1828, 1831, and 1842) and the Ordinance of 1840 
concerning Montreal was adopted. More tergiversations had to be carried out before a 
decision concerning the entire province was taken in 1854.  
Among the many issues at stake, was the question of the tenure to adopt as a 
replacement. Would it be, as many French Canadians preferred, the franc-aleu roturier, 
a form of freehold consistent with French civil law? Or would it be the free and common 
socage, with which settlers of British and American origins were familiar? The franc-
aleu was finally retained in 1854, when the law for the abolition of the seigneurial 
regime was passed.725 More hotly contested, however, was the nature of the 
compensation, if any, to be given to seigneurs for the loss of their seigneurial rights. As 
Grenier has explained, the legislators 
 
chose to end seigneurial ‘rights and duties’, but not without acknowledging the 
losses incurred by the seigneurs. The process therefore included a compensation 
[...]. [B]y this act the seigneurs became landowners like any others and could 	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freely dispose of their ‘domains’. […] Specifically the law first enacted the 
abolition of feudal rights and duties, starting with the disappearance of honorific 
rights without compensation. Besides, all other rights, whether the banalité, 
casual rights (such as lods et ventes) and even chores, were recognized as 
financial losses [...] to be compensated.726 
 
Detailed rules for calculating the financial compensation were enacted and ten officers 
were made responsible for surveying the seigneuries. In 1859, a register was created, 
identifying 330 seigneuries, and detailing the reimbursement to be received by the 
seigneurs. The state paid a part of the compensation, but the censitaires were left with 
the obligation to pay the compensation for the cens and rentes. While the Act provided 
for the mandatory commutation of censives into freeholds, it did not oblige censitaires to 
pay the compensation in full: censitaires could pay the whole compensation all at once, 
or opt for an annuity equalling 6% of the capital. The payment of the annuity gave the 
censitaire the right to postpone the payment of the capital, but it did not reduce its 
amount.727  
Given the imposition of this annuity on former censitaires, Grenier concluded 
that the act of 1854 was more the beginning of the end than the end itself. Around 1930, 
some 60,000 ex-censitaires were still paying the annuity on more than 200 seigneuries: 
‘[t]hey still have not redeemed the capital eighty years after the Act of 1854. These 
amounts represent a total capital of $3,577,573.38 and annual instalment of $212,486.53. 	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The remains of the seigneurial age persist and make of Quebec, according to the deputy 
and mayor of Saint-Hyacinthe, [...] the “last place in the universe” to suffer from 
them’.728 In Grenier’s view, the real date marking the abolition of the tie binding the 
censitaires to the seigneurs was November 11, 1940, when censitaires went in person to 
seigneurial manors to pay their annuity for the last time. The Syndicat national du rachat 
des rentes seigneuriales, created by the legislative Assembly of the province, was given 
the task of reimbursing the outstanding amount, a task that it took thirty years to 
complete.729  
That such a compensation was awarded to the seigneurs without successful 
resistance on the part of the peasantry, testifies to just how powerfully the legal claims 
of seigneurs to a share of the peasantry’s production were entrenched. Indeed, in her 
History of Agriculture in Quebec, Colette Chatillon has reiterated that the Act of 1854 
did not represent a radical break with the past because of the persistence of annuities 
linking former censitaires to seigneurs:  
 
the abolition was not really an abolition [...] The censitaire can choose between 
either paying an annuity of 6% on capital, that is to say, becoming debtor forever, 
or purchasing the land to the seigneur. As very few settlers have the capital 
necessary to purchase the land, the great majority continues to pay the rent. [...] 
In reality the situation of the inhabitants remains substantially the same.730 
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The persistence of this directly exploitative aspect of the seigneur-censitaire relationship 
well after the abolition of the seigneurial regime offers a sharp contrast with the 
abolition of the seigneurial regime in France during the Revolution. Achieved in times 
of crisis and violence, the abolition of the seigneurial relation of exploitation in France 
was, after some initial hesitations,731 complete and definitive. No ‘compensation’ was 
given to seigneurs; the peasantry was freed from payments of annuities. In Lower 
Canada, by contrast, the abolition of the seigneurial regime was a protracted process 
extending over several decades of piecemeal reforms that extended well into the 
twentieth century.  
 
Peasant Resistance to Market Imperatives 
 What effect had the abolition of seigneurial regime on the class structure of 
French Canadian peasant society and who benefited the most from it? The question 
should be understood broadly enough to encompass the role of the state and other 
classes beyond seigneurs and censitaires, as well as the nature of the changes it effected 
on agricultural productivity. The first observation, however, concerns seigneurs 
themselves. Many of the rights that had benefited the seigneurs in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries lost their relevance in the changing context of the middle of 	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the nineteenth century; while, for the most entrepreneurial, those, for instance, involved 
in trade or industries, the set of obligations associated with the seigneurial regime came 
to be seen as an impediment upon the free management of their affairs. In these 
circumstances, the compensation received for the abolition of privileges was not a bad 
deal; for many seigneurs, it was even quite profitable.732 
 On the other side, the abolition freed the censitaires from an array of dues and 
obligations that had constituted real burdens. The commutation of the censives into 
freeholds was expected to affect great changes in the lives of the peasantry: as Abraham 
Robert, accomplished writer and owner of the Montreal Gazette, noted in the 
introduction to Some remarks upon the French tenure of ‘franc aleu roturier’, ‘[i]n all 
ages, the mode in which a people has held its lands has been the most powerful agent in 
determining its character and fortunes’.733 The seigneurial tenure, he nevertheless 
concluded, was not the primary cause of ‘the backward agriculture of Lower Canada and 
the poverty of its inhabitants’.734 According to him, the real causes were to be found in 
patterns of inheritance that shaped the aspirations of the peasantry; writing at the time, 
 
[t]hough commutation is in some respects desirable, no material improvement 
can be effected while the present law of inheritance prevails, or rather while the 
custom of the country tends to indefinite division, and the accumulation and 
skilful application of capital are considered of secondary importance by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 Grenier, Brève histoire du régime seigneurial, 207. 
733 Robert Abraham, Some Remarks upon the French Tenure of “Franc Aleu Roturier”, and on Its 
Relation to the Feudal and Other Tenures (Montréal: Armour and Ramsay, 1849), 3. 
734 Ibid., 39. 
	  276	  	  	  	  
population whose aspirations […] are limited to deriving a mere existence from 
the soil.735  
 
Not everybody was of the same opinion. Writing in the same year, 1849, Clément 
Dumesnil led a frontal attack on the seigneurial tenure on behalf of the peasantry. In his 
De l’abolition des droits féodaux et seigneuriaux au Canada, he provided a long list of 
the obligations burdening the peasantry, before concluding that the abolition would 
bring prosperity to the common men and energy to agriculture of the peasants. Free ‘to 
not be troubled, upset, harassed, bullied, in the occupation of their land, they [the 
peasants] will finally be able to engage freely in all agricultural improvements and all 
industrial enterprises’.736  
Against expectations of this kind, the authorities decided to perpetuate the old 
social relation of exploitation through the imposition of a compensation; a perpetual 
annuity, in fact, for those unwilling or unable to defray the lump-sum payment. For 
many peasants, therefore, the abolition of the seigneurial regime resulted in ‘very subtle 
changes’ as they ‘continue[d] to pay a rent equivalent to the old, to the same person, and 
the same date’.737 In other words, the remnants of seigneurial relations of exploitation 
durably added fixed costs to agriculture, putting a strain on the capital available for the 
improvement of farms, even if the abolition of seigneurial obligations had formally 
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given peasants the full control of their estates. 
 In principle, the peasant was now free ‘to manage, develop, and dispose of his 
land as he saw fit’.738 Traditional inheritance practices and marital rights associated with 
French civil law, however, continued to influence the French Canadian peasantry’s 
dynamic of social reproduction and set strict limits upon the course of its economic 
development. As Gérard Bouchard has explained, this dynamic endowed the parents, in 
every generation, ‘with the obligation to provide for the establishment of many 
households out of only one’.739 This led to ‘an important movement of landholdings 
expansion and the reproduction, with each generation, of peasant household from simple 
to multiple’.740 As historians Serge Courville and Normand Séguin have explained, 
 
the more the household ages, the more its labour force increases, as well as its 
movable and immovable assets, until one day, the need to establish children on 
land results in a significant drop in assets. Once this is done, the household 
reaches new levels until the final abandonment of farm work, which often results 
in a donation of the residential plot to the elder son who, in return for the assets 
received, takes care of his parents and remaining children, who he will ensure the 
establishment later.741 
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This logic of social reproduction thus imposed rather strict limits and possibilities on the 
consolidation of farm units and the accumulation of capital by peasants, with important 
consequences for long-term patterns of economic development. Given these limits, 
Robert Abraham could declare, in 1849, that ‘one may travel twenty miles, in any 
direction, among the Canadian concessions, without seeing what in England would be 
called a “gentleman’s house”, that is, a house in which a person could live comfortably 
who was spending five hundred pounds a year’.742  
The familial dynamic of reproduction of the French Canadian peasantry was 
‘tying down’, in Abraham’s vivid depiction, ‘all the associations and hopes of families 
to a particular spot of earth’, converting ‘what ought to be thriving farms into petty 
hovels and gardens’, and inducing ‘the younger sons, instead of starting out 
energetically to new soils, with some assistance from the patrimonial estate, to become 
mere labourers on insufficient patches of land, or the unskilled servants of others’.743 
The rationality behind this dynamic, as Bouchard has argued, prioritized reproduction 
over production, favouring ‘territorial expansion rather than the consolidation of 
resources and productivity’.744 The peasant was an ‘enemy of the large specialized farm 
which was too dependent upon the whims of extra-regional market’.745 By ‘trying to 
produce clones of itself’, the peasant family was ‘following the model of a society [...] 
that sought an anchor in physical expansion and achieved a form of autonomy in the 
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diversification of its dependencies’.746 	  
While this familial dynamic of social reproduction had characterized the French 
Canadian peasant society since the early days of New France, during the third quarter of 
the nineteenth century political limits were progressively imposed on the seigneurial 
territory by the British authorities with the provisions of the Constitutional Act of 1791, 
the Acts of 1822 and 1825, the ordinance of 1840, and the Act of 1854.	  	  	  
1.2. Maps of the territorial division between seigneuries  
and townships (cantons) in Quebec, circa 1791-1854	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Source: Service national du RÉCIT de l’univers social. License: Creative Commons (by-nc-sa) 	  	  
The Act of 1791 put a limit on the reproduction of both the seigneurial and 
peasant classes by circumscribing the boundaries of the seigneurial tenure to the territory 
already existing under this tenure at the time. In other words, from then on, no new 
seigneurie would be granted by the British authorities, which meant that the areas of 
land that could henceforth be granted as censives to the peasantry now had definite 
physical limits. As a result of massive waves of immigration from the British Isles, ‘the 
Port of Quebec becoming the front door of tens of thousands of men and women fleeing 
poverty’, already in 1815, ‘access to land was beginning to pose serious problems for 
French Canadians’.747 These problems were intensified by the abolition of the 
seigneurial tenure in 1854, by which the peasantry completely lost its traditional non-
market access to land through free grants of censives on seigneuries. Moreover, the 
abolition happened at a time of rapid population growth, creating a veritable 
demographic crisis: ‘from some 70,000 in 1760’, the population of Lower Canada 
‘reached 511,000 in 1831 and 890,000 in the census of 1851, at the end of the 
seigneurial period itself. This growth, in the absence of new concessions of fiefs, has the 
effect of leading to the saturation of agricultural land in the seigneurial world’.748  
From then on, families could establish the new generation on a parcel of land 
only by subdividing the ‘vieux-bien’ (the parents’ farm) or acquiring land by purchase 	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on the market. For a population used to a life of subsistence without much interaction 
with the market, the consequences were catastrophic. With the exception of land sold at 
a fixed low price by the state in remote areas recently opened to colonization, land was 
too expensive to be bought by the French Canadian peasantry. Crucially, even as their 
long-established manner of social reproduction was under severe strain, peasant 
households that retained possession of their farms tenaciously resisted integration into 
competitive markets. Families often preferred to move to urban centres in Quebec and 
New England, rather than modify farm production to obey emerging market imperatives. 	  
During the second half of the nineteenth century, some 580,000 French 
Canadians made their way to the United States, with Fall River, in southern 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island attracting particularly large numbers.749 Many of those 
who left the countryside, however, stayed in the province, seeking skilled and unskilled 
jobs in urban centres, especially in Montreal, where the landless children of the French 
Canadian peasantry joined the ranks of wage workers and, together with Irish 
immigrants, fuelled the demographic growth of the city (from 10,000 in 1816, to 57,515 
in 1851, and 140,747 in 1881).750 At the same time as long-term economic development 
in the countryside was thwarted by the logic of reproduction of the peasant society, the 
same logic, under the historically specific conditions of the middle of the century, 
generated a considerable influx of wage labourers to urban centres, vitally contributing 
to the industrialization of the province. In this sense, the transformation of peasant 
agriculture into capitalist agriculture was not a necessary precondition for the 	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development of industrial capitalism. As a matter of fact, industrialization benefited 
from the persistence of a large peasant population. 	  
Another option left to those who sought out new horizons beyond the confines of 
their local parish, but did not want to abandon agriculture, was to search for affordable 
land in peripheral regions of Quebec recently opened to agricultural colonization, such 
as the Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, the Outaouais, and the Mauricie. There, public lands 
were granted to settlers at a price fixed by the government under similar conditions to 
those that characterized the period of Upper Canada’s formation, including the need to 
obtain a ‘concession ticket’ and the obligation to clear a certain surface of the land 
within a given lapse of time.751 In some regions, this ‘colonization’ movement, as it 
usually referred to, received the help of organized colonization societies associated with 
the Catholic Church. The importance of the clergy to the colonization movement was 
not so much the result of direct action on the ground, but, as Bouchard has noted, of its 
ideological influence on the movement and agriculture more generally, which I will turn 
to in the next section. 
	  
The Structural Position of the Church in Peasant Society	  
Our inquiry into the effects that the abolition of seigneurial regime had on the 
class structure of the province would be incomplete without examining the place of the 
Catholic Church in French Canadian peasant society. It is first necessary to note that the 
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failure of the rebellion of 1837-1838 considerably strengthened the power of the Church. 
The British authorities, continuing their long-term strategy of co-optation of the French 
Canadian elite, sought the support of the Church as a means to rule the population in the 
new ‘Province of Canada’, created in 1840 by the union of Lower Canada and Upper 
Canada.  
English was adopted as the sole official language of parliamentary documents 
and the new government was endowed with an Assembly consisting of 84 members, 
drawn equally from each of the two provinces, now renamed Canada West and Canada 
East.752 Canada East, nevertheless, kept its civil law and its educational institutions, 
which were then tightly woven with the Catholic Church. The liberal elements of the 
professional petty bourgeoisie and peasantry being in a state of disarray, the Church now 
naturally appeared as the main representative of the French Canadian nation and was 
well-placed to govern the countryside. The Church’s indefectible loyalty since the 
British Conquest finally paid off: as republican secularism was dealt its fatal blow, the 
Church was able to revive its power.753 The petty bourgeoisie easily fell in line: 
 
[T]he men of the professional bourgeoisie who formed the parliamentary 
leadership of the patriote movement quickly abandoned their democratic 
populism. Tempered by the defeat and imprisonment, those who had not been 
permanently exiled or otherwise marginalized tended to make peace with the 
existing order. Many of them, like Louis Hippolyte Lafontaine and Georges 	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Étienne Cartier, resumed their political career and fell on the conservative side of 
city merchants and the Catholic hierarchy.754	  
 
The Catholic hierarchy was itself radically reorganized with the aim of 
catholicizing the whole French Canadian population. The thoughts of bishop Ignace 
Bourget, here reported by Dumont, sketch out the direction of this reorganization: 
‘There will be unity of action among all the bishops of the province, [...] more majesty 
and pomp in worship, which can help to tie people to their religion and inspire a deep 
respect, more union among the bishops in their dealings with the Government, forcing 
the Government to think twice before antagonizing the episcopal body’.755  
The discipline imposed on clergy members was consequently strengthened and a 
new division of labour within the ecclesiastic body was operated. Priests were actively 
recruited across the province, their number more than doubling in twenty years. Gone 
were the days when politicians could turn a deaf ear to the priests.756 The clerical 
Establishment spared no effort to extend its influence well beyond the walls of its 
churches: it set up colleges, convents, temperance societies, missionaries, and other 
organizations, all carved out to work for ‘the spiritual and moral rebirth of the 
peasantry’.757 It also doubled efforts to provide essential services, including hospitals 
and educational institutions, as well as charitable associations.758 The liberal state, in 
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other words, was not the only institution which experienced a dramatic growth. The 
Church was becoming, according to Greer’s expression, ‘almost a quasi-state, and at the 
same time an influential partner of the state, the French Canadian Church of the mid-
nineteenth century did its part in subjecting rural society to outside supervision’.759	  
The Church’s ascendency in a period of identity redefinition on the part of 
French Canadians. It was a time in which, as Dumont notes, ‘from the economy to the 
forms taken by power, the whole social structure was redesigned; ideologies reshaped 
the direction of the community; the reconstruction of the past became a new urgency; 
literature became a national institution’.760 The Church was perfectly positioned to 
assume the leading role in a French Canadian society that had withdrawn into itself, 
‘excluded from the large-scale exploitation of natural resources, from the local use of 
foreign sources of capital, and from management positions in large-scale industry and 
the North American commercial space’.761 
The Church was worried that its French Canadian constituency would lose its 
numerical preponderance if the mass exodus toward the United States was not stopped. 
The clergy, therefore, became actively involved in the promotion of an ascetic life of 
traditional family values, religious observance, and tilling of the land. In the aftermath of 
the rebellion, this ideology of survival (‘la survivance’) took shape as a cultural 
movement of resistance in social conditions of politically- and economically-imposed 
inferiority. The ground for this ideological offensive had been prepared long before 	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1837, as the Church gained a degree of clerical control over education, ecclesiastical 
nominations, parish appointments, and the establishment of the diocese of Montreal. The 
continuous loyalty it had shown the British Empire through pastoral letters and sermons 
during the French Revolution and the War of 1812 proved that it could be a powerful 
ally in managing the domestic affairs of the colony.  
In 1854, the structural position of the Church in the peasant society was 
reinforced as one of the two pillars of the old French Canadian ruling coalition—the 
seigneurial class—was abolished. The influence of the seigneurs, undoubtedly, did not 
disappear overnight, as they left their mark on the landscape of the province, its 
architecture, and the toponymy of places.762 As mentioned before, a large portion of the 
peasantry also continued to pay an annuity to seigneurs. Moreover, many of the social, 
economic, and symbolic dimensions of seigneurial authority persisted in an informal 
status, with former seigneurs often ending up in important positions within municipal 
governments and in provincial politics, for instance as mayor, deputies, or ministers.763 
And yet, the unity of interests that the seigneurs as a class had had in the past, if there 
was any such unity, was lost forever.  
With the British government holding the door open, the Church was now free to 
fill the power vacuum left by the professional petty bourgeoisie and the formal 
disappearance of the seigneurial class. Its social conservative agenda encompassed all 
aspects of the peasant society, from the development of its productive forces to its 
patterns of consumption. At the top of this agenda, figured prominently the promotion of 	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agriculturalism. The ultramontane clerical elite ‘wanted to see the people maintaining its 
presence on the North American territory by land cultivation’.764 Its agenda also 
included a critique of the state, in competition with the Church for influence, and a 
rejection of liberal principles and capitalism.765 The parish was the Church’s ‘territorial 
stronghold’, from which it ‘presided over the organization of the spiritual life, certainly, 
but also of the political and economic life [...]. In farm families communities, the Church 
became, to borrow a phrase from Guy Laforest (1986), a kind of “collective sculptor” 
who shaped the souls and organized community, and in particular the public space’.766 
Where the clergy exerted its influence over the peasantry, the development of 
industry and commerce so eagerly desired by politicians and urban leaders was checked 
by a conservative ideology which extended beyond social mores to include agrarian 
questions. The Church’s agrarianism was a direct response to the development of 
industrial capitalism in the cities, which threatened the basis of its symbolic authority 
and the traditional way of life that it sought to preserve. As a result, its agrarianism 
‘meant to denounce unemployment, poverty, and the harsh conditions of the urban 
proletariat […], the immorality of cities and to exalt, in turn, the grandeur of agriculture 
and rural values. [...] From this superiority of country life, it was concluded that the 
French people had an agricultural vocation. Industry and commerce diverted it away 
from this vocation’.767 This so-called agricultural vocation may very well have ‘served 
as an alibi for the Francophone community which faced an economic development that 	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eluded it’.768	  	  
A Creative Process of Change in Production 
That economic development eluded the peasant society is a fact testified to by the 
absence of significant innovation or advancement in the farming techniques of French 
Canadian agriculture before the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Until that time, 
with the exception of a few regions settled by English-speaking communities, labour-
productivity was stagnant throughout Quebec. Farm animals were undernourished; 
columnists repeatedly complained of poor yields. In 1851, a report of the agricultural 
society of Beauharnois concluded that ‘there exists in Quebec two systems, the English 
system and the French system. The fundamental principle of English agriculture is the 
improvement of the soil, according to the most approved systems […]. The French 
Canadian system, on the contrary, implies the principle (if it is possible to speak so) of 
soil deterioration’.769 In 1879, the naturalist Provancher could still depict French 
Canadian agriculture as characterized by ‘the absence of fertilizer, imperfect drainage, 
defective ploughing, too few animals, and rarely the practice of accounting’.770  
Gérard Bouchard observed the technical stagnation and low-labour productivity 
of French Canadian agriculture in a regional study of agriculture in the Saguenay-Lac-
Saint-Jean. This region was opened to colonization in 1838, and constituted one of the 	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main destinations of those who sought to escape rural poverty without leaving the 
province or becoming wage labourers in urban centres. As Bouchard noted, during the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, Saguenay’s agricultural techniques and farm 
implements were almost identical to those of the first quarter of the century. The number 
of acres that could be cleared in a year had not changed significantly. Selective breeding 
in animal husbandry was ignored, and the feeding of cows during winter was deficient: 
at springtime they had to be ‘drawn by the tail’ out of barns. Pigs and hens were poorly 
fed too.771 Crop rotation was basic, with little crop diversity and little care in preparing 
the soil. Furthermore, Saguenay’s farmers ‘proved long reluctant to adequately prepare 
the land by rigorous dripping works, harrowing and levelling’.772 In sum, agriculture 
remained a traditional practice geared toward self-sufficiency, and in which ‘changes,’ 
when they did occur ‘were very localized and followed highly uneven rhythms’.773 
Jean-Pierre Wampach’s statistical analysis of agricultural labour productivity in 
the province as a whole demonstrates that the technical stagnation observed by 
Bouchard in the Saguenay was not limited to the region. Wampach’s statistics show that, 
up until the 1890s, throughout the whole province, ‘agricultural production increased 
less rapidly than the number of farms, and just as much as subsistence consumption on 
farms, so that agriculture was unable to generate an agricultural surplus nor, a fortiori, a 
provincial surplus: the degree of caloric sufficiency remained around 70%. Areas of 
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cultivation grew faster than production, while yield per hectare decreased’.774 Most of 
the nineteenth century, in other words, was characterized by the extension of traditional 
agricultural practices without a corresponding increase in productivity, ‘whether in 
labour or soil. [...] Agriculture had not fundamentally changed and it just managed to 
give rural people the nutritional balance that today we would deem of poor quality’.775 
 During the last quarter of the century, this situation, nevertheless, began to 
change. Indeed, by the 1890s, considerable technical development and an increase in 
labour-productivity had become apparent. According to Bouchard, what occurred in 
Saguenauy during this period ‘should truly be called a reform of agricultural 
technology’.776 Production shifted from wheat to the dairy industry, there was a 
diversification crops, and new technologies were introduced, such as the drill, the 
mower, and the reaper.777 With statistics for the province as a whole, Wampach 
identified a similar take-off in the late nineteenth century: ‘[a]gricultural production 
surges forward at the same time as agricultural labour forces decrease. Areas of 
cultivations shrink too. These movements express a better performance of the 
agricultural activity: both labour productivity and soil productivity increase’.778 Capital 
invested per worker and per hectare also increased: ‘[f]armers organize themselves 
differently, they change their methods, as well as their equipment. Increasingly aimed at 
commercial markets, production specializes: milk, for example, whose production 	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suddenly doubles between 1880 and 1910 farm’.779 As Régis Thibeault explains,  
 
[t]he rise of industrial milk processing occurs between 1870 and 1880. During 
this period, the number of counted factories increased from 27 to 159. This marks 
a start in the process of manufacturing butter and cheese in Quebec, which was 
hitherto based on domestic transformation processes and crafts. […] During the 
decade from 1881 to 1891, the growth in the number of factories is also 
spectacular. In 1891, Quebec has 726 factories composed of nearly 85% of 
cheese factories […]. This increase is even more pronounced from 1891 when 
the total number of butter and cheese factories increased by more than 220%. In 
Quebec during a single decade, 1,597 new factories were identified, which 
represents an average of three new factories per week for ten years.780	  
 
The birth of the dairy industry marks the switch away from extensive agriculture toward 
capital-intensive and specialized agricultural production.781 From then on, there was ‘a 
series of transformations that many contemporaries identified as a true revolution in the 
peasant economy. Very quickly farmers concentrated their efforts on livestock and diary 
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production and, soon enough, each parish had a cheese factory’.782 The dairy industry 
had a ripple effect on other crops: as an example, the demand for oats, clover, and hay, 
the basis of the feed given to dairy cows, rose sharply.783 
 In the 1860s, the American Civil War increased the demand for French Canadian 
products: not only oats and barley, but also hay, eggs, butter, poultry, and horses became 
the object of significant trade. The grain trade was short-lived, however, since the 
frontier was closed to Canadian agricultural products before the end of the War. 
Furthermore, the Reciprocity Treaty signed in 1854 expired in 1866. The closing of the 
border severely hit grain crops, but it shielded other industries from American 
competition.784 In these circumstances, it seemed to contemporary economic actors that 
milk could replace wheat for good: ‘[a]fter 1873 and the outbreak of the biggest 
financial crisis of the century, dairy products are among the few agricultural 
commodities to difficultly stay the course and be sold abroad. In Quebec parishes, butter 
factories are built and benefit from the expertise of agronomists out of new agricultural 
schools’.785	  
There was, in these years, a growing enthusiasm for the prospects of dairy 
production. While governmental publications encouraged Quebec’s farmers to make the 
transition,786 the secretary of the Montreal Board of Trade of the day observed that 
American protectionism was playing against American dairies, offering a chance for 
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cheese manufacturing to develop in Quebec.787 As another historian has insisted, there is 
‘an almost perfect coincidence between the start of trade protectionism and the creation 
of the first Quebec mills. The growing demand for cheese on the international market, 
and especially in the British market, coupled with the growth in demand for dairy 
products in local urban markets (from 1870) are also important causes of the 
development of the Quebec dairy industry’.788 
One cannot understand the development of the dairy industry in Quebec without 
examining the market conditions that encouraged its emergence. In themselves, 
however, market conditions fail to explain, in the first place, why peasants abandoned 
their subsistence agriculture to engage in market-exchanges after having resisted them 
for so long. Economic actors do not passively respond or adapt to market structures that 
are imposed from outside;789 as agents embedded in social relations and class conflict, 
they are ‘the ultimate arbiters over the form and direction of social change’.790 If French 
Canadian peasants were not willing to relinquish their traditional methods of agriculture, 
they did not, however, meekly follow the Church's exhortations to remain on the land, 
for this inevitably meant a life of impoverishment in over-crowded parishes. The 
colonization of remote areas of the province did not necessarily provide a more 
attractive option, for it meant a lifetime of hard work away from the comforts of 	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civilization, on land whose agricultural quality was often dubious: ‘[d]espite strong 
support from family networks, Catholic clergy, government, and colonization societies, 
colonists faced serious difficulties. Arable parts of the Shield and the Appalachians were 
isolated, and colonization roads proceeded only slowly, making it difficult to obtain 
supplies and to market potash, pork, and butter’.791 
With every new decade, the number of French Canadian peasants quitting the 
province for the United States reached new heights: there were 70,000 out-migrants in 
the 1850s, 100,000 in the 1860s, 120,000 in the 1870s, and 150,000 in the 1880s, when 
emigration reached its peak.792 Clearly, the Church’s efforts to keep the peasantry in the 
countryside had limited effects. Confronted with the limitations of its strategy by this 
mass migration, and threatened by the growing power of the state and capital, the 
Church for forced to adopt a new strategy of economic development had to improve 
economic development in the countryside and thereby lessen the irresistible attraction 
exerted by industrial centres. The Church sought, indeed, to adapt to changing 
conditions by embracing the idea that agricultural production could be made profitable 
without the peasantry having to renounce its Christian values.793	  
To conciliate two worlds so strongly apart, the Church had no choice but to 
innovate, eventually shaping the transformation of the peasant society by promoting a 
particular organizational model for the rural economy: the cooperative model.794 The 
cooperative model offered the promise of an economic development that would respect 	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kinship solidarity and religious customs. The Church then sought to put in place 
institutions aimed at coordinating the sale and transformation of farms’ surpluses 
through cooperative associations that it helped to diffuse in agricultural parishes,795 
offering a counterweight to the deprivation that was awaiting wage labourers in the 
urban centres of Montreal and New England. By providing organizational resources and 
forms of credit for investments, the cooperative movement came to play a role 
analogous to the one played elsewhere by the state or banks in contexts of 
backwardness.796	  
The cooperative movement thus renewed the ability of the Church to exert some 
influence on the direction taken by the economic development of Quebec’s peasant 
society as it entered the twentieth century.797 But the Church was not alone, of course, in 
seeking to shape the economic development of the province’s agriculture. The state, 
which had developed considerably in the decades following the rebellion, also 
intervened. It was influenced by ‘a more discrete and diffuse current of modernist ideas 
generated by the movement of economic transformation […]. This current was 
represented by representatives of various communities (agronomists, journalists, 
politicians, civil servants, members of the clergy involved in teaching) eager to see the 
Quebec countryside opening faster to agricultural progress’.798 State interventions 
contributed to the dissemination of knowledge and provided support for agricultural 	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exhibitions, societies, and journals. The state also undertook ‘further action with the 
adoption of laws favoring the creation of agricultural unions and cooperatives. It then 
wanted to give farmers the tools to better face the market economy’.799	  
The importance of cooperatives within Quebec’s economy long remained one of 
its most distinctive features. Of course, as a form of association and social philosophy, 
the cooperative was also an important element of European history during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, as workers and peasants tried to cope with the ‘multiple 
seizures experienced by civil society in the transition to the industrial world’.800 The 
crucial role that cooperatives played in the ‘late development’ of the province has, 
however, no parallel. In Quebec, it shaped the process by which the peasant economy 
switched from subsistence toward capital-intensive agriculture, and constituted ‘the 
foundation for a Quebec agri-food industry that still bears the imprint of its past’.801 Far 
from a ‘natural’ response to market conditions, the cooperative movement that presided 
over the emergence of the dairy industry testifies to the creative process by which 
economic agents—the peasantry, church organizations, and the state—decided to engage 
in ‘modernization’ at a time when industrial capitalism was already well-developed in 
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various regions of North America.	  	  
Conclusion 
The underdeveloped state of French Canadian agriculture in the second half of 
the nineteenth century is striking. As I have suggested in this chapter, key among the 
many constraints that impeded the long-term economic development of Quebec’s 
agriculture is the payment of annuities by ex-censitaires which put a strain on peasants’ 
agricultural capital. As late as 1930, 60,000 of them had not yet reimbursed the capital 
and were still paying the annuity. Another impediment was the specific patterns of 
inheritance and long-term demographic growth associated with the French Canadian 
peasant household’s dynamic of social reproduction. Given the limited supply of land, 
the priority given to familial reproduction by peasant households put limits on the 
consolidation of landholdings and impeded capital-intensive progress, for instance, by 
working against the ability of enterprising farmers to maintain herds of stock, vary crop-
rotation methods, or accumulate capital to provide a source of investment. 
The third reason evoked to explain the long term ‘backwardness’ of Quebec’s 
peasant economy is the structural position held by the Catholic Church. The Church 
emerged from decades of class struggle with the professional petty bourgeoisie, the 
seigneurial class, the English merchants, and the British authorities as a powerful social 
agent. Here, my emphasis was on the agrarian ideology of survival promoted by the 
clergy as a form of cultural resistance. This ideology was largely crafted as a response to 
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the transformation of the province’s urban areas into industrial centres and the attraction 
exerted by New England’s industrial capitalism over French Canadian peasants which 
threatened the Church’s traditional place within society. The strategy of survivance 
called for self-sufficiency; it demanded the practice of self-discipline and abstention 
from indulgence, and promoted the value of tradition, ultimately acting as a bulwark 
against capitalist imperatives. The peasantry, however, did not passively embrace this 
conservative ideology, but exited the province on mass or sought out new frontiers of 
colonization. The Church was soon forced to adapt to the new realities of late 
development, which it did through the promotion of the cooperative movement. Through 
this analysis, many aspects of the creative process by which social agents confronted the 
challenges that emerged from the encounter between Quebec’s pre-capitalist peasant 
economy and the developing world of industrial capitalism have been identified. 	  
 	  	  	  	   	  	  
 
	  299	  	  	  	  
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has offered a comparative account of the historical processes and 
social agents that determined the socio-economic transformations of agricultural 
production in Upper and Lower Canada in the early modern period. More generally, it 
endeavoured to reconstitute the social reproduction strategies of French Canadian 
peasants and their Upper Canadian counterparts and situate them within a constellation 
of international, intersocietal, and imperial social forces. In seeking to theorize the shift 
from extensive- to capital-intensive farming practices in these two different contexts, I 
found that, from the early nineteenth century onwards, the breakthrough to industrial 
capitalism in the northeast United States created a new international reality, irrevocably 
transforming the system-wide conditions in which subsequent agricultural evolution was 
to take place in neighbouring regions. While Upper Canadian rural households took 
advantage of these new structural opportunities by increasing the portion of their 
agriculture dedicated to the market, giving up subsistence production for the production 
of cash crops, particularly wheat, and readily adopting the new technologies made 
available to them, Lower Canadian peasants systematically avoided market imperatives 
by holding to their former subsistence farming practices, emigrating to the United States, 
or seeking out new plots of land on the frontiers of colonization. These findings point to 
the radically diverging outcomes of the resolution of the problem of late development.	  
Historians have sometimes been tempted to explain this differential resolution of 
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the problem of late development within similar structural pre-conditions by emphasizing 
differences in cultural mentalités. English Canadians are described as being particularly 
dynamic and entrepreneurial, while French Canadians are criticized for having an 
inherently conservative outlook opposed to change and progress. My thesis, however, 
has challenged these deep-rooted assumptions about cultural mentalités, as well as the 
allegedly static nature of peasant communities and their inherent inability to transform. 
It has done so through a radical historicization of social-property relations and class 
struggles premised on a comparative perspective that examined the international 
dimension of social change in Quebec and Ontario, by considering the set of pressures 
and possibilities generated by the northeastern United States, the American mid-west, 
England, and France. Crucially, this analysis has highlighted the game-changing 
importance of the development of industrial capitalism in New England on the 
conditions of social reproduction for ‘late developers’ like Upper Canada and Lower 
Canada. Efforts on the part of the social classes and political actors of these two 
provinces to adapt to the new international reality gave rise to creative processes of 
resistance and innovation, with different outcomes in each province.	  
The first settlements of British Loyalists in Upper Canada were a direct offspring 
of the American Revolution. From the time of its formation, the province’s destiny was 
intimately linked with that of its southern neighbour, who provided it not only with 
settlers, but eventually—following the development of industrial capitalism in the 
northeastern United State—with manufactured goods and farm implements. Upper 
Canada was also closely connected to the economic evolution of its eastern neighbour, 
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Lower Canada, where an agricultural crisis struck the countryside as the poor methods 
of cultivation associated with extensive types of farming had, by the early nineteenth 
century, exhausted the soil. The misfortune of Lower Canada contributed to the 
prosperity of Upper Canada, as rural household producers in the latter province were 
quick to seize upon market opportunities and dedicate ever larger areas of their farms to 
the commercial production of wheat destined for export to Lower Canada. 	  
This was made possible by the ‘independent’ character of these household-
producers in the absence of formal state obligations and political subordination. Since 
their production was not customary or communally regulated, they could readily adopt 
new technologies when they were presented with the opportunity to do so. As such, no 
strict limits imposed by social-property relations on long-term patterns of economic 
development prevented them from jumping on the capitalist bandwagon when a new 
material culture and productive possibilities were spawned by the development of 
industrial capitalism in the northeastern United States. In this sense, Upper Canadian 
independent household-producers benefited from the ‘advantage of backwardness’, that 
is, the possibility for late developers to skip developmental ‘stages’ and achieve 
sustained capitalist growth without having to go through the same processes as early 
developers.802 For Upper Canadian household-producers to become petty-commodity 
producers dependent on the law of value for their reproduction, the threat of 
dispossession from the means of subsistence through extra-economic processes had not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 For discussions of this issue, see, inter alias, Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective; Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky; Justin Rosenberg, “Isaac 
Deutscher and the Lost History of International Relations,” New Left Review, 1996, 3–15; Selwyn, 
“Trotsky, Gerschenkron and the Political Economy of Late Capitalist Development.” 
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been necessary; the attractions of material culture and the improved quality of living it 
promised were enough. 
In Upper Canada, like in the northeastern United States, essentially capitalist 
farming developed prior to the advent of industrial capitalism in urban areas. Upper 
Canadian households switched away from an extensive form of agriculture, exclusively 
premised on the geographical expansion of cleared land, to a hybrid agriculture 
combining both the extensive dimension of the former and the capital-intensive 
dimension of capitalist agriculture. At that time, extensive capital-intensive types of 
agriculture were unique to the North American context, where the almost unlimited land 
supply provided by westward colonization made it possible. This type of agriculture was 
‘capitalist’ in the sense that is was subordinated to the law of value, but in a 
contradictory manner: farm producers owned the ‘means of production’, but they 
depended on family labour and machinery to increase labour-productivity, instead of on 
the control and exploitation of wage workers, as would be the case with more directly 
capitalist types of production. In this sense, they were ‘petty-commodity producers’ 
rather than capitalists of the agrarian sector. They were, in other words, market-
dependent as producers, but not market-dependent with respect to their access to the 
means of production. 
 Lower Canada offered quite a contrast to Upper Canada. While industrial 
capitalism began to develop earlier in Montreal than in the urban centres of Upper 
Canada, ‘capitalist’ agriculture—read petty-commodity agriculture—developed much 
later in Lower Canada. These developmental differences are best accounted for by 
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examining the distinctive social-property relations and class struggles that characterized 
both provinces. In Upper Canada, the merchant class joined colonial administrators and 
military officers within the land/office state to preside over the distribution of land 
among the members of the ruling class. The timing of colonization was a decisive factor 
in enabling this specific strategy of accumulation and territorialisation: ruling over a 
pioneer frontier in a state of absolute backwardness at the time of Upper Canada’s 
formation, merchants and officers fell back upon speculative practices rather than the 
productive use of the land as their main way to reproduce and enrich themselves, not 
least of all because the absence of a large pool of wage labourers precluded the 
development of exploitative capital/labour relationships. 
 Because the colonization of Lower Canada dated back to the bygone era of New 
France, the province was already well-populated at the time when Upper Canada was 
only beginning to be settled. Its soil was already exhausted. No land/office state 
developed there, but a set of colonial institutions that shared some, though not all, of the 
properties of the French absolutist state. As a result of the conquest of these institutions 
by the British Empire in 1763, the French Canadian ruling class was expulsed from 
lucrative commercial connections and from positions of influence within the colony. The 
seigneurial class that had presided over the settlement of the colony since its origins was 
then left with little other choice than to rely upon their landed estates to ensure their 
reproduction by ‘squeezing’ more surpluses from the peasantry. The doors of the state 
were similarly closed to the French Canadian professional petty-bourgeoisie of notaries, 
advocates, doctors, innkeepers, and small merchants who had aspirations of social 
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mobility for themselves and their people.803 Excluded from economic networks, they 
nevertheless participated actively in the affairs of the state through the elected Assembly 
that was granted to the colony by the British authorities in 1791. 
 The impact of the introduction of the new legislature on the political 
development of the province can hardly be exaggerated. By this action, a first step 
toward the formation of what Robbie Shilliam calls the ‘impersonalized individual’ 
political subject of capitalism was realized,804 laying the groundwork for the gradual 
development of a capitalist state which, under the auspices of the British authorities, and 
in accordance with the desire of the English merchant class to see private property rights 
consolidated, pursued the reform of the provincial dual system of tenure that had been 
created with the Act of 1791. Meanwhile, the peasantry gave full support to the electoral 
struggle of the French Canadian professional petty bourgeoisie, who secured the control 
of the Assembly during the fifteen years preceding 1837. When it became clear, in 1837, 
that no further political progress could be made through electoral means, peasants and 
professionals joined together in an armed rebellion that was military crushed by British 
troops and Loyalist militias. 
 The aftermath of the Rebellion was a time of considerable transformation for the 
colonial state, which saw all branches of its power grow in size and scope. The Catholic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 That said, French Canadians were not, of course, totally excluded from the ruling apparatus of the 
province, as the criminal justice system and local state agencies did offer them some opportunities of 
(limited) social advancement. Fyson, “The Conquered and the Conqueror: The Mutual Adaptation of the 
Canadiens and the British in Quebec, 1759-1775”; Donald Fyson, “Between the Ancien Régime and 
Liberal Modernity: Law, Justice and State Formation in Colonial Quebec, 1760–1867,” History Compass 
12, no. 5 (2014): 412–32. 804	  According	  to	  which	  ‘the	  right	  to	  own	  and	  dispose	  of	  private	  property’	  was	  ‘unencumbered	  with	  wider	  social	  duties’,	  by	  opposition	  to	  ‘personalized,	  directly	  communal	  rights	  and	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  over	  property’.Shilliam,	  German	  Thought	  and	  International	  Relations,	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Church too was able to re-organize its institutions and expand its activities considerably. 
To do so, it benefited from the weakening of its rivalries, which had occurred through 
the abolition of the seigneurial regime and the military defeat of the forces of 
republicanism that left their leaders imprisoned or in exile. Rewarded for the loyalty that 
it had shown to the British Empire since the Conquest, the Church was in a perfect 
position to fill the social power vacuum. Meanwhile, peasants and professionals found 
something to fight for in the cultural realm, where the Church exerted considerable 
intellectual and moral leadership in promoting the agrarian vocation of the French 
nation. 
 At that time, the face of town and country had changed considerably since the 
beginning of the century. Rural seigneuries were beginning to feel cramped as the 
peasant population had grown at a rapid pace. The land supply, however, was limited by 
the political decision of the British authorities to circumscribe the extent of the 
seigneurial territory to the area already under that mode of tenure in 1791. New 
concessions were made under the free and common socage tenure in townships, where 
land had to be bought from monopolistic land companies and was often sold at 
expensive prices. Too expensive, in any case, for peasants who were used to living from 
subsistence agriculture with only limited participation in markets. Where neoclassical 
economists would expect individual peasants to adopt a ‘rational’ behavior of utility and 
profit maximization by embracing market-exchanges in order to acquire the means to 
purchase land for themselves and their children, the peasantry, on the contrary, resisted 
market imperatives through a three-pronged strategy of territorialization (out-migration 
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to the United States, to the province’s urban centres, and to pioneer frontiers). 
The peasantry’s refusal to subordinate itself to capitalist discipline despite the 
severe crisis of its traditional dynamic of social reproduction fits with one of the 
observations drawn by Robert Brenner from his study of European social history: once 
established, ‘class structures tend to be highly resilient in relation to the impact of 
economic forces; as a rule, they are not shaped by, or alterable in terms of, changes in 
demographic or commercial trends’.805 In another form of resistance, part of the 
peasantry embraced the conservative agrarian ideology of the survivance proposed by 
the Catholic Church. Not all peasants, however, accepted the frugal and ascetic destiny 
awaiting them if they were to follow the Church’s exhortation to till ever smaller plots of 
land in their over-crowded parishes, or to leave for marginal land with little potential for 
agriculture in remote areas recently opened to colonization.806  
The sources of clerical organizations’ social power in those days rested on the 
numerical superiority of the French Canadian rural population, who provided the Church 
with its wealth (tithes and voluntary labour), its influence with political parties and the 
government, and an army of loyal supporters. The Church thus had a strong interest in 
keeping the peasantry on the land. However, the industrialization of the province’s urban 
areas, especially Montreal, together with the industrialization of New England, provided 
peasants with opportunities to escape rural poverty. It is not clear, however, whether the 
life that was awaiting landless peasants-cum-wage workers in the towns was a great deal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805 Brenner, “The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,” 31. 
806 The Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, a fertile enclave bordered by forests and mountainous massifs in the 
Canadian Shield north of the St. Lawrence River, was the exception. The region was, however, quite far 
from any other settlement, and cut off from civilization. 
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better than that in the countryside, but it was, in any case, the option chosen by many: 
440,000 inhabitants left the province between 1850 and 1880.807 Clearly, the forces of 
attraction of industrial capitalism were winning over the Church’s efforts at retaining the 
peasantry on the land. For clerical organizations, there was, therefore, no ‘advantage of 
backwardness’ of which they could avail themselves, but only the disadvantage of facing 
a specific system of power relations—capitalism—constitutive of a distinctive social 
process that melted ‘all that is solid into air’.  
Nor did ‘advantages of backwardness’ await the peasantry. The position of 
political and economic inferiority in which peasants had been confined since the 
Conquest—formally subordinated, as a class, to seigneurs appropriating their surpluses 
and, as a ‘nation’, to the British authorities—imposed strict limits on the likelihood that 
they could share in the fruits of capitalism on an equal footing. It has been wrongly 
assumed by some historians that the conservative mentalité of the French Canadian 
peasantry was what maintained them in a state of backwardness. The inverse is, in fact, 
true, for it was the state of backwardness in which they were confined by their political 
and economic subordination that led them to grasp onto conservative forms of cultural 
resistance. Only by taking into account the specific social conditions under which 
peasants participated in class struggle can the attraction exerted by the Church’s 
ideological offensive be explained adequately. 
The Church itself had designed its program (family, religion, land, and labour) as 
a response to the development of industrial capitalism that threatened to dislocate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 Lavoie, L’émigration des Québécois aux États-Unis de 1840 à 1930, 53. 
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traditions and dissolve the social fabric. In these times of hardship, the anti-capitalism of 
la survivance met with the peasantry’s agreement. The logic of familial reproduction 
among the peasantry had prevented the consolidation of large holdings and the 
accumulation of capital, leaving peasants at a great disadvantage if they were to abandon 
their subsistence agriculture to enter commercial farming. But harsh exploitation was 
also awaiting them in industrial centres, where those who emigrated ended up filling the 
ranks of a burgeoning proletariat. In agriculture, as in commerce, industry, or finance, 
even if the most ambitious members of the peasantry had wanted to start-up capitalist 
ventures, they would not have been able to compete with English and American capital. 
The geopolitically uneven and socially combined development of various 
regional realities—the French Canadian peasant society, urban centres such as Montreal, 
industrial capitalist New England, and pioneer Upper Canada—gave rise in Lower 
Canada to a complex set of social relations in which the Church emerged as a leading 
agent in shaping long-term patterns of economic evolution. Repelled by the deleterious 
effects of capitalism, the Church and the peasantry coalesced into a social force 
dedicated to defending traditions and old ways of living. Emigration and survivance, as 
strategies of reproduction and spatial occupation, were substituted for the modernizing 
drive found within the industrial centres of North America. The peasantry and the 
Church could, alas, hold onto these strategies only for a while, however, as they failed to 
provide a sustainable alternative to capitalist development under conditions of limited 
land supply and strong demographic growth. 	  
As the pre-capitalist long-term pattern of economic development of French 
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Canadian agriculture was reaching its limits, clerical organizations opened up to the idea 
that changes in production were necessary. A compromise was found between the 
preservation of Christian values and the need for more ‘efficient’ production: the 
cooperative model. When put into practice, this model distinguished itself from capitalist 
farms in that it fostered links of solidarity among direct producers and enabled the 
creation of collective pools of resources—in terms of finance, technologies, labour, and 
knowledge—supported by external agencies (the Church and the state). The social 
welfare of the rural population could subsequently be served by more capital-intensive 
types of production (especially the dairy industry, which, still today constitutes the 
backbone of agriculture in Quebec) that did not threaten, in the short term, the social 
fabric of the French Canadian peasant economy, nor the traditional foundation of the 
Church’s power. 
By looking at how Quebec’s peasants and Ontario’s farmers turned toward 
capital-intensive agriculture at different moments in the nineteenth century, I have 
sought to re-ascribe to economic actors their agency as they creatively put forward 
diverse strategies of social reproduction to cope with a variety of economic, political, 
cultural, and demographic challenges that are not reducible to the automatic operation of 
market forces, to fixed cultural mentalités, or to ‘natural’ movements of population. In 
speaking of the development of capital-intensive agriculture in the two provinces, I 
emphasized the unevenness of the timing, not least because settler-colonization in 
various parts of central Canada occurred at different moments, with different paces, and 
with different people. These people also brought with them distinctive cultural and 
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institutional baggage, among which were divergent conceptions about tenurial 
arrangements that contributed to shaping different agrarian property settlements in 
Ontario and Quebec. But these peoples did not act within the boundaries of clearly 
delimitated states impervious to what was occurring elsewhere in the world. As such, the 
interplay of class conflicts within each society could only be understood within the 
broader geo-territorial configuration that constituted an inescapable dimension of social 
change in both provinces: it has been one of the main contentions of this dissertation that 
once capitalism had set off in Britain, the conditions of its development elsewhere in the 
world changed radically; the development of industrial capitalism in the north-eastern 
United States had no less epoch-making implications for the long-term economic 
evolution of various regions of North America and beyond.	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